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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the cognitive processes of intertemporal choice. Chapter 
1 is an introductory chapter, laying out the economics standard of intertemporal 
choice, the environmental complications and cognitive factors that drive the 
departures from rational intertemporal choice and finally the approach taken in the 
thesis.  
Chapters 2-4 are three empirical studies. Chapter 2 focuses on the evaluation 
rule of intertemporal choice. Three different evaluation rules have been proposed: 
alternative-based, attribute-based and hybrid rules. We contrast different evaluation 
rules by running a comprehensive model comparison in intertemporal choice by 
involving fifteen candidate models (eight alternative-based, one hybrid and six 
attribute-based), three stochastic specifications, and 225 data sets taken from the 
existing literature. Results lend strong support to the class of attribute-based models, 
especially the family of the tradeoff model, for intertemporal choice. 
Chapter 3 studies the attention effects on intertemporal choice. Behavioural 
theories and experimental studies usually assume an option-wise attention effect on 
value-based decision making: When an option is focused attention on, the option is 
given additional weight in the making of decision. Beyond the option-wise attention 
effect, the study in Chapter 3 reveals a component-wise attentional effect: When each 
component (or the single value of an attribute in an option) receives attention, it is 
given additional weight independently. Further comparisons between experiments 
suggest a probable co-existence of the component-wise and the attribute-wise 
attention effects, the latter of which is that the comparison along an attribute receives 
additional weight when focused attention on, on intertemporal choice. The study also 
demonstrates robust background contrast effects on intertemporal choice. 
Chapter 4 focuses on a controversial topic: the pattern of impatience 
concerning the near vs. the far future (i.e., decreasing impatience, increasing 
impatience and constant impatience). The study tests two ways to look through the 
conflicting results in the literature. The first is a design bias when pairs of 
intertemporal choice items are used to detect the aggregate pattern of impatience. This 
method makes an implicit assumption that the undetected patterns are homogeneous 
to the detected and thus generalises the detected patterns to the undetected ones. The 
present study is the first to test the homogeneity assumption and the results suggest a 
design bias. The second is an order effect on the detected pattern of impatience, 
relating to the background contrast effect. Taken together, the two findings could 
reconcile much variation in the detected pattern of impatience in the literature. 
Chapter 5 is a general discussion. I discuss the results from the preceding 
chapters and implications on theory development. Further discussion on extensions to 
other domains of intertemporal choice concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Many of our choices have consequences for the future. For example, we choose 
to enter a university for a prosperous career in the future. We save now to buy a house 
(or anything else) in the future. We buy a car now with a monthly instalment in the 
future. We exercise for future health, etc. For a society, decision making often has 
more temporally distant consequences for future generations, such as the Paris 
Agreement on climate change 2015. In such cases, a crucial point is how future 
benefits are evaluated in relation to immediate costs and how people make tradeoff 
between consequences in the near future and consequences in the far future. 
When a decision involves such an intertemporal tradeoff, it is called an 
intertemporal choice. For decades, intertemporal choice has been intensively 
investigated in psychology, economics and management science (for a historical 
overview, see Loewenstein, 1992). In the abundant literature, there are several 
different lines of research in this filed. For example, some studies investigated how 
the degree of impatience in intertemporal choice is related to individual differences in 
cognitive and personality traits (e.g., Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010; Enzler, 
Diekmann, & Meyer, 2014; Reimers, Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009; Shamosh et 
al., 2008). 1  Some compared the degree of impatience in intertemporal choice of 
different goods, such as money, health, food, drinks and working/leisure hours (e.g., 
Augenblick, Niederle, & Sprenger, 2012; Chapman, 1996a; 1996b; Ebert, 2010; Estle, 
Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007). Some attempted to develop better ways to elicit 
intertemporal preference (e.g., Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2008; Attema, 
Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker, 2010; Coller & Williams, 1999; Toubia, Johnson, 
Evgeniou, & Delquié, 2012). Some others attempted to find out the models that offer 
better descriptive accuracy to intertemporal choice (e.g., Cavagnaro, Aranovich, 
McClure, Pitt, & Myung, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Scholten & Read 2006; 2010; 
Scholten, Read, & Sanborn, 2014; 2016). Some studies suggested that intertemporal 
choice, as well as many other types of judgment and decision making, is malleable to 
a variety of normatively irrelative factors (e.g., Magen, Dweck, & Gross, 2008; Lerner, 
                                                 
1 Following Fisher (1930), I regard “impatience” as a synonym of time preference, which can be either 
rational or irrational although in the psychology literature, impatience is always used as an indicator of 
irrational reluctance to wait for a larger but later reward. 
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Li, & Weber, 2013; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Read, Airoldi, & Loewe, 2005; Read, 
Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005; Read, Olivola, & Hardisty, 2016; Scholten & Read, 
2013; Wu & He, 2012). 
Despite the increasing popularity, there is a lack of an agreed normative basis 
for the empirical analysis of intertemporal choice (see Coller & Williams, 1999). 
Particularly, several key claims are unclear. First, Samuelson’s (1937) discounted 
utility (DU) model has been repeatedly mentioned as the normative model for 
intertemporal choice while Samuelson himself explicitly stated that his model was not 
considered as the normative model and did not provide any axiomatic analysis. Second, 
when comparing the discount rates (or, more generally, the degree of impatience) for 
different commodities (usually between money and non-monetary outcomes), many 
researchers hold the null hypothesis that there should be a single discount rate that 
governs all commodities per the DU model (e.g., Chapman, 1996b), while the DU 
model itself does not make such an assumption. Third, many researchers claimed that 
participants in their experiments exhibited excessive discounting in the intertemporal 
choice of monetary outcomes, compared with the interest rate available in the market 
(see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), while the normative rationale for 
an association between people’s intertemporal preference of consumption and the rate 
of interest available in the market is rarely established. 
To make sense of these conceptual claims, this introductory chapter firstly 
draws attention to the forgotten economic basis for rational intertemporal choice by 
laying out the normative accounts for intertemporal preference for two different 
circumstances: (a) optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption and (b) optimal 
intertemporal choice. Intertemporal allocation of consumption is concerned with how 
people allocate a fixed bundle of resources to different time periods for consumption 
so as to maximise their overall utility. By contrast, intertemporal choice is concerned 
with choices between two or more options (such as investment opportunities), which 
produce different bundles of resources (such as streams of incomes). 2  With the 
normative accounts, I shall revisit the main findings from intertemporal choice 
research and discuss a list of environmental factors and cognitive factors that could 
                                                 
2 Note that this intertemporal choice allows individuals to borrow from and save in a market. The 
borrowing and saving opportunities are sometimes called intertemporal arbitrage in the literature, 
which is regarded as confound of the time preference for consumption (see Coller & Williams, 1999; 
Frederick et al., 2002). However, they are the key concepts in Fisher’s (1930) normative framework.  
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
3 
lead to empirical departures to the normative predictions. At the end of this chapter, I 
also briefly explain the approach taken in the thesis. 
1.1 Normative Models 
The formal analysis of intertemporal choice dates to Irving Fisher (1910; 1930). 
With the insights from his precedents, Fisher identified six personal characteristics 
that could shape one’s degree of impatience in intertemporal choice (or equivalently 
intertemporal preference). They are (1) foresight, (2) self-control, (3) habit, (4) 
expectation of life, (5) concern for the lives of other persons, and (6) fashion. These 
factors are still among the core interests in the study of intertemporal choice from both 
economic and psychological perspectives (Frederick et al. 2002; Read, 2004; Read, 
McDonald, & He, 2016). 
Fisher’s analysis went far beyond a mere list of these characteristics. Crucially, 
he assumed that preference of the intertemporal allocation of resources should be 
influenced by the individual’s current consumption circumstance and their expectation 
of future consumption circumstances. For example, a university student often does not 
have stable income at present but expects to be better off in the future. She will 
probably give more weight to the present consumption than future consumption. Thus, 
the student will show a high degree of impatience. When the same person is well-off 
with a decent salary at present but expects to get retired in the future without stable 
income, she will probably give more weight to her future consumption, showing a low 
degree of impatience. More starkly, the decision maker may even weigh future 
consumptions more than the present consumption if she is very well-off by now but 
expect bad financial circumstances in the future.  
Based on the crucial assumption on the dependence of actual time preference 
on background consumption, Fisher (1930) offered a formal framework to analyse 
rational behaviour in such intertemporal situations where people can reallocate their 
consumption by borrowing and lending in a market without transaction costs, which 
gives rise to the net present value (NPV) model as the normative model for 
intertemporal choice (between tradable goods, especially money).  
1.1.1 Converging interest rates 
Fisher’s (1930) analysis started with how interest rates in a capital market 
converged. I present a brief illustration of his formal analysis of the converging interest 
rates with the simplest setup here. Suppose there are only two players, A and B, and 
that the income streams and consumption streams only last for two periods, t0 and t1. 
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Each of the players is endowed with fixed incomes at the two periods: Player A is 
endowed with x0 at period t0 and x1 at period t1. Player B is endowed with y0 at period 
t0 and y1 at period t1. Suppose that the incomes are perishable and must be consumed 
at the same time as they are earned.3 If lending and borrowing are not possible, their 
consumption streams, denoted by {CA0, CA1} for A and {CB0, CB1} for B respectively, 
should be identical to their income streams (i.e., CA0 = x0, CA1 = x1, CB0 = y0, CB1 = 
y1).  
If the two players can borrow from or lend to each other without transaction 
costs, do they want to reschedule their consumption by borrowing or lending? To 
answer this question, a key concept is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution 
(Frank, 2008, pp.158). The marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (MRIS) is the 
number of units of consumption in the future (e.g., t1) one would be just willing to 
exchange for 1 unit of consumption at present (i.e., t0). Mathematically, it is the 
absolute value of the slope of the intertemporal indifference curve at a given point. As 
shown in Figure 1.1, at the endowment, player A’s MRIS is RA, which means that 
player A is willing to borrow 1 unit for consumption at t0, at the cost of R units of 
consumption at t1 as long as R < RA. Similarly, player B’s MRIS at the initial 
endowment is RB, which means that B is willing to lend 1 unit at t0 as long as she can 
get a return of R units at t1 if R > RB. Without the loss of generality, suppose RA > RB. 
Then player A and player B can reach an agreement on the borrowing-lending scheme 
with the intertemporal substitution rate R, as long as R satisfies RB < R < RA. That is, 
player A borrows 1 unit from player B at t0 and pay back R units at t1. After this 
lending-borrowing scheme is arranged to be implemented, player A’s expected 
consumption at t0 increases to (x0 + 1) and his expected consumption at t1 decreases to 
(x1 – R). By contrast, player B’s expected consumption at t0 decreases to (y0 – 1) and 
her expected consumption at t1 increases to (y1 + R).  
 
                                                 
3 Note that the incomes in Fisher’s (1930) terminology is not necessarily monetary outcomes. They are 
usually directly consumable goods. 
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Figure 1.1. Indifference curves and marginal rates of intertemporal substitution (RA 
and RB) of the two players at their initial endowments. Both players are willing to 
trade with each other at certain rate (to reach a better indifference curve) until their 
marginal rates of intertemporal substitution converge. 
 
The changes to their expected streams of consumption should influence their 
MRIS. Specifically, player A’s MRIS will decrease and player B’s MRIS will increase. 
Thus, the difference between the two players’ MRIS becomes smaller. This lending-
borrowing scheme will iteratively continue, as long as player A’s MRIS is still larger 
than player B’s, until their marginal rates of intertemporal substitution converge (RA* 
= RB*), reaching a stable market equilibrium. The converging MRIS becomes the 
intertemporal substitution rate, R*, in the market equilibrium ( *
10o
R  = RA* = RB*). In 
other words, the resulting interest rate in the market is indeed jointly determined by 
the time preferences of the players in the market. 
The illustration above can be generalised to situations where there are any 
number of players in the market (Fisher, 1930). Importantly, when the number of 
players is large enough, each player becomes negligible in the market, which means 
that an individual player's time preference of consumption will have a negligible effect 
on the interest rate at the market equilibrium. This lays the basis for the analysis of 
individuals’ optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption and rational 
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B(y0, y1)
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intertemporal choice between different bundles of resources, which are the focus of 
Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 respectively. 
1.1.2 Intertemporal allocation of consumption 
In a market where there are a very large number of players, each player will 
have access to a stable per-period interest rate of 
10or  (where 10or  = 
*
10o
R -1) between 
periods t0 and t1, where *
10o
R  is the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (MRIS) 
between t0 and t1 in the market equilibrium. Thus, with a bundle of resources, one 
could allocate any amount to each point of time along the dashed-straight budget line 
as shown in Figure 1.2. Intuitively, individuals’ allocation depends on how differently 
they value the consumptions at the two periods. Suppose someone only care about her 
consumption at t0. She will allocate all the resources (i.e., X) to consumption at t0. By 
contrast, if someone only care about the consumption at t1, she will allocate all the 
resources (i.e., X(1+ 10or ) or X 
*
10o
R ) to consumption at t1. However, most people are 
not so extreme and usually prefer to spread their consumption over time, which is also 
the crucial assumption in Fisher’s (1930) framework. 4  In other words, when the 
consumption concentrates on only one period, they are willing to sacrifice a large sum 
of consumption from that period for a small sum of consumption at the other period. 
Thus, their indifference curve will be convex as shown in Figure 1.2. Correspondingly, 
the best indifference curve that they can attain (representing the maximum utility from 
consumption) is the one that the budget constraint line is tangent to. In other words, 
people should make their allocation decisions according to the only point of contact 
(POC) between the curve and the budget constraint line. Any indifference curve that 
is above (or better than) this indifference curve is unattainable with this budget 
constraint line. 
 
                                                 
4 Obviously, this is also rational in terms of the fitness for survival. 
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Figure 1.2. The optimal allocation of consumption to the two periods. 
 
Because of the convexity of the indifference curve, the marginal rate of 
intertemporal substitution (MRIS) between the two periods depends on the allocation 
of consumptions of the resources to the two periods. Accordingly, the actual observed 
intertemporal preference or MRIS is variable, contingent on the pattern of background 
consumptions the individual is endowed with. For example, if someone has a large 
sum of consumption at t0, but a small one at t1, she is probably willing to sacrifice a 
large sum at t0 in exchange for a much smaller sum at t1. Fisher (1930) regarded pure 
time preference as the MRIS of the indifference curve when the allocations to the two 
periods are equal. Defined in this way, Fisher’s (1930) pure time preference for 
consumption is often not observable and is different from the observed time preference 
researchers’ observation in the field or experiments. 
1.1.3 Intertemporal choice 
Researchers are particularly interested in intertemporal choice when two or 
more options are offered. According to Fisher (1930), in a perfectly competitive 
capital market, options can be evaluated and compared according to the net present 
value (NPV). In the NPV model, a stream of incomes can be evaluated by being 
translated into an equivalent value at present.5 For example, the NPV of the stream of 
                                                 
5 Although the present time point is routinely used as the reference point, it does not matter if a future 
time point is used to calculate the equivalent value. 
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x0 at t0 (the present) and x1 at t1 (a future point) can be represented by 
10
1
0 1 o
 
r
xxNPV , where 10or  is the per-period interest rate between t0 and t1. 
It is not difficult to derive that people should choose the option that maximise 
the net present value in a market with costless, stable and accessible borrowing and 
lending opportunities, regardless of individuals’ time preference for consumption, 
because the option with the highest net present value offer a dominant budget 
constraint line. Take the choice between option X and Y in Figure 1.3 for example. 
Although Option X is preferred to Option Y at their initial endowments (according to 
the orange indifference curve), the budget constraint offered by Option X is dominated 
by that offered by Option Y (according to the dashed budget constraint lines). So, with 
the given interest rate in the market, decision makers should choose Y instead of X, 
because Y offers a better net present value or budget constraint than A does and thus 
attains better indifference curves (see the blue indifference curve). 
 
Figure 1.3. The budget constraint lines of two options with different net present 
values. Option X is preferred to Option Y at their initial endowments, but the budget 
constraint line from Option Y (blue dashed) dominates the counterpart from Option 
X (orange dashed) according to the interest rate in the market. 
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The NPV model can generalise to multiple periods with the inter-period 
intervals of the same length. Individuals’ optimal choice is the option that maximise 
the NPV according to the interest rates available in the market: 
¦ ¦
  o 
o ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
  
T
t
t
t
T
t
tt r
xxtdxxNPV
1 1 1
0
1
00 1
1)(
W WW
, 
where tx  is the amount of resources (often money) available at time t, )(0 otd  is the 
discount function for the interval between the present (i.e., a delay of 0) and time t, 
WW o1r  (τ ≥1) is the per-period interest rate over the interval between two consecutive 
periods τ-1 and τ. Note this analysis uses discrete time rather than continuous time. 
 
1.1.4 Forms of discount functions 
In this section, I discuss the forms of discount functions in both the NPV model 
and the DU model over multiple periods. 
The net present value (NPV) model. Fisher (1930) did not provide a general 
form of the discount function. However, research and practice in economics and 
finance often assumes constant interest rate over time, i.e., WW o1r  = r for all τ ≥1 (e.g., 
Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2012; Frank, 2008, p.156; Hey, 2003), although constant 
interest rate does not have a strict normative basis (Fisher, 1930). Thus, the net present 
value (NPV) model becomes, 
¦
 
¸
¹
·¨
©
§
 
T
t
t
t r
xNPV
0 1
1 , 
where r is the constant per-period interest rate available in the market. The 
corresponding per-period discount factor is 
r 1
1G  and the per-period discount rate 
is 1 - δ.6  
The discounted utility (DU) model. In terms of the intertemporal allocation 
of consumption, Paul Samuelson’s (1937) discounted utility (DU) model has been 
long regarded as the normative model: 
                                                 
6  Keynes (1936) discussed commodity-specific interest rates when the exchange rate between 
commodities changes over time. However, this is out of the scope of the normative account. In the 
normative account, a strong assumption that the exchange between commodities keeps constant over 
time is made. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
10 
¦
 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
 
T
t
t
c
t r
cuU
0 1
1)( , 
where cr  is the constant per-period personal interest rate for consumption. The 
corresponding per-period discount factor is 
c
c r 1
1G  and per-period discount rate is 
1 - δc.  
Strotz (1955) shows that a constant interest rate for consumption in the DU 
model is necessary to achieve time-consistent allocation of consumption over time.7 
Otherwise, people would keep changing the allocation of consumption over the 
passage of time. For example, as shown in Figure 1.4, a decreasingly impatient person 
gives special weights to temporally proximal selves and over-consume the resources 
and thus leave less for future selves. When future selves come closer in time, one of 
the “future” selves become the “present” one, she is going to re-evaluate and again 
give special weights to the present and temporally close selves and over-consume. 
When this iterative process happens for multiple selves, the far-future selves will get 
almost nothing. Koopmans (1960) provides a formal axiomatization for the constant 
interest rate in the discounted utility model. 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Time-inconsistent allocations of consumption over time (Strotz, 1955).  
                                                 
7 Note that this is not incongruent with Fisher’s (1930) argument that the degree of impatience should 
be influenced by background consumption, because Fisher’s (1930) observed time preference is defined 
on the objective amounts of consumption but the time preference (or discount rate) in Samuelson’s 
(1937) DU model is defined on the subjective utility from consumption. 
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In terms of the interest rate for different goods, Samuelson (1937) does not 
discuss whether there is a single interest rate cr  governing all different types of goods 
or there are good-specific interest rates. However, I argue that a unity of the interest 
rate for the consumption of different goods should hold as a postulate for the DU 
model. Otherwise, a cross-modal intertemporal choice could result in dynamic 
inconsistency in intertemporal choice (see Read & van Leeuwen, 1998; Read, 
Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999).8 For example, suppose an apple is worth 10 
utils, a chocolate is worth 15 utils and the discount rate for the utility of consuming a 
chocolate is larger than the discount rate for the utility from consuming an apple. 
Considering a choice of a chocolate and an apple available at the time point T20 (see 
Figure 1.5). At T0, the apple is preferred to the chocolate but, the preference is 
reversed when the time of decision comes closer to the time of consumption. For 
example, at T15, the chocolate is preferred to the apple. 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Time-inconsistent choice between different goods when discount rates 
differ across goods. 
 
                                                 
8 Another way of interpreting the time-inconsistent preference of the apple and the chocolate is that the 
consumption of the chocolate is for immediate enjoyment but the consumption of the apple is for future 
health. However, this alternative explanation does defect the illustrative power of different discount 
rates for the consumption of different goods. 
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Differences between the NPV and the DU models. There are two salient 
distinctions between the NPV model and the DU model. First, The NPV model 
involves the discount of the market value of bundles of resources, as long as they can 
be traded in the market, but the DU model involves the discount of the utility from 
consumption of resources. Second, the interest rate in the NPV model is the rate 
available in the market, while the interest rate in the DU model is a personal interest 
rate of utility from consumption and is unrelated to the interest rate in the market. Put 
in another way, the interest rate in the NPV model is universal to all participants in the 
same market but the interest rate in the DU model could be person-specific. However, 
many studies on intertemporal choice failed to make a distinction between them and 
thus making mistaken claims. 
The use of the NPV or DU model as the normative model depends on the 
objective of a study. If a study is to investigate whether people are excessive 
discounters compared with the interest rate available in the market, the NPV model 
should be used as the normative standard. However, it is important to note that when 
using NPV, we assume that the incomes or goods are tradable in a market (e.g., money, 
food). If a study focuses on the consumption of incomes and goods, which is always 
the case in the literature, DU should be used as the normative standard. Researchers 
could compare people’s discount rates from the DU model. However, we should be 
cautious about the assumptions we make for the utility function. For convenience and 
simplicity, the utility of consumption is always deemed equivalent to the raw amount 
of consumption (e.g., Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle et al., 2007; Odum, Baumann, 
& Rimington, 2006; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010; Ubfal, 
2016). This is problematic for many cases due to reasons such as satiation, which will 
be discussed later. 
1.1.5 Optimal choice when borrowing and lending rates differ 
Fisher’s (1930) framework assumes that the borrowing and lending interest 
rates in the markets are identical in a perfectly competitive capital market. However, 
this is unrealistic under most of the circumstances. According to the website of the 
Bank of England (2016), the saving interest rates are approximately between 0.5% and 
1% per annum while the borrowing interest rates from credit cards are approximately 
between 15% and 25% per annum. Apparently, there is a wide gap between the 
borrowing rate and the lending rate available in the market. 
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Cubitt and Read (2007) analysed the situation where the borrowing and the 
saving interest rates were different (see also Coller & Williams, 1999). Suppose the 
borrowing rate is 20% per annum and the saving rate is 1% per annum. Intuitively, 
there would be two different interest rates to calculate the net present value when 
choosing between two or more options. If the calculation of net present values 
according to both rates favour the same option, then people should choose the option 
with the highest net present value. However, if the net present value according to the 
two interest rates favour different options, then decision makers’ optimal choice 
depends on the financial circumstances they are facing. If decision makers are saving 
at the rate of 1% per annum, they should choose the option that is favoured by the net 
present values according the annual rate of 1%. By contrast, if they are borrowing at 
the rate of 20%, she should choose the option that is favoured by the net present values 
according to the annual rate of 20%.  
  
 
Figure 1.6. Optimal choice when borrowing and lending rates differ. The orange 
dashed line is the budget constraint from receiving $1000 today (SS), with the saving 
interest rate of 1% per annum. The blue dashed line is the budget constraint from 
receiving $1100, with the borrowing interest rate of 20% per annum (LL). 
 
If the net present value according to the two interest rates favour different 
options and if the decision maker has neither saving nor debt, the NPV model no 
longer offer a conclusive answer. Consider, for example, a choice between receiving 
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$1000 now (referred to as SS) and receiving $1100 in one year (referred to as LL), 
implying an interest rate of 10% per annum. Suppose the two options are only 
allocated for consumption at two periods: now and in-one-year. As shown in Figure 
1.6, on one extreme, if the SS option is all spent now, the amount for consumption 
now is $1000. On the other extreme, the SS option can be all saved with an annual 
rate of 1% and thus the amount for consumption in one year is $1010. It can also be 
partly spent now and partly saved for one-year later. So the budget constraint line from 
the SS option is shown as the orange dashed line in Figure 1.6. Likewise, the LL option 
can be all spent in one year ($1100), all spent now (borrowing %201
1100$
  = $917 now for 
consumption and paying back $1100 in one year), or partly spent now and partly spent 
in one year. So the budget constraint line from the LL option is shown as the blue 
dashed line in Figure 1.6. Importantly the budget constraint lines offered by the two 
options intersect at certain point. Thus, decision makers’ optimal choice will depend 
on their personal intertemporal preferences for consumption and should choose the 
option that bring them to the best indifference curve, rather than the interest rates in 
the market (Cubitt & Read, 2007). For example, as shown in Figure 1.6, A should 
choose the LL option because it is the LL option that brings her to her best attainable 
indifference curve while, for the same reason, B should choose the SS option. 
1.1.6 Interim summary 
With both the NPV model and the DU model, we can reconsider the diverse 
claims made in the literature. First, for tradable goods (in a perfectly competitive 
capital market), the NPV model, which has an interest rate related to the interest rate 
available in the market, should be the normative model to evaluate the choice among 
two or more options. With the NPV model, the interest rate elicited from laboratory 
experiments can be compared with the prevailing interest rate in the market. Second, 
the DU model, which endorses individual-specific discount rate, is the normative 
model for intertemporal allocation of consumption for the sake of time consistency. 
This interest rate is incomparable with the prevailing interest rate in the market. Third, 
for each individual person, the discount rate in the DU model should be the same for 
different goods for the sake of time consistency. 
1.2 Empirical Findings 
Empirical research into intertemporal choice has used diverse types of 
outcomes, including money, tradable commodities and directly consumable goods. 
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These studies, with few exceptions, have shown substantial departure from the 
normative predictions. 
1.2.1 Monetary outcomes 
Among all, many studies on intertemporal choice used monetary outcomes. 
The most frequently used tasks are choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-
later (LL) monetary options. Researchers always infer the discount rate from decision 
makers’ choice in SS-LL questions. For example, if someone choose SS in a choice 
between receiving $100 today (SS) or receiving $150 in a year (LL), the choice 
suggests that the decision maker requires an interest rate over 50% per annum. Some 
also used choices between sequences of monetary outcomes. Because of the liquidity 
of money, it is reckoned that people can reschedule the consumption of the money by 
borrowing from and saving in the market. Thus the net present value (NPV) model is 
considered the economic standard for intertemporal choice of monetary outcomes. In 
this section, I review findings from the studies using monetary outcomes. 
Excessive discounting. Excessive discounting refers to that the discount rates 
elicited from intertemporal choice between monetary outcomes are excessively higher 
than what is available in the market (Frederick et al., 2002; Read et al., 2005). As 
discussed earlier, the interest rate at which one can get from saving in banks is 
relatively low. The interest rates people can earn from other investments (e.g., 
securities, bonds and stocks) are generally not be too high either. The interest rates 
that one need to pay for loans are higher, but are mostly lower than 30% per annum in 
the UK or other western countries. However, in laboratory or field experiments, people 
always require interest rates higher than 100% per annum (see Frederick et al., 2002 
for a review). For example, many people would prefer receiving $100 now to receiving 
$250 in one year.  
Sign effect. The sign effect is that people discount more steeply for delayed 
gains than for delayed losses (Thaler, 1981). For example, someone indifferent 
between receiving $100 today and receiving $150 in one year would probably prefer 
paying $100 today to $150 in one year. The sign effect is replicated in many studies 
(e.g., Estle et al., 2006; Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 2005; Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, 
& Jiang, 2009). In some case, the sign effect can be more extreme that many people 
will prefer to pay now rather than to pay later, even if delaying the payment does not 
incur additional financial costs (e.g., Hardisty, Appelt & Weber, 2013; Yates & Watts, 
1975).  
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Absolute magnitude effect. The absolute magnitude effect is that implied 
discount rates decrease with the magnitude of the outcome (Loewenstein and Prelec 
1992). For example, someone indifferent between $200 in one year and $100 today 
would probably prefer $2,000 in one year to $1,000 today. It is one of the most robust 
phenomena in intertemporal choice and has been corroborated in a wide range of 
studies (e.g., Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Benhabib, Bisin, & Schotter, 2010; 
Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Holcomb & 
Nelson, 1992; Petry, 2001; Thaler, 1981). 
Delay effect. The delay effect is that people require higher interest rate for 
short delays than for long delays (Thaler, 1981). For example, someone indifferent 
between $100 today and $225 in two years (implying an interest rate of 50% per 
annum) would probably prefer $100 today to $150 in one year (implying an interest 
rate over 50% per annum). Concerning the delay effect, there are two different 
explanations. One is decreasing impatience and the other is subadditive discounting 
(Read, 2001). See further discussion of the two effects below. 
Non-constant discounting. Non-constant discounting includes decreasing 
impatience and increasing impatience. In some literature, decreasing impatience is 
also known as the common difference effect, which means that the interest rate over 
an interval decreases as the delay to the onset of the interval increases (Loewenstein 
& Prelec, 1992). For example, someone indifferent between $200 in one year and $100 
today would probably prefer $200 in two years to $100 in one year. This effect has 
been corroborated in several studies (e.g., Green et al., 1994; Green, Myerson, & 
Macaux, 2005; Holt Green, Myerson, & Estle, 2008; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Kirby 
& Herrnstein, 1995; Scholten & Read, 2006). However, some others have found 
evidence for increasing impatience that the discount rate over an interval increase with 
the onset of the interval (e.g. Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Read et al., 2005; Sayman & 
Öncüler, 2009; Attema et al., 2010). 
Non-additive discounting. Non-additive discounting is that the discounting 
over an interval depends on whether it is divided into sub-intervals or is kept undivided. 
Two patterns of non-additivity have been observed: subadditivity and superadditivity. 
Subadditivity is that implied discount rates are lower over an undivided interval than 
over an interval that is divided into subintervals. It has been corroborated in many 
studies (Kinari, Ohtake, & Tsutsui, 2009; McAlvanah, 2010; Read, 2001; Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read 2006). An example for subadditivity is that 
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someone indifferent between $100 now and $150 in six months and indifferent 
between $150 in six months and $200 in one year would prefer $200 in one year to 
$100 today. Superadditivity is the reversal of subadditivity, in that implied discount 
rates are higher over an undivided interval than over an interval that is divided into 
subintervals (Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Scholten et al., 2014).  
Sequence effects.  Intertemporal choices between sequences of positive 
outcomes have been shown to be different from those between single-dated outcomes. 
Most compellingly, negative time preference, which means a preference for a positive 
outcome to take place later rather than earlier, has been frequently observed when 
participants choose between intertemporal sequences (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; 
Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Read & Powell, 2002), but is rarely observed when 
they are asked to choose between two single-dated outcomes.  
Framing effects. The literature has documented diverse framing effects 
showing how the description of intertemporal choice questions influences 
intertemporal choice. The delay/speed-up asymmetry is that people are less impatient 
when the intertemporal choice is framed as expediting the larger-later option to the 
smaller-soon option than when the same choice is described as deferring the smaller-
soon option to the larger-later option (Appelt, Hardisty, & Weber, 2011; Benzion et 
al., 1989; Loewenstein, 1988; Malkoc & Zauberman, 2006; McAlvanah, 2010; 
Scholten & Read, 2013; Shelley, 1993; Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, & 
Goldstein, 2007). The date/delay effect is that people tend to be less impatient when 
time is described with calendar dates than with the length of delays (LeBoeuf, 2006; 
Read et al., 2005b). Outcome framing effects are that people exhibit different degrees 
of impatience when the outcomes are framed in different terms, such as an interest 
rate, the gross interest earned, or the total amount earned (Read et al., 2005a; Read, 
Frederick, & Scholten, 2013). The (asymmetric) hidden-zero effect is that the explicit 
display of getting nothing at a later point of time in the SS option reduces impatience 
(Magen, Dweck, & Gross, 2008; Read et al., in press; Wu & He, 2012). Lastly, 
Comparisons of different response modes always show that time preference elicited 
with different methods are systematically different (Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, & 
Weber, 2013; Read & Roelofsma, 2003).  
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1.2.2 Non-monetary outcomes 
Although a majority of studies used monetary outcomes for research into 
intertemporal choice, there is still a significant proportion of studies using other 
commodities as outcomes, such as food, drinks and other consumable goods.  
Domain-specific discounting. Most of the studies on the discounting of 
consumable commodities made a comparison between the interest rates of consumable 
commodities and that of monetary outcomes. The results often suggested that directly 
consumable goods (e.g., alcohol, food, CDs and DVDs) are discounted more steeply 
than money (e.g., Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle et al., 2007; Odum, Baumann, & 
Rimington, 2006; Odum & Rainaud, 2003; Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010; Ubfal, 
2016). There are some exceptions though. Hardisty and Weber (2009) found that the 
discount of monetary outcomes, (public) environmental goods and health was similar 
to each other. Chapman (1996b) found that the discount rate for health was always 
higher than that for money. 
While there is always a gap between discounting of money and consumable 
commodities, individuals’ discount of money and consumable commodities are still 
correlated. Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) found that the discount rates for 
money and chocolates were moderately correlated. Odum (2011) showed that the 
discount rate for money was highly correlated with the discount rates for a variety of 
consumable commodities (i.e., food, heroin and cigarettes). Ubfal (2016) also found 
that high degrees of correlation among discount rates of a variety of goods including 
money, meat and sugar. Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010) showed that the 
correlation between discount rates of money and that of consumable goods were lower 
than the correlation of discount rates among different consumable goods, drawing a 
second line between directly consumable goods and money.  
A surprising observation in these studies mentioned above is that when the 
discount rates of different goods were compared, none of them used the DU model to 
estimate individual discount rates. Instead, discount rates are usually measured with 
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), the hyperbolic discount 
model (Mazur, 1987) and/or a model-free estimation called Area Under the Curve 
(AUC: Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 2001).  
Utility function. Although many studies claimed to identify domain-specific 
discount rates, the vast majority failed to address the curvature of the utility function 
properly. Many of them made an assumption that the utility from consumption is a 
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linear function of amount of consumption, even for food (see Kirby and Santiesteban, 
2003 for an exception). A closely related issue to the utility function is satiation of 
consumptions (Read et al., in press). For example, someone having two pizzas for 
oneself to eat will not be twice as happy as when she has only one pizza to eat. So, an 
important empirical concern is the elicitation of utility function.  
Measuring the curvature of the utility function is a difficulty. Different 
approaches have been proposed. Andersen et al., (2008) used the method of double 
elicitation. With monetary outcomes, Andersen et al. (2008) elicited the curvature of 
the utility function for money from risky choice and applied the utility function from 
risky choice to intertemporal choice.  Some others have attempted to elicit time 
preference by avoiding the curvature of the utility function through their experimental 
designs (Attema et al., 2010; Chapman, 1996b; Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout, 2012). 
Although the technical solutions of these designs differ from one another, they share 
the same intuition that the amounts of the outcomes in SS and LL are kept constant 
across items. However, these methods were applied to monetary outcomes only. 
Further research should pay more attention to the curvature of the utility function. 
1.3 Causes of Departures from the Normative Models 
Empirical tests of intertemporal choice of money or non-monetary goods have 
shown substantial departures from the predictions by the NPV model or the DU model. 
Various causes have been proposed to explain the departures including both 
environmental factors and cognitive limitations. 
1.3.1 Market imperfection and complication 
The NPV model makes a strong assumption of a perfect capital market where 
people have perfect and costless access to saving and borrowing opportunities. 
However, this is by no means true for decision makers. First of all, as stated earlier, 
there is a large gap between the rates with which decision makers can save and borrow. 
Second, the interest rate available in the market depends on the amount of money 
saved or borrowed. For example, there is probably no such a formal market for one to 
exchange £1 now for £1.05 in one year, but it is likely that one can exchange £1,000 
now for £1,050 in one year. Third, transaction costs are inevitable when people 
reschedule their consumption across time by lending and borrowing. The optimal 
choice is not cognitively straightforward, especially when the borrowing and lending 
rates available to a person differ (Cubitt & Read, 2007). In addition, people have to at 
least go to ATM or logon to online bank account to transfer money. 
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Concerning the variability of discount rates for different commodities, Keynes 
(1936) points out that the exchange rate between commodities is not constant across 
time. Indeed, even the exchange rate between two currencies, such as sterling pounds 
and dollars, keeps changing over time. Other important factors that influence 
commodity-specific interest rates include the yield, the carrying cost and the liquidity 
premium (Keynes, 1936; Read et al., in press). The yield means the owner’s benefit 
from the use of a good, especially when the value of the good is not much reduced 
after the use. The yield is especially applicable to durable goods, such as a house. The 
owner of the house can use the house as accommodation, but the value of the house in 
the market is more or less maintained. The carrying cost refers to the cost incurred 
during the good is held, such as storage, obsolescence, spoilage and wastage. A good 
example is fresh vegetables sold in supermarkets. The liquidity premium refers to the 
convenience of a good to be exchangeable to other goods with the identical market 
value. Among all, money, as the common currency, probably has the highest liquidity 
premium. For example, one can buy candies or shop groceries with money. But it is 
inconvenient to exchange candies for groceries or vice versa. 
1.3.2 Background consumption 
While background consumption is one of most important determinants of the 
observed time preference in Fisher’s (1930) framework, it often dismissed in the vast 
number of studies investigating individual differences in intertemporal preference 
(e.g., Dohmen, et al., 2010; Enzler et al., 2014; Shamosh et al., 2008) and discounting 
of different goods (e.g., Augenblick et al., 2012; Chapman, 1996b; Estle et al., 2007). 
It is especially problematic when the curvature of the utility function (in the DU model) 
is not taken into consideration. For example, Noor (2009) used the curvature of the 
utility function induced by background consumption to explain hyperbolic discounting 
on raw amounts. 
Moreover, it is almost indistinguishable between the utility function and the 
discount rate in the DU model (Read et al., in press). For example, when someone is 
highly desired for an immediate consumption at the cost of the consumption later of a 
much larger amount, it could be attributed to a high discount rate but it could be 
equivalently attributed to a disproportionately large utility from the current 
consumption.  
Fisher’s (1930) definition of the pure time preference, which appears a good 
solution that sidesteps the difficulty of the elicitation of the curvature of the utility 
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function. However, as discussed earlier, this pure time preference is defined as the 
marginal rate of intertemporal substitution only when the background consumption is 
equal at different time periods. Thus it is often unobservable and is unlikely to 
overcome the obstacles from background consumption either. 
1.3.3 Uncertainty associated with delayed offers 
Many people may be concerned with the uncertainty of the delayed outcome 
when faced with a choice between an immediately available and a delayed outcome 
(Epper, Fehr-Duda, & Bruhin, 2011; Fisher, 1930). Sozou (1998) shows that a 
hyperbolic discount function can arise from the (constant) exponential discounting 
function if future outcomes are uncertainty. Michaelson et al. (2013) showed that 
people are more likely to choose the delayed but larger reward when the person who 
is going to deliver it looks trustworthy than when the person looks untrustworthy, 
which implies that the delayed option is perceived as risky in the meantime.  
Because of the confound of uncertainty, some studies took measures to control 
the uncertainty of a delayed payment. For example, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) 
tried to guarantee the delayed payments using a credit system. In Andersen, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutstrom (2008), delayed payments to participants were guaranteed by a 
national Ministry in Denmark and was paid directly into participants’ personal bank 
accounts. 
1.3.4 Subjective perception of delays 
Psychophysical accounts suggest that subjective perception of or sensitivity to 
delays is a source of non-constant discounting. Takahashi (2005) shows that a 
generalized hyperbolic discount function by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), which 
embodies decreasing impatience, can be derived from constant impatience with a 
decreasingly elastic function for subjective time perception. Experimental studies 
have supported this view by showing that the subjective perception of delays is 
nonlinear and that the discounting over the subjective perception of delays tends to be 
constant (Han &Takahashi, 2012; Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Bettman, 2009). Ebert 
and Prelec (2007) extended the view of subjective sensitivity to delays to allow for 
both decreasing and increasing impatience.  
1.3.5 Myopia or a lack of self-control 
Explanations to time-inconsistent intertemporal choice always pinpoint to the 
problem of myopia or self-control (Ainslie, 1975; Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981; Strotz, 
1955). Myopic individuals often give special weights to temporally proximal selves 
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and over-consume the resources and thus leave less for future selves. When future 
selves come closer in time, the “future” selves become the “present” ones and again 
over-consume. When this iterative process happens for multiple selves, the far-future 
selves will get almost nothing (Figure 1.4). This lays the foundations of many studies 
of intertemporal choice in behavioural economics and has been applied to diverse 
phenomena such as pension scheme (Laibson,1997), credit card borrowing (Meier & 
Sprenger, 2012), procrastination (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999) and addiction 
(Heyman, 1996). 
1.3.6 Cognitive inertia 
Lastly, but probably most importantly for the thesis, cognitive inertia could be 
a key drive behind intertemporal choice. As shown by Frederick (2005), a simple 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) consisting of three items is a prominent predictor of 
intertemporal discounting. CRT is a psychological battery that assesses to what degree 
one is likely to use intuitive heuristics or deliberative thinking, analogous to dual-
systems (Sloman, 1996; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002). Based on CRT, those with 
high cognitive reflection are much less impatient than those with low cognitive 
reflection in intertemporal choice of monetary outcomes. 
Various framing effects are also strong evidence for the key role of cognitive 
inertia in intertemporal choice. These effects suggest that most decision makers not 
only skip optimising, but also make decisions in respect to many normatively 
irrelevant information (see framing effects in Section 1.2.1, pp. 17). A good example 
is from Read et al. (2013), their participants exhibited much less impatience when the 
intertemporal choice between monetary outcomes was described as an investment, 
while the normative account suggest that people are always aware of investment 
opportunities. It is these framing effects that call for a more coherent understanding of 
the psychology of intertemporal choice.  
1.4 Cognitive Processes in Intertemporal Choice  
The failure of the normative models has motivated some researchers to move 
away from the normative approach and to study what cognitive processes underlie 
intertemporal choice, in line with the recommendation by Ariel Rubinstein (2003) to 
open the psychological black-box of intertemporal decision making. The reasons for 
this shift are probably twofold. First, the reality in the environment does not satisfy 
the assumptions in the normative models. For example, for the NPV model, a perfect 
competitive capital market hardly exists. When the model fails to capture realistic 
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environmental features relating to the making of decisions, even rational individual 
behaviour could depart from the prediction of the model. Second, various framing 
effects suggest that individuals show inconsistent preferences when normatively 
equivalent decisions (see framing effects in Section 1.2.1, pp. 17). Those effects are 
frequently explained by different cognitive processes invoked by different framing, 
highlighting the importance of studying cognitive processes in intertemporal choice 
(e.g., Cubitt, McDonald, & Read, 2017; Read et al., 2016; Weber et al., 2007). Below, 
I briefly introduce several important cognitive processes that could govern individual 
intertemporal choice, which are also the focus of the following chapters in the thesis. 
1.4.1 Evaluation rule 
One of the fundamental questions regarding the cognitive processes of 
intertemporal choice, as well as other types of value-based decision making, is how 
information of the choice is processed and evaluated. There are mainly two different 
evaluation rules in intertemporal choice: alternative-based and attribute-based rules 
(see Scholten et al., 2014; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014).9 According to the alternative-
based rule, options are evaluated and assigned values independently. The option with 
the highest assigned value is chosen. By contrast, the attribute-based rule assumes that 
options are directly compared along the time and outcome attributes respectively, and 
the option favoured by these comparisons is chosen (e.g., Gonzalez-Vallejo, 2002; 
Tversky, 1972). 
Two strands of evidence could shed light on the comparisons of different 
evaluation rules. First, eye-tracking studies offer the process-level evidence on 
whether decision is made by alternative-wise computation or attribute-wise 
comparison. For example, Arieli, Ben-Ami and Rubinstein (2011) found that 
participants make intra-attribute eye movements much more often than intra-option 
eye movements. Second, different evaluation rules are written in models and thus the 
descriptive accuracy of the models with different evaluation rules behind can be 
quantitatively compared with each other (e.g., Scholten et al., 2014; Dai & Busemeyer, 
2014).  
                                                 
9 A third evaluation rule was used in Scholten and Read’s (2006) interval discounting model. See further 
discussion in Chapter 2. 
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1.4.2 Attention 
Attention allocation matters in many value-based decision making, including 
intertemporal choice. Many studies posit that attention is a key cognitive process that 
drives value-based preference (e.g., Bhatia, 2014; Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 
2012; Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013; Read et al., 2013; Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher, 2012; 
Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; see Weber & Johnson, 2009 for a review). A few 
studies have directly tested the relationship between attention and food choice (Armel, 
Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010), risky choice (e.g., 
Fiedler & Glőckner, 2012; Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2016) and intertemporal 
choice (e.g., Fisher & Rangel, 2014; Franco-Watkins, Mattson, & Jackson, 2016). A 
better understand of the attention effects on intertemporal choice is a key step towards 
the understanding of cognitive processes of intertemporal choice. 
1.4.3 Background contrast 
Background contrast is another important cognitive factor that have been 
found to play an important role in value-based decision making (Simonson & Tversky, 
1992). This effect has been very well-established in a wide range of studies (Ebert & 
Prelec, 2007; Priester, Dholakia, & Fleming, 2004; Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Vlaev 
& Chater, 2006; 2007; Walasek & Stewart, 2015). In their seminal work, Simonson 
and Tversky (1992) showed that participants’ tradeoff between two attributes (e.g., the 
price and the quality of a personal computer) was strongly influenced by the preceding 
tradeoff they have been exposed to, regardless of their choices in the preceding 
tradeoff.10 For example, as shown in Figure 1.7, in a choice between paying $1200 for 
a computer with 720K memory (Option x) or paying $1000 for a computer with 640K 
memory (Option y), participants were more likely to choose x when they had been 
previously exposed to a choice between paying $1200 for a computer with 880K 
memory (Option a) or paying $1000 for a computer with 480K memory (Option b) 
than when they had been previously exposed to a choice between paying $1500 for a 
computer with 720K memory (Option a’) or paying $700 for a computer with 640K 
memory (Option b’). 
 
                                                 
10 A closely related effect to the background contrast effect is the prospect relativity effect (e.g., Stewart, 
Chater, Stott, & Reimers, 2003; Ungemach, Stewart, & Reimers, 2011; Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2007; 
Vlaev, Seymour, Dolan, & Chater, 2009), which suggests that the valuation of an option (or an attribute 
value), rather the tradeoff rate between two attributes, is influenced by previously exposed similar 
options (or values of the same attribute). 
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Figure 1.7. A graphical illustration of Simonson and Tversky’s (1992) study on the 
background contrast effect. 
 
1.5 Overview of the Following Chapters 
The thesis is aimed at a better understanding of the cognitive processes in 
intertemporal choice. Three separate empirical studies are reported in Chapters 2-4, 
investigating various cognitive processes including evaluation rules, attention, and 
background contrast. Chapter 5 further summarises the results from the empirical 
studies and discusses the implications on theory development of intertemporal choice. 
The study in Chapter 2 makes a comprehensive model comparison in 
intertemporal choice. The literature has documented a wide array of intertemporal 
choice models. However, existing studies that quantitatively compare intertemporal 
choice models often lend support to different models. Several limitations make it 
difficult to compare the results from different studies. This comprehensive model 
comparison attempts to address or, at least, alleviate three limitations: Model 
selectivity, stochastic-specification selectivity and stimulus diversity. The results lend 
strong support to attribute-based models, especially the family of the tradeoff model. 
There is also an interaction between models and stochastic specifications on model 
performance, highlighting the importance of stochastic specification in intertemporal 
choice modelling. 
720, -1200
640, -1000
880, -1200
480, -1000
720, -1500
640, -700
Cost($)
Memory(K)
Target (x or y)
Background 1 (a or b)
Background 2 (a' or b')
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The study in Chapter 3 investigates the attention effect on intertemporal choice. 
Previous studies on the relationship between attention and value-based choice often 
assumed an option-wise attention effect and other ways of the attention effect. The 
study in Chapter 3 develops a new attention manipulation method that allows the 
attention effect to operate in multiple ways to test the attention effect on intertemporal 
choice. The results from the study suggests that, beyond the option-wise attention 
effect, attention can operate in attribute-wise and component-wise ways to influence 
intertemporal choice. In addition, the study observes robust background contrast 
effects on intertemporal choice, which indicate the violation of sequential 
independence in intertemporal choice. 
The study in Chapter 4 focuses on a controversial topic in intertemporal choice: 
the patterns of impatience. Concerning the degree of impatience in near vs. far future, 
people can show decreasing impatience, constant impatience and increasing 
impatience. As the basis of the family of hyperbolic discounting models, decreasing 
impatience has received much attention these years. However, testing of the patterns 
impatience has accumulated mixed and conflicting results. The study in Chapter 4 
tests two ways to look through the heterogeneity. The first is on a potential design bias. 
A vast number of tests of the pattern of impatience used pairs of intertemporal choice 
items. This method makes an implicit assumption that individuals’ patterns of 
impatience are independent from their degrees of impatience. The first goal of the 
study is to directly test the hypothesis of independence between the pattern and the 
degree of impatience. Results suggest that the two are correlated and thus point to a 
design bias when pairs of items are used to test the aggregate pattern of impatience. 
The second focus is on the instability of the detected pattern of impatience from 
experimental studies. Specifically, an order effect, which is relevant to the background 
contrast effect, on the detected aggregate pattern of impatience is observed. Taken 
together, the two ways may reconcile much of the variation in the detected aggregate 
pattern of impatience in the literature. 
Chapter 5 provides a general discussion of the thesis. First, I discuss the results 
from Chapters 2-4 in the general framework of the cognitive processes in 
intertemporal choice, crystallising the understanding of them. It further points out the 
limitation of the thesis as it only investigated one type of intertemporal choice and 
potential extensions to other domains of intertemporal choice are discussed.  
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Experimental studies on intertemporal choice typically investigate choices 
between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) amounts of money, such as a choice 
between $100 today and $200 in one year.  Economic analysis provides researchers 
and consumers with “normative” models of how people should make these choices, 
but as with many other domains of choice, economic models do not predict the 
preferences people express. Consequently, researchers have developed alternative 
accounts of how intertemporal choices for money are made, each designed to capture 
the complex interaction between the choice options people are presented with, and 
their preferences over those options (e.g., Doyle, 2012).  
In this study, we systematically addressed the question of which models and 
categories of models best described human choice behaviour. We did this by means 
of quantitative model comparisons, in which models were tested against empirical 
data. We report a comprehensive quantitative comparison between models of 
intertemporal choice drawn from economics and psychology. We addressed major 
limitations in previous model contests by including fifteen intertemporal choice 
models, three stochastic specifications and 225 (out of 256) data sets collected from 
diverse sources. 
2.1 Categories of Models 
The simple intertemporal choices we investigated involved two options. The 
SS option is a smaller amount of money (denoted xS) at an earlier time (xL).  The LL 
option is a larger amount (xL) at a later time (tL).  Choices between such options can 
be determined by a range of transformations and interactions of these four values.  One 
possibility is what we call alternative-based choice. Alternative-based choice means 
that each alternative (either SS or LL) is independently assigned a value, and these 
values are then compared with the better option being chosen.  In intertemporal choice, 
alternative-based choice always entails some function of time (denoted d(t) in Table 
2.1) being used to weight some function of the outcome (denoted v(x)), so the present 
value of a delayed outcome is v(x)d(t). 
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Table 2.1 Categories of intertemporal choice models. 
Category Evaluation rule 
Alternative-based )()(    )()( LLSS tdxvtdxv 
!  
Attribute-based ),(    ),( LSLS xxVttQ 
!  
Hybrid )(),(),0(    )(),0( LLSSSS xvttDtDxvtD 
!  
 
Attribute-based models are derived from an approach to choice initiated by 
Tversky’s (1969) additive difference model. In these models, time and outcome are 
treated as separate attributes just as in other multi-attribute choice models, and the 
advantage or disadvantage of each option on each attribute is computed, and the choice 
is made by evaluating whether a sum of attribute differences favours one option or 
another.  When choosing between $100 now and $200 in one year, for instance, the 
decision maker determines how much better $200 is from $100 (computing V(xS, xL)), 
and how much better “now” is to “one year” (computing Q(tS, tL)) and chooses the 
$200 if the outcome advantage exceeds the time advantage, and the $100 otherwise. 
Attribute-based models were pioneered by Leland (2002) and Rubinstein (2003), and 
a mathematical model amenable to formal testing was described by Scholten and Read 
(2010). 
Hybrid models mix alternative-based and attribute-based comparisons.  Only 
one hybrid model is in the literature, the interval discounting model (Read 2001, 
Scholten and Read 2006, Scholten et al. 2014). This model is alternative-based in that 
each outcome receives a discounted value, and it is attribute-based in that the values 
of outcomes are discounted not only as a function of the delays to the outcomes, but 
also as a function of the interval between them. 
2.2 Models 
The primary goal of this study was to compare different categories of models. 
The fifteen intertemporal choice models listed in Table 2.2 were subjected to a model 
comparison. These include eight alternative-based models, one hybrid model, and six 
attribute-based model. Seven of the eight alternative-based models are what we will 
call outcome discounting models, because they do not involve any transformation of 
monetary outcomes, and thus only differ from the standard economic model in the 
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way discounting takes place. These models are (1) the exponential discounting model, 
(2) the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), which includes (1) as a 
special case, (3) a hyperbolic discounting model (Herrnstein, 1981; referred to as 
HyperbolicH), (4) a generalized hyperbolic discounting model (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992; referred to as HyperbolicLP), which includes (1) and (3) as special cases, (5) a 
hyperbolic discounting model in which discounting takes place over weighted delays 
(Mazur, 1987; referred to as HyperbolicM), (6) the constant-sensitivity discounting 
model, which includes (1) as a special case, and in which, depending on how delays 
are weighted, discounting can be hyperbolic or hypobolic (Ebert & Prelec, 2007), and 
(7) the double-exponential discounting model (McClure et al., 2007). The eighth 
alternative-based model, Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) full hyperbolic discounting 
model, is a value-discounting model, in which the generalized hyperbolic discount 
function is applied to subjective outcome values rather than objective outcomes. The 
specific operationalization used here comes from Scholten, Read and Sanborn (2014), 
thus it is referred to as HyperbolicSRS. 
The hybrid model is the discounting by intervals model (Interval, Read, 2001; 
Scholten & Read 2006; Scholten et al., 2014). Being a generalization of 
HyperbolicSRS, it is also a value-discounting model, and with an increasingly elastic 
value function. 
The six attribute-based models involved in the model contest are the 
proportional-difference model (PD; Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016), the 
intertemporal-choice-heuristics model (ITCH; Ericson et al., 2015), the difference-
ratio-interest-finance-time model (DRIFT; Read et al., 2013), the tradeoff model (TM; 
Scholten et al., 2014), and two reduced versions of the tradeoff model which we call 
basic tradeoff models. They differ in whether the value function and the time-weighing 
function are normalized logarithmic functions (Scholten & Read, 2013; referred to as 
BTMSR, a special case of TM) or power functions (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; referred 
to as BTMDB).11 
 
                                                 
11The tradeoff model evaluated by Scholten and Read (2013) reduces to BTMSR when the data do not 
contain the delay-speedup asymmetry, as is the case in our data sets.  
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Table 2.2 List of intertemporal choice models involved in this model comparison.  
ALTERNATIVE-BASED MODELS 
Name Source Delay Discount Function Value Function Domain 
Exponential Samuelson (1937) ttd G )(  xxv  )(  0 d G d 1 
Quasi-
hyperbolic Laibson (1997) 
tttd GE )0I()( !  xxv  )(  0 d E, G d 1 
HyperbolicH Herrnstein (1981) 1)1()(  ttd D  xxv  )(  D t 0 
HyperbolicM Mazur (1987) 1)1()(  WDttd  xxv  )(  D, W t 0 
HyperbolicLP Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) DED /)1()(  ttd  xxv  )(  D, E t 0 
Constant 
sensitivity Ebert and Prelec (2007) 
WE )()( tetd   xxv  )(  E, W t 0 
Double 
exponential McClure et al. (2007) 
tttd GZZE )1()(   xxv  )(  0 d E, G d 1, 0.5 d Z d 1 
HyperbolicSRS Scholten et al. (2014) DED /)1()(  ttd  JJ PJJ xxxv   )1()1()(  D, E t 0, 0 d J d 1, P t 1 
ATTRIBUTE-BASED MODELS 
Name Source Time and Outcome Advantages Domain 
PD (Logistic / 
Fechnerian only) 
Cheng and González-Vallejo 
(2016) 
L
SL
LS x
xxxxV  ),(   
ψ),(  
L
SL
LS t
ttttQ  2 d \ d 2 
PD (Luce only)a  L
SL
LS x
xxxxV  ),(   
L
SL
LS t
tt
ttQ
 N),(  N t 0 
ITCH b Ericson et al. (2015) 
*
))(1(),(
x
xxwxxwxxV SLxSLxLS
  0 d wx d 1 
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¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§  
*
))(1(),(
t
ttwttwttQ SLtSLtLS N  0 d wt d 1, N t 0 
DRIFT Read et al. (2013) 
   1)/()/)())(1)(1(),( ))/(1(   SL ttSLISSLRSLRILS xxwxxxwxxwwxxV  0 d wI, wR d 1 
)(),( SLLS ttttQ  N  N t 0 
BTMDB Dai and Busemeyer (2014) 
JJ
SLLS xxxxV  ),(  0 d J d 1 
)(),( WWN SLLS ttttQ   N t 0, 0 d W  d 1 
BTMSR Scholten and Read (2013) 
 )1ln()1ln(1),( SLLS xxxxV JJJ   J t 0 
 )1ln()1ln(),( SLLS ttttQ WWW
N   N, W t 0 
TM Scholten et al. (2014) 
 )1ln()1ln(1),( SLLS xxxxV JJJ   J t 0 
 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
¸
¹
·¨
©
§  
-
-
WWWDD
N )1ln()1ln()/1(1log),( SLLS
ttttQ  D, N, W t 0, - t 1 
HYBRID MODEL 
Name Source Interval Discount Function and Value Function Domain 
Interval Scholten et al. (2014) 
  DE-
-
WWWD
/
)1ln()1ln()/1(1),(

¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§
¸
¹
·¨
©
§  SLLS
ttttD  D, E, W t 0, - t 1 
JJ PJJ xxxv   )1()1()(  0 d J d 1, P t 1 
a Under the Luce specification, PD could not be estimated in its original form, because \ could move the time advantage of SS into negative territory. 
b 
*x is the arithmetic mean of the two outcomes: 2*
LS xxx  . *t is the arithmetic mean of the two delays: 2* LS ttt  . The intercept, a free parameter, of the 
original ITCH model (Ericson et al., 2015) is removed. That intercept is theoretically incorrect because it will predict a preference towards a specific option in 
a binary choice even when the two options are identical.  
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Table 2.3 Behavioural regularities covered by intertemporal choice models. 
Category Model 
Phenomenon 
Positive 
discounting 
Absolute 
magnitude 
effect 
Delay effect 
Common 
difference 
effect (CDE) 
Reverse 
CDE Nonadditivity 
Relative 
nonadditivity 
Alternative-based 
Exponential        
Quasi-hyperbolic    ?    
HyperbolicH        
HyperbolicM        
HyperbolicLP        
Constant sensitivity        
Double exponential        
HyperbolicSRS        
Hybrid Interval        
Attribute-based 
PD ?       
DRIFT       ? 
ITCH       ? 
BTMDB       ? 
BTMSR       ? 
TM       ? 
Note. A check mark means that a model can accommodate the phenomenon. A question mark means that a model can accommodate the 
phenomenon on some occasions, but not on others. Models accounting for relative nonadditivity do so by combining with the Luce specification. 
Although the ITCH model can occasionally accommodate nonadditivity according to the results from Parameter Space Partitioning in Appendix 
2C, however, this property is irregular and intractable, in a stark contrast to TM, which uses two parameters to systematically accommodate 
subadditivity and superadditivity respectively (Scholten et al., 2014).  
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2.3 Behavioural Regularities and Model Coverage 
Studies involving choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) 
monetary options have discovered numerous patterns or what we call behavioural 
regularities. These behavioural regularities are the primary motive for developing 
alternative models of intertemporal choice and, on the other hand, constitute 
qualitative evidence for or against models (summarised in Table 2.3). Here we provide 
a brief description of the behavioural regularities reported for monetary gains.  
2.3.1 Positive discounting  
Positive discounting is that people are generally impatient and prefer a 
positive-valence outcome to happen sooner, rather than later (Frederick et al., 2002).12 
It is normally the cornerstone of studies employing SS-LL choices of monetary gains. 
Positive discounting implies that, when the smaller outcome (xS) and the smaller delay 
(tS) are held constant, an increase in the larger delay (tL) requires an increase in xL for 
a person to remain indifferent between SS and LL (Scholten & Read, 2013). For 
instance, someone indifferent between $100 today and $200 in one year would be 
indifferent between $100 today and more than $200 in two years. All the fifteen 
models can fully accommodate this except for the PD model. Specifically, the function 
for time advantage in PD is insensitive to tL when tS = 0, because (tL – 0) / tL = 1, i.e., 
the proportional difference between the delays is 1 regardless of how long tL is.  
2.3.2 Absolute magnitude effect 
The absolute magnitude effect is that the discount rate decreases with outcome 
magnitude (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). For example, someone indifferent between 
$200 in one year and $100 today is likely to prefer $2,000 in one year to $1,000 today, 
when, in both choices, the interest rates on offer is a 100% per year. The absolute 
magnitude effect is a robust finding for monetary gains.13 None of the outcome-
discounting models can accommodate this effect but the two value-discounting models 
(i.e., HyperbolicSRS and Interval) can accommodate the absolute magnitude effect with 
the increasingly elastic value function. All attribute-based models, but PD, can 
accommodate the absolute magnitude effect. 
                                                 
12 Positive discounting is not necessarily anomalous to the NPV model, but still serves as an important 
piece of qualitative evidence for or against models. 
13  In the domain of monetary losses, the magnitude effect may attenuate (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; 
Scholten & Read, 2013; Scholten et al., 2014), or even reverse (Hardisty et al., 2013a). 
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2.3.3 Delay effect 
The discount rate declines with the delay to the outcome (Thaler, 1981). For 
example, someone indifferent between $200 in one year and $100 today (an implied 
interest rate of 100% per year) might prefer $400 in two years to $100 today (less than 
100% per year). The delay effect has been one of the most prominent pieces of 
evidence for the family of hyperbolic discounting models. It must be recognized, 
however, that the delay to the later outcome is confounded with that of the interval 
between the outcomes (Read 2001). All models, but Exponential, can accommodate 
the delay effect. 
2.3.4 Common difference effect and its reversal 
The common difference effect is that implied discount rates decrease as the 
delay to the onset of an interval increases (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). For example, 
someone indifferent between $200 in one year and $100 today might prefer $200 in 
two years to $100 in one year. The common difference effect has proven less robust 
than the above phenomena: It is seen in some studies (Green et al., 1994; 2005; Holt 
et al., 2008; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Read et al., 2005; 
Scholten & Read, 2006), but not reliably in others (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Baron, 
2000; Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Read, 2001; Read et al., 2005; Read & Roelofsma, 
2003), and, occasionally a reverse common difference effect is observed (Attema et 
al., 2010). Thus, for example, someone indifferent between $200 in two years to $100 
in one year  might prefer $200 in one year to $100 today. All models, but Exponential 
and Quasi-hyperbolic, can fully accommodate the common difference effect. 
Exponential cannot accommodate this effect and Quasi-hyperbolic is just able to 
accommodate a special case of the common difference effect, the present bias (or 
immediacy effect), in which the earlier interval has no front-end delay. Only the 
constant-sensitivity discounting model alone can accommodate the reversal of the 
common difference effect. 
2.3.5 Nonadditivity of intervals 
Nonadditivity of intervals can manifest itself in two ways. Subadditivity is that 
implied discount rates are lower over an undivided interval than over its subintervals 
(Kinari et al., 2009; McAlvanah, 2010; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003, 
Scholten & Read, 2006, Zauberman et al., 2009). Superadditivity is the reverse pattern, 
in which implied discount rates are higher over an undivided interval than over its 
subintervals (Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Scholten et al., 2014). Consider someone 
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who is indifferent between (xS, tS) and (xM, tM), indifferent between (xM, tM) and (xL, 
tL), and indifferent between (xS, tS) and (y, tL), where 0 < xS < xM < xL, and 0 d tS < tM 
< tL. Subadditivity is that xM < y < xL, whereas superadditivity is that y > xL, meaning 
that time has less or more impact, respectively, over the undivided interval than over 
its subintervals.14 The hybrid discounting model (Interval) and the full tradeoff model 
(TM) can accommodate nonadditivity (see Scholten et al., 2014). 
2.3.6 Relative nonadditivity 
Let C = {SS, MM, LL} be a set of single dated outcomes as defined previously, 
and let c = {ss, mm, ll} be another set of single dated outcomes obtained from C by 
reducing all three outcomes by a common factor. Relative nonadditivity is that 
subadditivity is more common in c than in C, but superadditivity is more common in 
C than in c (Scholten & Read, 2010; Scholten et al., 2014). Scholten et al. (2014; 
pp.420) have shown that relative nonadditivity emerges as a regular pattern of product-
rule violations from the combination of TM and a ratio interpretation of Luce (1959) 
choice axiom (referred to as the Luce specification): In c, the odds of choosing ll rather 
than ss are higher than the joint odds of choosing mm rather than ss, and ll rather than 
mm (subadditivity), but, in C, the odds of choosing LL rather than SS are lower than 
the joint odds of choosing MM rather than SS, and LL rather than MM 
(superadditivity). We further argue that this feature is applicable to all other attribute-
based models involved in this model contest, expect for PD (see Appendix 2D for the 
proof).  
2.3.7 Interim summary 
The above review is a sample of behavioural regularities relating to SS-LL 
choice between monetary gains. We restrict our focus to non-framing behavioural 
regularities, and do not consider phenomena related to how options are described. 
Framing-related phenomena in the SS-LL paradigm include the delay-speedup 
asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988; Scholten & Read, 2013; Weber et al., 2007), the 
date/delay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read et al., 2005a), outcome framing effects (Read 
et al., 2005b; Read et al., 2013) and the (asymmetric) hidden-zero effect (Magen et al., 
2008; Read et al., in press; Wu and He 2012). See framing effects in Section 1.2.1 in 
Chapter 1 (pp. 17) for a more detailed review. 
                                                 
14 See Dai (2017; in press) and Scholten (in press) for recent debates on these effects at both individual 
and aggregate levels. 
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2.4 Incomparability of Past Results 
There have been many published comparisons between intertemporal choice 
models. Early work primarily focused on alternative-based models (e.g., Abdellaoui 
et al., 2010; Cairns & van der Pol, 1997; 2000; Cavagnaro et al., 2016; Kirby & 
Maraković, 1995; Madden et al., 1999; McKerchar et al., 2009; Peters et al., 2012; 
Pine et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 2008; Yi et al., 2009), and a growing number of 
studies included attribute-based models in the model comparisons (e.g., Cheng & 
González-Vallejo, 2016; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Ericson et al., 2015; Scholten & 
Read 2013; Scholten et al., 2014; Stevens, 2016). 
The results from previous model selection studies are mixed and do not agree 
with each other. Among alternative-based models, many studies suggested that 
HyperbolicH, the one-parameter hyperbolic model, outperformed the exponential 
discounting model (e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Kirby & Maraković, 1995; Madden 
et al., 1999; McKerchar et al., 2009). Some others found that HyperbolicLP 
outperformed the exponential discounting model and HyperbolicH, the one-parameter 
hyperbolic model (Cairns & van der Pol, 1997; 2000; Mcerchar et al., 2009). Peters et 
al. (2012) found that the constant-sensitivity discounting model provided the best fit 
to their experimental data. However, Cavagnaro et al. (2016) suggested that none of 
the alternative-based models they considered provided satisfactory fits to all 
behavioural patterns exposed in their results. When attribute-based models were 
involved in the model comparison, attribute-based models usually outperformed 
alternative-based or hybrid models. However, different studies included different 
attribute-based models, thus there is a lack of coherent message from those studies.  
We suggest several reasons for the mixed and incoherent evidence from 
existing model comparisons. The first reason is model selectivity: Most studies include 
a small subset of models, and different studies involve different subsets. Transitivity 
is not guaranteed, because different models might best fit different data. For example, 
if one study suggests that Model A outperforms Model B, and another study suggests 
that Model B outperforms Model C based on a different data set, it is not guaranteed 
that Model C will outperform Model A in the latter study. 
The second reason is stochastic-specification selectivity. To test a choice 
model, it is necessary to specify not just the model, but also how the model converts 
its outputs into choice probabilities (Table 2.4). Different model tests use different 
specifications. For example, Scholten et al. (2014) used the Luce specification; 
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Ericson et al. (2015) used the Logistic specification; and Cheng and González-Vallejo 
(2016) used different specifications for different models. It is well understood that 
stochastic specification can make a big difference to the relative accuracy of decision 
or categorisation models (e.g., Blavatskyy & Pogrebna, 2010 Wills, Reimers, Stewart, 
Suret, & McLaren, 2000), but is largely overlooked in the literature on intertemporal 
choice (but see Dai & Busemeyer, 2014, who compared static stochastic 
specifications, the Logistic and the Fechnerian specifications, with dynamic drift-
diffusion models). 
Third, stimulus diversity: Not only do the models and specifications differ from 
study to study, so do the stimuli. Outcomes vary from cents to hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, and delays from days to decades. Also, stimulus designs vary across studies, 
partly depending on the preference patterns that the researcher plans to expose (e.g., 
how implied discount rates vary as a function of outcome sign and magnitude, or as a 
function of delay and interval length).  
2.5 Methods 
Given the issues with the comparability of past results, the study in this chapter 
resolves them by applying a large set of fifteen models (in Table 2.2) with three 
stochastic specifications (in Table 2.4) to 256 data sets obtained from published papers 
and unpublished projects(see Appendix 2B for the summary of the data sets). 
2.5.1 Data sets 
Intertemporal choice data were collected from published papers and 
unpublished projects Specifically, we selected only data of binary choices between 
single dated monetary outcomes (i.e., SS vs. LL).15 This ruled out other preference 
elicitation methods (e.g., matching, pricing, rating, and allocation), non-monetary 
outcomes (e.g., health and food), and data of choices between outcomes sequences.  
We requested data in various ways, although it was not meant to be a meta-
analytic literature search. First, a request email was sent out on December 3, 2013 to 
the Society of Judgment and Decision Making mailing list, asking for aggregate data 
or raw data from studies that conformed to our selection criteria. Second, one of the 
authors requested data from intertemporal choice researchers whom he had 
connections with. Third, we requested data from authors of studies that have cited 
Kirby et al. (1999), which is one of the most widely cited empirical studies employing 
                                                 
15 In very few studies, participants were also allowed to be indifferent between the two options. 
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the SS-LL paradigm, at least once in Google Scholar. Note that not only did we request 
the data from the specific studies citing Kirby et al. (1999), but also other studies that 
met our selection criteria from the same authors. Fourth, we downloaded data sets 
available online from Judgment and Decision Making and American Economic 
Review with the approval from the author(s) of the papers. Lastly, we searched CNKI 
(China National Knowledge Infrastructure), a comprehensive Chinese scholarly 
database in February 2014 and sent request emails to the authors of the identified 
papers.  
We obtained data from 112 published papers and unpublished projects. From 
each paper or project, separate data sets were created when there were different 
experiments, when there were different experimental conditions, or when the 
respondents were residents in different countries. When experimental conditions 
differed only in outcomes and/or delays used to expose certain phenomena (e.g., the 
common difference effect), and no other manipulations took place, they were 
combined in one data set. For example, to test the immediacy effect, Keren and 
Roelofsma (1995) asked one group of participants to choose between $150 today and 
$200 in 9 months and another group to choose between $150 in 10 years and $200 in 
10 years and 9 months. Although the two questions were answered by different 
participants, they were jointly used to expose a specific frame-free choice pattern of 
our interest in this study. Thus, the two items were combined into the same data set. 
When participants were allowed to be indifferent between the available options, 
“indifferent” responses were removed, and the sample size for an item was reduced 
accordingly. Data sets with only one item were removed from the analysis; since 
models are fit to each data set individually, a single-item data set is uninformative in 
a model contest. Stimuli in the qualifying data sets were then screened according to 
the following criteria: 
(1) The LL outcome (xL) was larger than the SS outcome (xS); 
(2) The LL delay (tL) was longer than the SS delay (tS); 
(3) Both outcomes were to be received with certainty. 
Using all these criteria, we were left with 256 data sets from 97 papers or 
projects (see Appendix 2B for details). Each line in a data set contained the amounts 
and delays, the frequency with which participants in the data set chose LL, and the 
number of participants for the item in the data set.  
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2.5.2 Models 
As mentioned earlier, the fifteen intertemporal choice models involved in the 
contest included eight alternative-based models, six attribute-based models and one 
hybrid model. The alternative-based models were the exponential discounting model, 
five variants of the hyperbolic discounting model (Quasi-hyperbolic, HyperbolicH, 
HyperbolicM, HyperbolicLP and HyperbolicSRS), the constant-sensitivity discounting 
model, and the double-exponential discounting model. Of the eight alternative-based 
models, seven were outcome-discounting models and only HyperbolicSRS was a value-
discounting model. The six attribute-based models were the proportional-difference 
model (PD; Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016), the intertemporal-choice-heuristics 
model (ITCH; Ericson et al., 2015), the difference-ratio-interest-finance-time model 
(DRIFT; Read et al., 2013), and three variants of the tradeoff model (BTMSR, BTMDB 
and TM). The hybrid model had only one member, the discounting by intervals model 
(Interval). 
2.5.3 Stochastic specifications 
Three different stochastic specifications were used to model choices between 
SS and LL. The Luce specification views the strength of preference for LL over SS as 
a function of the ratio between the value (in alternative-based models) or advantage 
(in attribute-based models) of LL and the value or advantage of SS. The Logistic 
specification is transformation of the Luce with the value or advantage of LL and SS 
exponentiated respectively. The third is the Fechnerian specification, which views the 
strength of preference for LL over SS as a function of the difference between the value 
or advantage of LL and the value or advantage of SS, with the difference being 
evaluated under a standard cumulative normal distribution ). The Logistic and 
Fechnerian specifications, in the functional forms, specify the strength of preference 
with the difference between the values or advantages of the two options. Thus, they 
are both termed difference specifications. 
 
Table 2.4 List of stochastic specifications.  
Name Stochastic specification 
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Note. URHS is the right-hand side, and ULHS the left-hand side, of the equations 
representing each class of evaluation rules in Table 2.1, and pˆ  is the predicted 
probability that LL will be chosen over SS, where )(L  is the standard cumulative 
Logistic distribution function, )(F  is the standard cumulative normal distribution 
function, and H > 0 is the “noisiness” of choice behaviour; as H approaches 0, choice 
becomes increasingly determined by the model.  
 
2.5.4 Baseline model 
To check whether a data set was informative enough for model selection, a 
baseline model, in which the predicted probability of choosing LL rather than SS was 
simply spˆ , i.e., a constant across all items in data set s, was involved. If the baseline 
model turns out to be the winning model in a data set, then that data set was considered 
uninformative, and removed from the analysis. 
2.5.5 Bayesian Information Criterion 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978) was used for model 
selection. The Bayesian information criterion is a measure of model goodness of fit 
that penalizes models for the number of parameters it contains. A smaller BIC value 
indicates better balance between the goodness of fit to data and the complexity of the 
model. For each combination of a model (q), a stochastic specification (r), and a data 
set (s), it is given as: 
)ln()ln(2BIC sqrqrsqrs nmL  , 
where )ln( qrsL is the maximum log-likelihood for the combination of q, r, and s. The 
term at the end of the left-had side is a penalty term, where mqr is the number of free 
parameters in the model specification (q and r), and ns is the number of responses 
across items in data set s. The maximum log-likelihood )ln( qrsL is given by: 
¦
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i
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where B(.) is the binomial distribution, fis is the frequency with which participants in 
data set s choose LL from item i, Nis is the number of participants in s choosing either 
SS or LL from item i, and 
iqrspˆ  is the probability of participants in data set s choosing 
LL from item i as predicted by the model specifications (q and r). Maximum log-
likelihood values were obtained using the Nelder-Mead Simplex Method in Matlab 
(see Appendix 2A for more details). 
2.6 Results 
A screening process with the baseline model was applied to select only the data 
sets that were informative enough for model selection. With the eligible data sets, we 
will successively discuss the best-performing stochastic specification for each model, 
model performance when models were combined with the best-performing stochastic 
specification, and the adverse consequences of a monolithic stochastic specification 
for all models. 
2.6.1 Data screening 
For each data set, 46 BIC values were estimated (15 models × 3 stochastic 
specifications plus 1 baseline model). The baseline model gave the lowest BIC value 
for 31 data sets, which were removed from the analysis, thus leaving us with 225 
eligible data sets.  
The stimuli in these eligible data sets differed in various aspects. In the 
following, we highlight three important and manageable aspects. First, out of the 225 
data sets, 144 (64.0%) involved only choices between an immediately available option 
and a delayed option (intervals without upfront delays). Another 39 data sets (17.3%) 
involved only choices between two delayed options (intervals with upfront delays). 
Only 42 (18.7%) involved both choices between immediate-delayed options and 
choices between delayed-delayed options. 
Second, the interest rates implied by the stimuli were much higher than 
prevailing market rates. Interest rates implied by 16,003 stimuli in 225 data sets, i.e., 
1)/( )/(1   SL ttSL xxr , where t was measured in days
16, showed a distribution covering 
a range of very high interest rates (Figure 2.1a). While a daily interest rate of 0.01% 
is equivalent to 3.7% per year, which is similar to (or still higher than) the prevailing 
                                                 
16 The implied daily interest rate, rather than the implied annual interest rate, is presented and plotted 
in the figure because the implied annual interest rate is much more dispersed and skewed (even in a 
log-scale) and thus less friendly to graphical exposition. The transformation process of some items even 
exceeded the limit of the double-precision numeric format. 
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market savings rates, 97% of the implied daily interest rates were higher than 0.01% 
per day, and 48% of them were higher than 1% per day, which translates to more than 
3,678% per year. This observation suggested that, on one hand, researchers generally 
had the consensus that participants were generally excessively impatient compared 
with the prevailing interest rates in the market, based on either their intuition or their 
experience with human participants. On the other hand, because of the context effects 
such as the background contrast effect (Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Stewart et al., 
2015), such stimulus designs could also contribute to the often-observed excessive 
discounting in the literature (Frederick et al., 2002). 
Third, the data sets differed substantially in both the number of stimuli and the 
average number of participants per item. The number of stimuli in a data set could be 
as small as 2 and as large as 720 (Figure 2.1b). A small number of stimuli means a 
limited amount of information in the data, which should benefit models with few 
parameters, such as the one-parameter models Exponential, HyperbolicH, and PD, due 
to their parsimony. The average number of participants per item means the weighted 
sample size of participants in a data set. For example, if, in a data set with 20 items, 
17 items had 100 responses each and the remaining three items had 95 responses each, 
the average number of participants per item was (100 × 17 + 95 × 3) / 20 = 99.25. 
Across data sets, the average number of participants per item can be as small as 1.5 
per item and as large as 3,500 per item (Figure 2.1b).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Details of the data sets. (a) Histogram showing implied daily interest 
rates on a log-scale. (b) Scatterplot showing the distribution of the number of items 
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(x-axis) and the average number of participants (y-axis) in the data sets, both on log-
scales. 
 
2.6.2 Stochastic specification influencing model performance 
We began the formal analysis by showing the influence of the stochastic 
specification on model performance. Figure 2.2 provides the comparisons between 
stochastic specifications. For each model q and stochastic specification r, we 
computed an Aggregate BIC value (ABIC), meaning BIC values summed across all 
data sets: 
¦
 
 
S
s
qrsqr
1
BICABIC
, 
where S = 225 (number of data sets).  
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Figure 2.2. Differences in Aggregate BIC values between stochastic specifications. 
(a) Differences between the Luce specification and the Logistic specification 
showing that the Luce specification was better for attribute-based models but the 
Logistic specification was better for alternative-based models and the hybrid model. 
(b) Differences between the Logistic specification and the Fechnerian specification 
showing that the former was better than the latter for all models. 
 
Figure 2.2a compares, for each model q, the Luce specification with the 
Logistic specification. Among the alternative-based models, all outcome-discounting 
models performed better with the Logistic specification than with the Luce 
specification. The value-discounting models, one of which is an alternative-based 
model (HyperbolicSRS) and the other a hybrid model (Interval), performed about 
equally well with the two stochastic specifications. All attribute-based models 
performed better with the Luce than with the Logistic specification. Figure 2.2b 
compares, for each model q, the Logistic specification with the Fechnerian 
specification. All models performed better with the Logistic than with the Fechnerian 
specification, although the difference for PD was small in comparisons with the 
differences for other models. 
It was clear that the stochastic specification made a big difference, and that we 
could not rely on a single specification to models when comparing different models. 
Thus, as the core interest of this study, the comparison of different intertemporal 
choice models below allowed the models to be flexibly combined with the stochastic 
specification that maximised their performance as follows. 
2.6.3 Model performance with the best-performing stochastic specification 
Given that different specifications produced different ranking of models, the 
choice of stochastic specification became an issue. To be maximally generous, we 
allowed each combination of a model and a data set to boost its performance by 
matching it with the best-performing stochastic specification. For the ease of 
exposition, we defined the Best BIC, or BBIC, of model q for data set s as the lowest 
value of the BIC values produced by the three stochastic specifications: 
qrs
R
rqs
BICminBBIC
1 
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where R = 3 (number of stochastic specifications). The Aggregate BBIC value 
(ABBIC) of model q was then obtained by summing the BBIC values across all 
datasets: 
¦
 
 
S
s
qsq
1
BBICABBIC , 
where S = 225 (number of data sets). Figure 2.3 shows these Aggregate BBIC values. 
The three tradeoff models (TM, BTMDB, and BTMSR respectively) came out best from 
the contest. The other two attribute-based models (DRIFT and ITCH) came out next, 
followed by the value-discounting models (Interval and HyperbolicSRS), in turn 
followed by the outcome-discounting models. The one-parameter proportional-
difference model (PD) came out worst. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Aggregate BBIC value for each model q (ABBICq). 
 
One possibility for the victory of the attribute-based models could be that they 
were favoured by only a small proportion of data sets, but the strength of evidence 
from them were extremely strong. Thus we continued to test whether or not a majority 
of data sets favoured the attribute-based models. Table 2.5 presents the percentage of 
all 225 data sets that each combination of model and stochastic specification provided 
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the lowest BBIC value for. To be clear, the lowest BBIC value is the lowest of the 
BBIC values across the fifteen models, or equivalently the lowest BIC value across 
the 45 combinations of model and stochastic specification, for a data set. A breakdown 
according to the model suggested that attribute-based models achieved the lowest 
BBIC value for 76.6% of the data sets. Among the discounting models, whether 
alternative-based or hybrid, the one-parameter specifications achieved the lowest 
BBIC value for 20.3% of the data sets, with HyperbolicH coming out first (13.4%), 
and Exponential second (6.8%). Combined, all remaining discounting models 
achieved the lowest BBIC value for only 3.1% of the data sets.  
 
Table 2.5 Percentage of data sets identifying each combination of model and 
stochastic specification as producing the lowest BBIC value. 
Category Model 
Stochastic specification 
Total 
Luce Logistic Fechnerian 
Alternative-based 
Exponential 4.3% 0.5% 2.1% 
22.5% 
Quasi-hyperbolic 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 
HyperbolicH 7.1% 1.7% 4.6% 
HyperbolicM 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
HyperbolicLP 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 
Constant sensitivity 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Double exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
HyperbolicSRS 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Hybrid Interval 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 
Attribute-based 
PD 5.1% 4.2% 3.3% 
76.6% 
DRIFT 11.1% 0.9% 0.4% 
ITCH 7.1% 1.3% 0.4% 
BTMDB 20.9% 2.7% 0.0% 
BTMSR 10.7% 1.3% 1.8% 
TM 4.0% 0.9% 0.4% 
Total  71.5% 14.0% 14.5% 100% 
Note. When more than one combination (m in number) has the lowest BBIC value, 
the count is evenly split (1 / m) among those combinations. 
 
There are two apparent contradictions in the results presented above. First, the 
full tradeoff model (TM) outperformed all other attribute-based models in terms of 
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Aggregate BBIC values (Figure 2.3), but was outperformed by all those models in 
terms of the percentage of data sets that identified them as producing the lowest BBIC 
value (Table 2.5). Second, Exponential and HyperbolicH seemed to beat all other 
discounting models, whether alternative-based or hybrid, regarding the percentage of 
data sets that they provided the lowest BBIC values (Table 2.5), but were beaten by 
all other discounting models (except for the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model) on 
the Aggregate BBIC values (Figure 2.3). To foster a better understanding of the 
contradictions, we carried out a more in-depth analysis in two separate waves for the 
attribute-based models and the (alternative-based and hybrid) discounting models 
respectively.  
Pairwise Comparisons between attribute-based models. To clarify this 
contradiction among attribute-based models, we disaggregated the data sets, and 
compared, for each data set s, the BBIC value achieved by the full tradeoff model 
(TM) with the BBIC values achieved by other attribute-based models. Figure 2.4a 
compared TM with basic tradeoff model by Scholten and Read (2013; BTMSR). A 
majority of the differences between the BBIC values (89.3%) fell above 6 (in favour 
of BTMSR) or below 6 (in favour of TM), which, by a conventional standard (Kass 
& Raftery, 1995; Raftery, 1995), constituted “strong” support or beyond for the 
winning model and there were many more occasions on which BTMSR received the 
support (85.1%) than occasions on which TM did (14.9%). However, if we look at the 
differences falling above 100 or below 100, which by an informal standard constitute 
“extremely strong” support for the winning model, there were eight occasions on 
which TM received the support (88.9%) but only one occasion on which BTMSR did 
(11.1%). Additionally, while the strongest evidence for BTMSR was a BBIC difference 
of 119, the strongest evidence for TM was a BBIC difference as high as 4,731. 
Therefore, we were confident to tell that BTMSR was favoured by the number of 
matches won, whereas TM was favoured by its extremely high scores in a relatively 
small number of matches won. Figures 2.4b-d tell similar stories about the 
comparisons between TM and BTMDB, DRIFT and ITCH respectively. Figures 2.4e, 
however, suggests that TM outperformed PD with respect to both the number of 
matches won and the strength of evidence in the matches won. 
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Figure 2.4. Pairwise differences in BBIC values (BBICqs) between the full tradeoff 
model (TM) and other attribute-based models. The 225 data sets are ordered from the 
most negative difference (favouring another attribute-based model other than TM) to 
the most positive difference (favouring TM). Dashed lines are positioned at BBIC 
differences of 6 or -6. 
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Figure 2.5. Pairwise differences in BBIC values (BBICqs) between BTMSR and other 
attribute-based models. The 225 data sets are ordered from the most negative 
difference (favouring another attribute-based model) to the most positive difference 
(favouring BTMSR). Dashed lines are positioned at BBIC differences of 6 or -6. 
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Figure 2.6. Pairwise differences in BBIC values (BBICqs) between BTMDB and 
attribute-based models. The 225 data sets are ordered from the most negative 
difference (favouring another attribute-based model) to the most positive difference 
(favouring BTMDB). Dashed lines are positioned at BBIC differences of 6 or -6. 
 
Further pairwise comparisons between the basic tradeoff models (BTMSR and 
BTMDB) and other attribute-based models suggested these two models outperformed 
other attribute-based models (see Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6). Finally, a pairwise 
comparison between the two basic tradeoff models (BTMSR and BTMDB) suggested 
BTMDB had an edge over BTMSR. Particularly, they performed almost equally well 
(|BBIC difference| < 2) for 50.7% of the data sets and another 16.0% provided only 
modest support to one or the other (2 ≤ |BBIC difference| < 6), but, for the remaining 
data sets, 73.3% of the remaining datasets (55 of 75) provided strong support to 
BTMDB and only 26.7% (20 of 75) provide strong support to BTMSR (see Figure 2.5a). 
Comparisons between discounting models. For the contradiction among the 
discounting models, certainly, the Aggregate-BBIC criterion should be more reliable 
than the Percentage-of-the-Lowest-BBIC criterion because the latter was silent on the 
majority of data sets that lent their support exclusively to the attribute-based models. 
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Indeed, the former was also consistent with the findings from previous intertemporal 
choice model contests that Exponential and HyperbolicH were typically outperformed 
by other discounting models (e.g., Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Cavagnaro et al., 2016; 
Peters et al., 2012; Scholten et al., 2014; Takahashi et al., 2008). 
Exponential and HyperbolicH were the only one-parameter discounting models 
in the contest and were special cases for many other discounting models. Thus they 
could win out only because of their parsimony, especially when data sets had a small 
number of stimuli or showed a narrow array of preference patterns. The boxplots in 
Figure 2.7 confirms this conjecture by showing that the subsets of data lending support 
to the one-parameter discounting models (i.e., Exponential and HyperbolicH), as well 
as the one-parameter PD model, generally had less items than other data sets. When 
data sets showed a broader array of patterns, other discounting models would probably 
fare better than the one-parameter discounting models (as indicated in Figure 2.3), but, 
in the majority of such cases, attribute-based models fared better still, with only a total 
of 3.1% of the lowest BBIC values going to the multi-parameter discounting models.  
 
 
Figure 2.7. Boxplots of the number of items per data set (x-axis is on a log scale). All 
eligible data sets are divided into three subsets: supporting one-parameter 
discounting models (n = 51), supporting the PD model (n = 34), and others (n = 
151). The numbers do not sum up to 225 because 11 data sets appear in the first two 
categories both. 
 
2.6.4 Model performance with monolithic stochastic specifications 
We have so far seen that the attribute-based models, especially the three 
variants of the tradeoff model, emerged as the winning models (Figure 2.3 and Table 
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2.5) and that, from comparisons of Aggregate BIC values between stochastic 
specifications, the Luce specification emerged as the optimal stochastic specification 
for attribute-based models, whereas the Logistic specification emerged as the optimal 
for the alternative-based models and the hybrid model (Figure 2.2). We now evaluate 
the potential costs of arbitrarily assuming a particular stochastic specification for all 
models in the contest. Figure 2.8 shows the Aggregate BIC values obtained with the 
three stochastic specifications respectively. The ranking according to the Aggregate 
BIC values obtained with the Luce specification was similar to the ranking according 
to Aggregate BBIC values. However, the Aggregate BIC values with the Logistic 
specification did not achieve the same resemblance. Instead, with the Logistic 
specification, the two value-discounting models (i.e., HyperbolicSRS and Interval) 
came out best from the contest, overturning the pattern obtained with the Aggregate 
BBIC values. The Fechnerian specification obtained a similar pattern of ranking to the 
one by the Logistic specification. We therefore confirmed what Stott (2006) and 
Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2010) earlier found outside the domain of intertemporal 
choice that different stochastic specifications could yield different rankings of models, 
echoing the vital importance of stochastic specification in choice modelling. 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Aggregate BIC values with monolithic stochastic specifications. 
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2.7 Discussion 
In this study, the attribute-based models, especially the family of tradeoff 
models, emerged as the convincing winners from a contest in which fifteen 
intertemporal choice models, each combined with three stochastic specifications, 
battled it out over 16,003 items in 225 data sets. In pairwise comparisons between 
attribute-based models, the full tradeoff model (TM) won fewer matches than most of 
other attribute-based models, but scored much better in matches won, meaning that, 
although the TM did not win out very often, if it won out, it won out big. This study 
also suggested that stochastic specifications played a vitally important role in the 
performance of intertemporal choice models in the model contest. While Logistic and 
Fechnerian specifications gave rise to value-discounting models (i.e., HyperbolicSRS 
and Interval), the Luce specification gave rise to the class of attribute-based models 
(except for PD), highlighting the importance of stochastic specifications in 
intertemporal choice modelling. 
2.7.1 Attribute-based models as the convincing winner 
This study provides extremely strong evidence for the attribute-based models. 
This evidence also lent support to the attribute-based evaluation rule recently proposed 
in intertemporal choice (Leland, 2002; Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010) and, 
more generally, judgment and decision making (Tversky, 1969; 1972). Further 
comparisons suggested that attribute-based models outperformed other attribute-based 
models (see Figure 2.3; this is also confirmed by the pairwise comparisons of BTMSR 
and BTMDB with other attribute-based models in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6).  
The proportional difference model (PD; Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016) is 
the only exception. The PD model came out poorly in terms of Aggregate Best BIC 
values, lagging behind all other models, although the percentage of data sets 
identifying it as the best model was not too bad (note that this percentage score was 
unreliable in this case as it was silent on the majority of data sets that support other 
models). These results could be appreciated in the light of two considerations. First, 
the PD model does not accommodate a basic discounting pattern implied by positive 
discounting that when xS and tS are held constant, an increase in tL – tS requires an 
increase in xL for a person to remain indifferent between SS and LL (Scholten & Read, 
2013). Meanwhile, the majority of the data sets in this contest involved only choices 
between an immediately available option and a delayed option, thus this theoretical 
CHAPTER 2 A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL COMPARISON 
 54 
limitation place PD in an obviously disadvantaged position. Second, PD does not 
accommodate the absolute magnitude effect, which is one of the most robust 
observations in intertemporal choice studies. 17  With these theoretical limitations, 
especially the former, it is not surprising that PD perform poorly in the contest. 
Despite the overwhelming success of attribute-based models in this model 
contest, they did not win in a sizeable minority of data sets. Furthermore, these data 
sets typically involved a few trials each. One possibility is that there is a shift of 
decision making strategies across trials. In particular, in the starting trials, people may 
use the alternative-based evaluation rule. When they get more experienced with some 
trials, they may switch to more heuristic attribute-based evaluation rule. As a result, 
data sets with more trials are likely to favour attribute-based models and those with 
less trials are likely to favour alternative-based models. However, the evidence for this 
proposal is weak in this study, because those data sets with a few trials mostly favoured 
the simplest alternative-based models primarily because of parsimony. 
2.7.2 The importance of stochastic specifications in choice modelling 
Like what Stott (2006) observed in risky choice, this study revealed an 
interaction between model and stochastic specification on model performance: 
Attribute-based models performed better with the Luce specification, but (alternative-
based and hybrid) discounting models performed better with the Logistic 
specification. We suggested two driving forces that could lead to the interaction. First, 
the Luce specification capacitates attribute-based models (except for PD) to 
accommodate the intricate pattern of relative nonadditivity, in terms of the violation 
to the product rule, while Logistic specification does not. Scholten et al. (2014, pp.420) 
demonstrate this feature in a basic tradeoff mode (BTMSR). We further argued that this 
feature was applicable to all the attribute-based models involved in this model contest, 
expect for PD (see Appendix 2D). This feature may make the Luce specification 
superior to the Logistic specification for attribute-based models. Second, the Logistic 
specification capacitates the outcome discounting models, which by themselves do not 
accommodate the absolute magnitude effect, to produce a quasi-absolute magnitude 
effect when LL is preferred to SS while the Luce specification never does. It is called 
                                                 
17 The absolute magnitude effect could be accommodated if one sets the threshold \ at different levels 
for the different outcome magnitudes (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016), as some have done for 
HyperbolicH to accommodate the same effect (e.g. Giordano et al., 2002; Green et al., 1997; Kirby, 
1997), but this is not explicitly written in the model and would have led to an endless proliferation of 
parameter settings within and across data sets.  
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a quasi-effect because it only predicts a change in the strength of preference, but not a 
preference reversal. For example, if one prefers $200 in 2 years to $100 in 1 year. 
Under the Logistic specification, that preference can be written as 0 < d(2)200  
d(1)100, where d (.) is the discount function. It follows that the strength of preference 
for LL will be augmented if the magnitude of the outcomes is raised by a common 
ratio k (k > 1), i.e., 0 < d(2)200  d(1)100 < d(2)200k  d(1)100k. However it is 
important to note that they could also produce a reverse-quasi-absolute magnitude 
effect when SS is preferred to LL, i.e., d(2)200k  d(1)100k < d(2)200  d(1)100 < 0.  
We also compared the Logistic specification with the Fechnerian specification, 
both difference specifications. All models performed better with the Logistic 
specification than with the Fechnerian specification. The cumulative Logistic and the 
cumulative normal functions are very similar except that the former asymptotes less 
sharply, or has fatter tails, than the latter (Figure 2.9). Thus, the Logistic specification 
is more tolerant of choice uncertainty than the Fechnerian specification, and may 
therefore contribute to better model fits. These findings highlighted the importance of 
developing alternative stochastic specifications that conveys distribution-free strength 
of preference in choice modelling (e.g., Cavagnaro, Regenwetter, & Popova, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2.9. The Logistic (standard cumulative logistic distribution) and the 
Fechnerian (standard cumulative normal distribution) specifications. 
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2.7.3 Conclusion 
Wrapped up, this model contest on a vast amount of secondary data strongly 
supports attribute-based models, especially the family of the tradeoff model, over 
alternative-based models of intertemporal choice and the Luce specification over 
difference specifications as the stochastic specification. Extensions to monetary 
losses, nonmonetary outcomes, and outcome sequences, whether monetary (Scholten 
et al., 2016), nonmonetary (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993), or both (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1998), are recommended, so as to evaluate the robustness of attribute-
based intertemporal choice. 
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CHAPTER 3 ATTENTION AND INTERTEMPORAL 
CHOICE 
 
 
Behavioural theories suggest that attention plays an important role in value-
based decision making (Bhatia, 2014; Bardalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012; 
Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Kőszegi &Szeidl, 2013; Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 
2010; Tversky, 1972). The more we attend to something the more important it 
becomes, or vice versa. To quantify the attention effect, some researchers proposed 
that, based on the drift-diffusion models, attention modulated the speed of value 
accumulation of options: An option accumulates its value faster when it is focused 
attention on than when it is not (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 
2011). Thus, for example, in a binary choice, the more an option is attended to, the 
more likely it is to be chosen (as long as it has a positive value). Studies on such option-
wise attention effects have gained increasing popularity in the literature (Armel, 
Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008; Franco-Watkins, Mattson and Jackson, 2016; Krajbich, 
Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & 
Scheier, 2003; Stewart, Hermens, & Matthews, 2016; Störmer & Alvarez, 2016).  
However, the option-wise attention effect is silent on what information people 
are accessing when focusing attention on an option. Studies have suggested that people 
could query information from different perspectives, not necessarily in an option-wise 
way when faced by a decision (Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, Brodscholl, & 
Goldstein, 2007; Tversky 1972). For one, many studies suggested that value-based 
choice could be made in an attribute-based fashion (Arieli et al., 2011; Leland, 2002; 
Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010; Tversky 1972; see Vlaev et al., 2011 for a 
review). In line with the attribute-based perspective, some studies suggested that 
attending to (the comparison along) an attribute across options produced an attribute-
wise attention effect (Fisher & Rangel, 2014; Experiment 2; Hare, Malmaud, & 
Rangel, 2011). For example, in a choice between fruit salad and cheesecake, focusing 
attention on calories will increase the likelihood of choosing the fruit salad against 
cheesecake while focusing attention on their tastiness will do the reversal. For another, 
focusing attention on (the valuation) of a single component, or an attribute value in a 
single option, could produce a component-wise attention effect (Fisher & Rangel, 
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2014; Experiment 2). For instance, focusing attention on the calories of the cheesecake 
is different from focusing attention on its tastiness and is also different from focusing 
attention on the calories of the fruit salad. The option-wise view on attention-driven 
preference is silent on either attribute-wise or component-wise attention effect. 
Based on the existing literature on the relationship between attention and 
choice, we described an overarching theoretical framework of the attention effects on 
intertemporal choice and proposed a novel procedure of attention manipulation that 
allowed us to investigate different ways of attention effect on intertemporal choice.  
3.1 Existing Literature 
There are two main approaches to studying the attention effects on value-based 
decision making. First, the attention effect can be measured using eye-tracking, and, 
second, attention can be manipulated directly.  
Eye-tracking studies. In eye-tracking studies, measures of visual attention 
such as eye movements and gaze duration are directly observed. Most eye-tracking 
studies focused on the option-wise attention effect (e.g. Fiedler & Glőckner, 2012; 
Franco-Watkins et al., 2016; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Stewart 
et al., 2016). These studies invariably found an option-wise attention effect on value-
based decision making that the more often an option was attended to, the more likely 
it was to be chosen (when options have positive values). For example, in an eye-
tracking study of the attention effect on intertemporal choice between smaller-sooner 
(SS) and larger-later (LL) options, Franco-Watkins et al. (2016) found that focusing 
attention on LL increased the likelihood of choosing LL and focusing attention on SS 
decreased the likelihood of choosing LL. 
Fisher and Rangel (2014; Experiment 1) was an exception. They analysed the 
attention effects on intertemporal choice in a component-wise way: Gaze durations on 
each of the four components (i.e., SS outcome, SS delay, LL outcome and LL delay) 
were identified independently, all of which served as the independent variables of a 
regression with the individual discount rate as the dependent variable. They found that 
attending to LL outcome decreased the individual discount rate (i.e., increased the 
likelihood of choosing LL) and attending to SS delay increased the individual discount 
rate (i.e., decreased the likelihood of choosing LL), while attending to the other two 
components had no significant behavioural effects. To account for this finding, Fisher 
and Rangel (2014) proposed a component-wise attention effect: attending to different 
components in the same option or along the same attribute can contribute 
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independently to the final choice. However, their conclusion was premature because 
they did not consider the possibility of the co-existence of multiple ways of the 
attention effect on value-based decision making, which will be discussed later.  
To sum up, eye-tracking generally can be used to test multiple ways of the 
attention effects on value-based decision making, although this advantage was rarely 
taken. Despite this advantage, eye-tracking studies can only draw a correlational 
relationship between attention and choice/preference and thus are silent on whether 
attention drives or merely reflects preference (Shimojo et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 
2016). 
Attention-manipulation studies. To draw a causal relationship between 
attention and value-based decision making, a few studies experimentally manipulated 
attention and tested the attention effects on decision making. Again, most of them 
tested the option-wise attention effect. For example, Shimojo et al. (2003) used the 
gaze-manipulation paradigm to study how attention influenced the judgment of facial 
attractiveness. They presented their participants with a pair of two faces sequentially 
on a computer screen. The faces were shown alternatively for 300 ms and 900 ms 
respectively for the same number of repetitions, after which participants decided 
which one of the faces was more attractive. Option-wise attention was manipulated by 
varying the duration for which options were directly attended to (i.e., 300 ms vs. 900 
ms per repetition), with a longer time inferred as greater attention. Armel et al. (2008) 
applied the same gaze-manipulation paradigm in choices between food items and 
choices between art posters respectively. A recent study by Störmer and Alvarez 
(2016) used the psychophysical attentional-cuing paradigm (Carrasco, Ling, & Read, 
2004) to study the option-wise attention effect on perceived facial attractiveness. 
Participants were shown two faces simultaneously (for 58 ms) and then decided which 
one was more attractive. Attention was manipulated by a task-irrelevant attention cue 
(a black dot for 70 ms) at the location of one of the faces preceding the onset of face 
presentation. They found that the cued face was more likely to be judged as more 
attractive.  
A few studies experimentally manipulated attribute-wise attention. To elicit 
attribute-wise attention, Hare et al. (2011) explicitly asked participants to attend to the 
healthiness, the taste or whatever features that automatically came to their minds in 
different conditions respectively in two-option food choices. This is an attribute-wise 
attention manipulation because healthiness and tastiness are different attributes or 
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dimensions in choosing between items of food. Fisher and Rangel (2014, Experiment 
2) used the gaze-manipulation paradigm to study the attribute-wise attention effect on 
intertemporal choice. In a standard intertemporal choice task between SS and LL, they 
presented participants with different attributes (i.e., outcomes and delays) 
alternatively. Attention was manipulated by presenting one attribute for 2,000 ms, the 
other for 500 ms alternatively, each repeated twice. They found that longer visual 
exposure, or greater attention, to the outcomes (i.e., SS and LL outcomes) than to the 
delays (i.e., SS and LL delays) increased the likelihood of choosing LL and thus 
decreased impatience. Specifically, when outcomes are exposed longer the proportion 
of LL choice is 53.6%, opposed to 51.6% when delays longer.  
These studies, without an exception, only elicited either the option-wise or the 
attribute-wise attention effect. Moreover, no previous study elicited the component-
wise attention. When the attention effect on value-based decisions operates in different 
ways, it is of principal interest in this study to synthesize these findings and to provide 
an integral account of them. 
3.2 Framework of the Attention Effects 
To help organise the existing literature, we drew up a framework of the 
attention effects in the context of intertemporal choice. The framework includes 
option-wise, attribute-wise and component-wise attention effects.  
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the framework. The option-wise effect is 
that focusing attention on the valuation of an option make the option in focus more 
likely to be chosen (Figure 3.1a). So focusing attention on SS decreases the chance for 
LL to be chosen while focusing attention on LL increases the chance that LL be 
chosen.  
The attribute-wise effect, instead, is that focusing attention on the comparison 
along an attribute makes the attribute overweighed and thus the option favoured by 
the comparison under attentional focus becomes more likely to be chosen. So focusing 
attention on outcomes increases the likelihood of choosing LL while focusing 
attention on delays decreases the likelihood of choosing LL (Figure 3.1b).  
The component-wise effect is that focusing attention on the judgment of a 
component of an option looms larger this specific component. If the component is 
favourable (i.e., positive in valence), the likelihood that the corresponding option be 
chosen increases. If the component is aversive (i.e., negative in valence), the likelihood 
that the option be chosen decreases. Thus, focusing attention on LL outcome [or SS 
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outcome] decreases [or increases] the likelihood that LL be chosen. By contrast, 
focusing attention on LL delay [or SS delay] increases [or decreases] the chance for 
LL to be chosen (Figure 3.1c).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Graphical illustrations of different ways of the attention effect on 
intertemporal choice. The upward arrows mean increased preferences for LL when 
the corresponding aspects are attended to. The downward arrows mean decreased 
preference for LL when the corresponding aspects are attended to. (a) Option-wise 
effect: attention being focused on options. (b) Attribute-wise effect: attention being 
focused on attributes. (c) Component-wise effect: attention is operated on each 
component independently from each other. 
 
In addition, different ways of the attention effects (i.e., option-wise, attribute-
wise and component-wise) are not exclusive. It is natural that people could allocate 
attention from different perspectives from time to time when faced with a decision 
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Scheibehenne, Rieskamp & Wagenmakers, 2013; 
Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Tversky, 1972; Weber, Johnson, Milch, Chang, 
Brodscholl, & Goldstein, 2007). Thus, it is theoretically possible that multiple ways 
of attention effects could co-exist in the making of value-based decisions. For 
example, one may first focus attention on the comparison along the outcomes 
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(attribute-wise) first and then switch her attention to the SS delay alone (component-
wise) in an intertemporal choice. 
3.3 Attention Manipulation and the Present Study 
To study different ways of the attention effects on intertemporal choice, we 
proposed a new way to manipulate attention in intertemporal choice. Roughly 
speaking, attention was manipulated by keeping one component varying across items 
while all other components were kept unchanged (see the experimental procedure of 
Experiment 1 in Figure 3.2 for an example). Given the long-standing assumption that 
stimuli that are varied within an otherwise stationary environment draw 
disproportionate attention (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Franconeri & 
Simons, 2003; Weber & Johnson, 2009), the varying component should attract more 
attention than others. For example, in an intertemporal choice between SS and LL, 
when the LL outcome kept varying across items but other components were kept 
constant, we expected LL outcome will attract more attention than others. 
Manipulating attention in this way had three advantages. First and foremost, 
this manipulation allowed attention to operate in different ways at the participants’ 
own will. This was a stark contrast to existing paradigms, in which participants were 
merely to show a pre-determined way of the attention effect on decision making, either 
option-wise (Armel et al., 2008; Shimojo et al., 2003) or attribute-wise (Fisher & 
Rangel, 2014; Hare et al., 2011). Second, the procedure opened the door to testing the 
component-wise attention effect, which had not been achieved by existing paradigms 
of attention manipulation. Third, the procedure delivered full information of the choice 
question to participants simultaneously so that the manipulation of attention should 
not intrude on the natural decision process. As it has been controversial whether people 
make option-based or attribute-based evaluation in value-based decision making 
(Leland, 2002; Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2010; Tversky, 1969; 1972), it is 
essential to display all relevant information to facilitate the natural decision process. 
By contrast, in the widely-used gaze-manipulation paradigm, only partial information 
of the choice questions was displayed once at a time, which could intrude the natural 
decision process. 
A drawback of this method was that it could lead to systematically different 
decision contexts across conditions at the item level, which could produce a 
background contrast effect (Ebert & Prelec, 2007; Priester, Dholakia, & Fleming, 
2004; Simonson & Tversky, 1992). The background contrast effect is a well-
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documented violation of sequential independence, which means that the current 
tradeoff will be influenced by other similar tradeoffs that one has been recently 
exposed to.18 This effect could take place when a series of LL options were presented 
sequentially. While systematically different blocking of items was used to manipulate 
attention, it could also produce a background contrast effect as a by-product, although 
the unintended manipulation of background contrast is orthogonal to the manipulation 
of attention as detailed later. Thus, while testing the attention effect on intertemporal 
choice, we in the meantime quantified the background contrast and statistically 
controlled the background contrast effect. 
Two experiments were conducted to test the attention effects on intertemporal 
choice with the new way of attention manipulation. Attention was directed to different 
components (the outcome and the delay) of LL (Experiment 1) and SS (Experiment 2) 
respectively.  
3.4 Experiment 1: Varying LL Components 
In Experiment 1, attention was manipulated by varying either the LL outcome 
[outcome-focus condition] or the LL delay [delay-focus condition] across items 
respectively. As attention was directed to the same option across conditions, the 
option-wise attention effect was silent on the difference between conditions. The 
attribute-wise and the component-wise effects both predicted that focusing attention 
on the LL outcome (in the outcome-focus condition) made people less impatient and 
thus more likely to choose LL than focusing attention on the LL delay (in the delay-
focus condition; see Figure 3.1). 
3.4.1 Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants. Participants for Experiment 1 were 191 USA residents recruited 
from Prolific Academic (73 females and 118 males). They were on average aged 31.6 
years old. 60.2% of them had a university degree or higher. After completing the 
experiment, each of them received a flat payment of $1. 
Intertemporal choice task. The intertemporal choice task included 81 target 
items. Across items, the smaller-sooner (SS) option was held constant, which was 
always receiving $110 in 2 months. The target items were created by crossing nine 
different LL outcomes with nine different LL delays. The LL outcome could take nine 
                                                 
18 While referring to similar concepts, Stewart et al. (2003) and Vlaev, et al. (2007) use the term 
“prospect relativity” and Ebert and Prelec describe this as attention-driven sensitivity to an attribute. 
We follow Simonson and Tversky (1992) by using the term “background contrast”. 
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values from $120 to $200 by an increment of $10. The LL delay could also take nine 
different values from 4 months to 20 months by an increment of 2 months. Nine 
additional screening items with a dominant option, which differed across conditions, 
were added to the target items to check whether participants were just responding 
randomly. So, there were totally 90 intertemporal choice items in each condition. 
Design. A between-participant design was adopted in Experiment 1. All 
participants answered the same target intertemporal choice questions, with only the 
pattern of presentation being different across conditions. In the outcome-focus 
condition, the 81 target items were divided into nine blocks so that only one LL delay, 
but all LL outcomes, appeared in a block. In each block, an additional screening item 
was added, whose LL outcome was $100 and LL delay was the same as the LL delay 
of target items in the same block (e.g., $100 in 6 months), making LL dominated by 
SS. The screening items were chosen in order not to intrude the one-attribute-varying 
property within a block. To consolidate the manipulation of attention, the inter-item 
substitution of LL outcomes was accompanied by a smooth transition animation (1000 
ms) with Odometer, a jQuery plugin in HTML (see Figure 3.2 for an illustration).19 
The order of blocks and the order of LL outcomes within each block were randomized 
among participants. 
In the delay-focus condition, items were also divided into nine blocks of nine 
items each. In each block, all LL delays, but only one LL outcome, appeared. An 
additional screening item was added to each block. The LL outcome of the screening 
item was the same as the corresponding LL outcome in the block and the LL delay is 
2 months (e.g., $150 in 2 months), making LL dominate SS. Within each block, the 
LL delay varied with the same inter-item transition animation (1000 ms), while others 
were kept constant across items. The order of blocks and the order of items in each 
block were randomized across participants. 
 
                                                 
19 The link to Experiment 1 is: http://gilum.lnx.warwick.ac.uk/wbs/experiment1/  
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Figure 3.2. Example screenshots of the experimental procedure in Experiment 1. In 
the outcome-focus condition, each intertemporal choice (except the first item in each 
block) was preceded by a transition from a different LL outcome to the current one 
(1000 ms), while the environment was otherwise kept unchanged. In the delay-focus 
condition, each intertemporal choice (except the first item in a block) was preceded 
by a transition from another LL delay to the current one (1000 ms), while the 
environment was otherwise kept unchanged. 
 
Procedures. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. 
To further control the effect of the relative position of the two options, the vertical 
placement of the SS and the LL options were counterbalanced among participants. For 
half of the participants from each condition, SS was placed above LL; for the other 
half, SS was placed below LL. After the intertemporal choice task, participants 
completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and demographic 
questions including gender, age, ethnical identity, annual income, educational 
qualifications and employment status. Being loosely related to the core focus of the 
chapter, results related to CRT were reported in Appendix 3C. 
Outcome-focus condition Delay-focus condition 
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Data analysis. Data analysis was carried out at the aggregate level. Binary data 
points from individual participants were aggregated into binomial data on each item 
in each condition. Mixed-effect models were applied to the aggregate data with a 
random intercept for each intertemporal choice item to capture the variation of the 
relative attractiveness of LL to SS across items.20 Statistical model fitting consisted of 
two steps. First, the probability of choosing LL was predicted by mixed-effect models 
with a logit link function. Specifically, two models were used:  
(1)  Attention1][-1logitˆ iiji xβ p  D  and 
(2)  Contrast BackgroundAttention3Contrast Background2Attention1][-1logitˆ iiiiiji xxxxβ p EED  , 
where ][ijD  (j = 1, …, 81) was the random intercept for each item. The random 
intercept was used to capture the relative attractiveness between SS and LL for each 
item. Model (1) had only attention, an effect-coded variable (-0.5 = delay-focus; 0.5 = 
outcome-focus), as the fixed-effect predictor while Model (2) involved both attention 
and background contrast. Second, the predicted probability of choosing LL, ipˆ , was 
fitted to data with the binomial distribution )ˆ,(Bin~ iii pNk , where ik was frequency of 
LL choices and iN  was the corresponding sample size. Results of the two models are 
shown in Table 3.1. 
Bayesian modelling was used for parameter estimation and model evaluation 
(see Kruschke, 2010). To be conservative, the prior distribution used for all parameters 
was the standard normal distribution, rather than the uniform distribution. Estimation 
of parameters was summarized by the median (Md) and 95% high density interval 
(95% HDI) of posterior distributions. Model evaluation and comparisons were based 
on the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC; Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, Vehtari, 
& Rubin, 2014a; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002): The lower the 
DIC value, the better the model. The descriptive accuracy of some models was further 
checked with posterior predictive check (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, Vehtari, & 
Rubin, 2014b). 
Bayesian modelling and Deviance Information Criterion were approximated 
by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) in JAGS (Plummer, 2003), which was called 
                                                 
20 We did not involve the formal intertemporal choice models (as in Chapter 2) to capture the variation 
across items because it is highly controversial which model is descriptively accurate (see also 
Cavagnaro et al., 2016a; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Read, 2001; Scholten et al., 2014). 
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by the runjags package (Denwood, in press) in R (R Core Team, 2016). Three 
independent Markov chains were run for each model. Each chain consisted of 10,000 
burn-in samples, which served as the initial adaption period and were discarded from 
formal approximation, and 50,000 formal samples. Convergence among the three 
chains was checked with the Gelman-Rubin statistic (Gelman &Rubin, 1992). The 
three chains summed up to 150,000 samples from the posterior distribution. 
3.4.2 Experiment 1: Results and discussion 
Among all 191 participants, five did not choose the dominant option in at least 
seven out of the nine screening items (see the histogram in Figure 3.3 for a full 
distribution of the number of dominant choices among the nine screening items) and 
thus were excluded from the formal analysis, leaving us with data from 186 
participants in the analysis. Note that the results were the same when all data were 
included in the following analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Histogram of the number of dominant choices of the nine screening 
items. 
 
Attention effect. A preliminary check of the attention effect is by comparing 
the proportion of LL choices in the two experimental conditions. Participants in the 
outcome-focus condition made 40.1% LL choices while those in the delay-focus 
condition only chose 29.5% LL, showing a sizable attention effect on intertemporal 
choice. The Bayesian estimation of the attention effect in Model (1) confirmed that 
participants from the outcome-focus condition were much more likely to choose LL 
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than those from the delay-focus condition (Mdβ1 = 0.581, 95% HDIβ1 = [0.506, 0.657]; 
see Table 3.1).  
Background contrast effect. As explained earlier, this manipulation of 
attention would also change the background contrast at the item level as a by-product. 
Specifically, we distinguished between two types of background contrast: the global 
background contrast and the local background contrast. The global background 
contrast referred to all the tradeoffs in the experiment that have been exposed before 
the current tradeoff. Because of the randomization of both blocks and items within 
blocks, any two items would appear prior to or after each other with even odds in both 
conditions, so global contrast was counterbalanced between conditions at the 
aggregate level.  
The local background contrast referred to all the tradeoff in the same block 
that have been exposed before the current tradeoff. Because the SS option was constant 
across items, we quantified the local background contrast with the relative rank of the 
LL option of all LL options in the same block, ranging from -1 (dominated by all other 
LL options), through 0, to 1 (dominating all other LL options).21 Practically, it was 
calculated with the difference between the proportion of LL options that an LL option 
dominated and the proportion of LL options that dominated the LL proportion among 
all other items in the same block. For example, in the outcome-focus condition, $150 
in 8 months dominated three LL options and were dominated by five LL options in 
the same block. Its local background contrast is quantified as 3/8 – 5/8 = -0.25. In the 
delay-focus condition, $150 in 8 months dominated six LL options and were 
dominated by two LL options in the same block. Its local background contrast is 
quantified as 6/8 – 2/8 = 0.5.  
Model (2) involved the quantified local background contrast and thus 
statistically controlled the background contrast effect. The result from this model was 
consistent with Model (1) in terms the attention effect on intertemporal choice (Mdβ1 
= 0.563, 95% HDIβ1 = [0.483, 0.641]; see Table 3.1). In addition, it revealed a strong 
background contrast effect in the predicted direction: The more dominated LL options 
(or the less dominating LL options) there were in the same block, the more likely the 
                                                 
21 Theoretically, only the items that appeared before the current one is the “background”. Because the 
order of items in a block is randomized, each item has even odd to appear before or after another item. 
So when data are aggregated across participants, the overall pattern should be a good approximation of 
the aggregate “background” for the current item. 
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current LL is to be chosen (Mdβ2 = 0.484, 95% HDIβ2 = [0.404, 0.564]). Local contrast 
did not influence the attention effect (Mdβ2 = 0.044, 95% HDIβ2 = [-0.146, 0.235]). 
 
Table 3.1 Model evaluation and parameter estimation (Experiment 1) 
Fixed-effect Parameter 
Estimation  
(1) (2) 
Attention β1 0.581 [0.506, 0.657] 0.563 [0.483, 0.641] 
Background Contrast β2  0.484 [0.404, 0.564] 
Attention × 
Background Contrast β3  0.044 [-0.146, 0.235] 
DIC  1036.535 930.558 
Note. Attention is an effect-coded variable: -0.5 = delay-focus; 0.5 = outcome-focus. 
Background contrast ranges from -1 to 1, by an increment of 0.25. The estimates 
outside of the brackets are the median (Md) and the estimates in the brackets are the 
95% High Density Intervals (95% HDIs) of the 150,000 samples from the posterior 
distribution. The 95% HDIs of the cells in boldface do not cross 0. 
 
Involving the local background contrast in the model increased the 
performance of the model. According to DIC, Model (2), which involved background 
contrast as a fixed-effect predictor along with attention, performed better than Model 
(1), which involved attention as the only fixed-effect predictor (DICM1 = 1036.535; 
DICM2 = 930.558). To further check the goodness of fit of Model (2) to data, we ran a 
posterior predictive check by comparing the predicted probability of choosing LL 
based on posterior distributions of parameters with the original proportion of LL 
choice (Figure 3.4). We found that Model (2) described the data in Experiment 1 very 
well. Ninety-eight percent (159 out of 162) of the original LL proportions from data 
are accommodated within the predicted 95% HDIs based on the posterior distribution 
of parameters.  
To summarise, Experiment 1 showed a strong attention effect on intertemporal 
choice, with an attention-driven shift of preference of 10.6% LL choices (40.1% vs. 
29.5%). The robustness of this effect was confirmed by two mixed-effect Bayesian 
models (Models 1-2 in Table 3.1). The finding was consistent with both attribute-wise 
and component-wise attention effects on intertemporal choice, which predicted that 
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attending to the LL outcome, relative to attending to the LL delay, reduced impatience, 
(see Figure 3.1b-c). 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Posterior predictive check of Model (2) for Experiment 1. The dots 
represent original proportions of LL choices and the vertical lines represent the 95% 
high density intervals (HDIs) of the predicted probability of choosing LL based on 
the 150,000 samples drawn from posterior distributions. 
 
3.5 Experiment 2: Varying SS Components 
Experiment 2 disentangled the attribute-wise and the component-wise 
attention effects. It was similar to Experiment 1 except that attention was manipulated 
on the smaller-sooner (SS) option. Thus, in the outcome-focus condition, attention was 
directed to the SS outcome; In the delay-focus condition, attention was directed to the 
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SS delay. The attribute-wise attention effect predicted that focusing attention on the 
SS outcome (outcome-focus condition), invoking the comparison of options along the 
outcome attribute, made people less impatient than attending to the SS delay (delay-
focus condition), invoking the comparison along the delay attribute (Figure 3.1b). By 
contrast, the component-wise effect predicted that attending to the SS outcome made 
SS more attractive and attending to the SS delay made SS less attractive. So, the 
component-wise effect predicted that attending to the SS outcome would make people 
more impatient than attending to the SS delay (Figure 3.1c). 
3.5.1 Experiment 2: Methods 
Participants. Participants were recruited using the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1.  There were 196 USA residents recruited via Prolific Academic (76 
females and 120 males). They were on average 31.0 years old. 62.8% of them had 
completed a university degree or higher. After completing the experiment, each of 
them received a flat payment of $1. 
Intertemporal-choice task. Each participant made 90 choices, of which 81 
were target items and 9 were screening items with a dominant option. LL was constant 
across all items, which was receiving $190 in 20 months while SS varied in both the 
magnitude of the outcome and the length of the delay. The SS outcomes of the target 
items could take nine values from $100 to $180 by an increment of $10. The SS delays 
of the target items could take nine different values from 2 months to 18 months by an 
increment of 2 months.  
Design. There were two conditions, manipulated between participants. In the 
outcome-focus condition, the 81 target items were divided into nine blocks so that only 
one of the nine SS delays, but all SS outcomes, appeared within a block. In each block, 
an additional screening item was added, of which the SS outcome was $200 and the 
SS delay was the same as the delay in the corresponding block (e.g., $200 in 6 months), 
making LL dominated by SS. In the delay-focus condition, items were also divided 
into nine blocks. In each block, all SS delays, but only one SS outcome, appeared. The 
SS delay of the screening item was 20 months and the SS outcome was the same as 
the SS outcome of target items in the corresponding block, making SS dominated by 
LL. In both conditions, the substitution of the varying value across items in a block 
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was accompanied with a one-second inter-item transition animation, as in Experiment 
1.22  
Procedures. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. 
Within each condition, the order of blocks was randomized and the order of items in 
each block was randomized across participants. The relative position of SS and LL 
were counterbalanced across participants. For half of the participants from each 
condition, SS was always above LL; for the other half, SS was always below LL. After 
the intertemporal choice task, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) and demographic questions as in Experiment 1 (see Appendix 3A-B for details; 
see Appendix 3C for results relating to CRT). 
Data analysis. As in Experiment 1, parameter estimation was carried out with 
mixed-effect Bayesian modelling. Different fixed-effect terms were used for models 
as shown in Table 3.2 and random intercepts were applied to each item to capture the 
relative attractiveness of LL to SS across items. The Bayesian analysis was 
approximated with the same MCMC simulation procedure as in Experiment 1. Model 
evaluation and comparison were based on DIC and posterior predictive check. 
3.5.2 Experiment 2: Results and discussion 
Data from three participants were excluded from the formal analysis because 
they did not choose the dominant option in at least seven out of the nine screening 
items, leaving data from 193 participants in the formal analysis.  
Attention effect. Participants in the outcome-focus condition chose 41.2% LL 
and those in the delay-focus condition chose 43.0% LL, showing a slight attention 
effect on intertemporal choice. The direction of the effect was consistent with the 
component-wise effect, but was inconsistent with the attribute-wise effect. This effect 
was confirmed by the mixed-effect Bayesian model with manipulated attention as the 
fixed-effect predictor (Model (1) in Table 3.2). Participants in the outcome-focus 
condition were less likely to choose LL than those from the delay-focus condition 
(Mdβ1 = -0.107, 95% HDIβ1 = [-0.184, -0.033]). 
  
                                                 
22 The link to Experiment 2 is: http://gilum.lnx.warwick.ac.uk/wbs/experiment2/  
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Table 3.2 Model evaluation and parameter estimation (Experiment 2). 
Fixed-effect Parameter 
Estimation 
 (1)  (2) 
Attention β1 -0.107 [-0.184, -0.033] -0.152 [-0.230, -0.076] 
Background Contrast β2  -0.439 [-0.517, -0.359] 
Attention × 
Background Contrast β3  -0.272 [-0.474, -0.067] 
DIC  1020.769 930.206 
Note. Attention is an effect-coded variable: -0.5 = delay-focus; 0.5 = outcome-focus. 
Background contrast ranges from -1 to 1, by an increment of 0.25. Model evaluation 
and parameter estimation (Experiment 2): The estimates outside the brackets are the 
median (Md) and the estimates in the brackets are the 95% High Density Intervals 
(95% HDIs) of the 150,000 samples from the posterior distribution. The 95% HDIs of 
the cells in boldface do not cross 0. 
 
Background contrast effect. The local background contrast was quantified as 
in Experiment 1, ranging from -1 (the current SS option was dominated by all others 
in the same block) to 1 (the current SS option dominated all others in the same block). 
Model (2) in Table 3.2 controlled the background contrast effect. In Model (2), the 
direction of the attention effect was consistent with that in Model (1) (Mdβ1 = -0.152, 
95% HDIβ1 = [-0.230, -0.076]). The local background contrast also influenced 
intertemporal choice in the predicted direction (Mdβ2 = -0.439, 95% HDIβ2 = [-0.517, 
-0.359]). There was an interaction between the attention effect and the background 
contrast effect on intertemporal choice (Mdβ3 = -0.272, 95% HDIβ3 = [-0.474, -
0.0067]), which means the attention effect was moderated by the local background 
contrast. This moderation effect, however, did not attenuate the attention effect as 
shown in the main effect of attention in Model (2).  
Involving background contrast improved the performance of the model. As 
shown in Table 3.2, the DIC value of Model (2) was smaller than the DIC value of 
Model (1) (DICM1 = 1020.769; DICM2 = 930.206). The goodness of fit of Model (2) 
to the data in Experiment 2 was further confirmed by a posterior predictive check. 
Comparisons between the original data and the posterior predictions suggested that 
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98.8% (160 out of 162) original LL proportions points were within the corresponding 
95% HDIs of the predicted probability of choosing LL based on the 150,000 samples 
from the posterior distribution of parameters (see Figure 3.5). 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Posterior predictive check of Model (2) for Experiment 2. The dots 
represent original proportions of LL choices and the vertical lines represent the 95% 
high density intervals (HDIs) of the predicted probability of choosing LL based on 
the 150,000 samples drawn from posterior distributions. 
 
Comparisons between Experiments 1 and 2.  Although the direction of the 
attention effect was inconsistent with prediction of the attribute-wise effect, it did not 
rule out the possibility that the attribute-wise effect co-exist with the component-wise 
effect. Indeed, it was very likely that they co-existed because the attention-driven 
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preferential shift in in Experiment 2, where the attribute-wise and the component-wise 
effects offset each other, was much smaller than that in Experiment 1, where the two 
ways of the attention effects compensated each other. This contrast had two 
manifestations. First, between-condition difference in the average proportion of LL 
choice of all items was 10.6% in Experiment 1, which was much larger than 1.8% as 
in Experiment 2 (Figure 3.6a). Using a frequentist independent-sample t-test, the 
difference reached significance at α = .001 (t155 = 6.48, p < .001). This difference could 
not be attributed to a floor or ceiling effect in Experiment 2 because the average 
proportion of LL choice in Experiment 2 is even closer to 50-50 than that in 
Experiment 1. Thus, there should be no floor or ceiling in Experiment 2 that curbed 
the effect size. Second, the Bayesian estimation of the attention effect (β1), which 
could be exponentiated to Odd Ratio as the effect size, from model fitting was much 
larger in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2 (Figure 3.6b). Regardless of which model 
was used for the estimation, the estimated effect size was constantly larger in 
Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Comparisons of the two experiments. (a) The between-condition 
difference of the overall proportion of LL choice is larger in Experiment 1 (blue 
bars), where attribute-wise and component-wise effects compensate each other, than 
in Experiment 2 (orange bars), where they offset each other. (b) Bayesian estimation 
of the size of the attention effect (β1) is larger in Experiment 1 (blue lines) than in 
Experiment 2 (orange lines). The points represent median values of posterior 
distributions and the lines 95% and 99% HDIs respectively. Note that the direction 
of the effect in Experiment 2 was mirrored for the ease of comparing the effect sizes. 
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To sum up, when the attribute-wise and component-wise effects were 
disentangled, the direction of the net attention effect found in Experiment 2 was not 
consistent with the attribute-wise effect, neither the option-wise effect. Thus, it was 
direct evidence of the component-wise attention effect on intertemporal choice. 
Moreover, the findings did not rule out the possibility that the attribute-wise attention 
effect co-existed with the component-wise attention effect. Comparisons of the effect 
sizes from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggested that the co-existence of the 
attribute-wise and the component-wise attention effects could explain the gap in the 
effect sizes from the two experiments better than the absence of the attribute-wise 
attention effect in the two experiments. 
3.6 Discussion 
Beyond the option-wise attention effect, this study provided evidence for two 
ways of the attention effects (i.e., attribute-wise and component-wise attention effects) 
on intertemporal choice, using a new method to manipulate attention. In Experiment 
1, manipulated attention produced a sizable attention effect on intertemporal choice 
when the attribute-wise and component-wise effect compensated each other. 
Experiment 2 further provided direct evidence for the component-wise attention 
effect, when the two effects were disentangled. Finally, the large gap between the 
attention effect sizes in the two experiments suggested a probable co-existence of the 
attribute-wise and the component-wise attention effects.  
This study also generalise some previous findings. Most previous studies have 
found evidence for the option-wise attention effect on value-based decisions, but these 
effects were based on strong assumptions of the decision process (e.g., Fiedler & 
Glőckner, 2012; Franco-Watkins et al., 2016; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et 
al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2016). When studying the option-wise attention effect only, 
researchers were also, at least implicitly, assuming the alternative-based evaluation 
rule for decision making. While many studies suggest attribute-based evaluation rule 
for decision making (e.g., Arieli et al., 2011; Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Scholten & 
Read, 2010; Tversky, 1972; as well as Chapter 2 in this thesis), the investigation of 
the attribute-wise attention effect is rare (see Fisher & Rangel, 2014, Experiment 2; 
Hare et al., 2011). In face of both lines of evidence, the present study did not make a 
particular assumption of the decision process and the way of the attention effect and 
found evidence for the co-existence of multiple ways of the attention effect. Moreover, 
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with the (indirect) evidence for the attribute-wise attention effect, the results also 
suggest the existence of attribute-based evaluation rule for intertemporal choice. 
This study has several limitations. First, although we are pretty confident that 
this attention manipulation was valid, we lacked the process data, such as eye-tracking, 
to prove that our participants were paying more attention to the component of interest, 
which we intended to direct their attention to, than others. Second, the results did not 
provide direct evidence for the attribute-wise attention effect. However, because of the 
similarity between the two experiments, we were able to make an inter-experiment 
comparison and thus inferred that the attribute-wise attention effect co-existed with 
the component-wise attention effect Third, in this study, we did not study the most 
studied option-wise attention effect. 
 
To conclude, this study showed that attention, which was manipulated by 
simply varying different components across items, alters intertemporal choice, thus 
driving intertemporal preference. The results suggested that, beyond the option-wise 
effect, attention could operate on an attribute and a component individually, therefore 
influencing choice behaviour differently. In addition, the experiments also found 
robust background contrast effects, suggesting violations of sequential independence 
in intertemporal choice. Collectively, these results suggested that the elicited 
intertemporal preference was highly uncertain, contingent on attention allocation, as 
well as background contrast. While the elicitation of time preference inevitably 
involves varying one or another component across items, a better understanding of 
how attention drives intertemporal choice is especially valuable to de-biasing the 
attention effect that is very likely to emerge in the elicitation procedure. 
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CHAPTER 4 DETECTED PATTERNS OF 
IMPATIENCE 
METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS 
 
 
Standard models of intertemporal discounting assume stationarity or constant 
impatience (CI) over time (Fisher, 1930; Fishburn & Rubinstein, 1982; Koopmans, 
1960; Samuelson, 1937). Despite the normative appeal and mathematical tractability 
of constant impatience, studies have documented an array of phenomena that are 
anomalous to constant discounting (see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 
2002; Read et al., in press for further reviews). One of the most prominent phenomena 
is the delay effect, which means that people discount at a higher rate for short delays 
than for long ones. For example, someone indifferent between $1,000 in one year and 
$800 today (implying a discount rate of 20% per annum) would probably prefer $1250 
in two years to $800 today (implying a discount rate lower than 20% per annum). 
The delay effect is one of the most robust phenomena anomalous to constant 
discounting and has been corroborated in a host of studies (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Benzion 
et al., 1989; Bleichrodt & Johannesson, 2001; Cairns & van der Pol, 2000; Green et 
al., 1994b; Kirby & Marakovic, 1995; Pender, 1996; Myerson & Green, 1995; Read 
& Read, 2004; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988; 
Thaler, 1981). Based primarily on the delay effect, many researchers proposed that the 
discount rate declined over time, which was called decreasing impatience (DI). In the 
above example, with the inferred discount rate of 20% per annum over the first year 
from the indifference between $1,000 in one year and $800 today, the preference of 
$1250 in two years to $800 today suggests that the discount rate over the second year 
of the longer delay is lower than 20% per annum. 
However, the delay effect confounds decreasing impatience with subadditive 
discounting (Read, 2001). Subadditive discounting means that people are more 
impatient when a delay is divided into sub-intervals than when the delay is undivided. 
This effect has been replicated in many studies (e.g., Kinari, Ohtake, & Tsutsui, 2009; 
McAlvanah, 2010; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006; 
2010). Reconsider the example of the delay effect above. The preference of $1250 in 
two years to $800 today can be attributed to either a decrease of discount rate over the 
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second year (i.e., decreasing impatience) or a decrease of discount rate over the 
undivided delay of two years than over the two consecutive one-year sub-intervals 
(subadditive discounting). Thus, the delay effect is not convincing evidence for 
decreasing impatience.  
The pattern of impatience (sometimes described as constant vs. hyperbolic vs. 
anti-hyperbolic discounting) has thereafter been debated for decades in the study of 
intertemporal choice. Many studies attempted to examine the pattern of impatience 
while subadditive discounting was controlled. Unsurprisingly, testing at the individual 
level often showed heterogeneous patterns, with some decreasingly impatient and 
other increasingly impatient (e.g., Attema, Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker; 2010; 
Augenblick, Niederle, &Sprenger, 2015; Bleichrodt, Gao, &Rohde, 2016; Halevy, 
2015; Olea & Strzalecki, 2014). Still, testing at the aggregate level also resulted in a 
mixture of constant impatience (CI; e.g., Halevy, 2015; Read, 2001), decreasing 
impatience (DI; e.g., Bleichrodt et al., 2016; Chark, Chew, & Zhong, 2015; Green, 
Myerson, Macaux, 2005; Keren & Roelosfma, 1995; Kinari, Ohtake, & Tsutsui, 2009; 
Read & Read, 2004; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Sopher 
& Sheth, 2006; Weber & Chapman, 2005) and increasing impatience (II; e.g., Attema 
et al., 2010; Read, Olivola, & Hardisty, 2016; Sayman & Öncüler, 2009; Scholten & 
Read, 2006; 2010). Increasing impatience is the reversal of decreasing impatience, 
which means that people discount more for remote future than for close future. 
4.1 A Design Bias 
Among all, a vast majority of the studies used pairs of intertemporal choice 
items between smaller sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) options to detect the pattern 
of impatience at the aggregate level (e.g., Chark, Chew, & Zhong, 2015; Holcomb & 
Nelson, 1992; Keren & Roelosfma, 1995; Read, Olivola, & Hardisty, 2016; Sayman 
& Öncüler, 2009; Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Sopher & Sheth, 2006; Weber & 
Chapman, 2005). For example, in the pair of choices below, 
Choice 1a: $100 today (A) or $110 in three months (B) 
Choice 1b: $100 in three months (C) or $110 in six months (D), 
if someone chooses A and D, she is showing decreasing impatience. By contrast, if 
someone chooses B and C, she is showing increasing impatience. However, the 
patterns of those choosing A and C [or B and D] cannot be identified. Thus, studies 
employing such paradigms made an implicit assumption that the unobserved patterns 
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were homogeneous to the observed and thus generalized from the observed patterns 
to the unobserved. 
However, to our best knowledge, the assumption that the unobserved patterns 
of impatience are homogeneous to the observed patterns has not been empirically 
tested. If this assumption does not hold, we argued that the detected aggregate pattern 
of impatience could be biased by the design of pairs. To illustrate, in the pair of 
Choice1a and 1b, because the LL options are relatively less attractive than the SS 
options, impatient people are likely to choose A and C regardless of their patterns of 
impatience and thus their patterns are unobservable. Thus, this pair is likely to identify 
only the patterns of impatience from patient individuals. By contrast, in the pair of 
Choice 2a and 2b below: 
Choice 2a: $100 today (E) or $300 in three months (F) 
Choice 2b: $100 in three months (G) or $300 in six months (H), 
because the LL options are relatively more attractive than the SS options, patient 
individuals are very likely to choose F and H regardless of their patterns of impatience. 
Correspondingly, the pair of Choice 2a and 2b is likely to identify only the patterns of 
impatience from impatient individuals.  
As illustrated above, a testable hypothesis from the homogeneity assumption 
is the independence between individuals’ pattern of impatience and their degree of 
impatience. Suppose that impatient individuals are more likely to exhibit decreasing 
impatience (DI) than patient ones and patient individuals are more likely to exhibit 
increasing impatience (II) than impatient ones. Then the pair of Choice 1a and 1b is 
likely to show increasing impatience, but the pair of Choice 2a and 2b is likely to show 
decreasing impatience, at the aggregate level. 
4.2 An Order Effect 
Studies that investigate discounting using either the switch paradigm or other 
paradigms ask two matched sets of intertemporal choice questions: we will call these 
a base set and a delayed set.  As in the examples above, a common front-end delay 
(FED) is added to the delays of the base set to form the delayed set.  In many studies 
both sets are presented in random order (e.g., Bleichrodt et al., 2016; Green et al., 
2005; Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Kinari, Ohtake, & Tsutsui, 2009; Read, 2001; Read 
& Read, 2004; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Read et al., 2016; Scholten & Read, 2006; 
Sopher & Sheth, 2006), in others the two sets are presented separately and sequentially 
in order. For example, Sayman and Öncüler (2009, Study 2a) presented the base set 
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prior to the delayed set to half of their participants and presented the delayed set prior 
to the base set to the other half, but no comparison was made in the paper. Chark et al. 
(2015) used one base set and two delayed sets and the base set was presented at the 
top of a list of choices, followed by the two delayed sets.  Some studies assigned the 
different sets to different groups of participants (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Sayman 
& Öncüler, 2009, Study 2b; Weber & Chapman, 2005).  
Does the presentation order influence the identified discount pattern? In 
behavioural decision research, order effects have been observed in financial decision 
making (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & 
Schwartz, 1997), social choice (Knez & Camerer, 2000; Vlaev & Chater, 2007) and 
intertemporal choice (Dai, Grace, & Kemp, 2009). A well-documented order effect is 
the background contrast effect, which suggests that exposure to prior tradeoff will 
influence their choice in the current tradeoff (Priester et al., 2004; Simonson & 
Tversky, 1992; Stewart et al., 2003; 2015; Ungemach et al., 2011; Vlaev et al., 2007; 
2009; Walasek & Stewart, 2015).  However, to our best knowledge, no study has 
directly investigated the order effect on the identified discount pattern. Given that 
different studies presented intertemporal choice questions with different orders, if 
there were an order effect on the identified discount pattern, it could contribute to 
conflicting evidence on hyperbolic discounting.  
4.3 The Present Study 
This study focused on the methodological issues on the pattern of impatience 
and has three goals. The first was to study the relationship between individuals’ pattern 
of impatience and their degree of impatience, therefore examining a potential design 
bias when pairs of items were used to detect the aggregate pattern of impatience. The 
second goal was to test an order effect on the detected pattern of impatience. The two 
contributions not only filled the gaps in the literature, but could also contribute to the 
understanding of the heterogeneous and conflicting findings regarding the pattern of 
impatience in the literature. Third, it could also detect the pattern of impatience in 
various conditions. 
Two experiments were conducted for this study. Both experiments adapted 
Kirby, Petry and Bickel’s (1999) Monetary Choice Questionnaire to measure the 
degree of impatience and to detect the pattern of impatience. The original Monetary 
Choice Questionnaire had 27 intertemporal choice items, of which each was a binary 
choice between an immediately available smaller-sooner (SS) option and a delayed 
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larger-later (LL) option (see Table 4.1). To detect the pattern of impatience, another 
27 items were created by adding a front-end delay of 100 days to each of the 27 
original intertemporal choice items. A comparison between the new items and the 
original items enabled us to identify the pattern and, to some extent, to quantify the 
degree of decreasing impatience. 
The advantages to use the adapted Monetary Choice Questionnaire were 
twofold. First, this questionnaire was easy to use and time-saving. With only 27 
original items and 27 adapted items, participants mostly completed the task within ten 
minutes. Second, the 27 pairs of choices offered extensive variation in terms of the 
relative attractiveness between SS and LL, which enables us to identify the aggregate 
pattern of impatience with different subsets of participants along the spectrum of the 
relative attractiveness between SS and LL (see Figure 4.2 showing that the average SS 
proportion per pair ranges from one end [0%] to the other [100%]). 
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Table 4.1 Intertemporal choice items and implied hyperbolic discount rates in both 
the no-FED (front-end delay = 0) condition and the FED (front-end delay = 100) 
condition. 
Pair ID 
Smaller 
amount 
(xL) 
Larger 
amount 
(xS) 
Interval 
(t) 
Magnitude 
level 
Implied k 
(no-FED) 
Implied k 
(FED) 
1 11 30 7 Small 0.24675 -0.01042 
2 15 35 13 Small 0.10256 -0.01108 
3 14 25 19 Small 0.04135 -0.01319 
4 24 35 29 Small 0.01580 -0.02723 
5 19 25 53 Small 0.00596 0.01474 
6 25 30 80 Small 0.00250 0.00333 
7 22 25 136 Small 0.00100 0.00111 
8 28 30 179 Small 0.00040 0.00042 
9 34 35 186 Small 0.00016 0.00016 
10 20 55 7 Medium 0.25000 -0.01042 
11 25 60 14 Medium 0.10000 -0.01111 
12 27 50 21 Medium 0.04056 -0.01327 
13 34 50 30 Medium 0.01569 -0.02759 
14 40 55 62 Medium 0.00605 0.01531 
15 49 60 89 Medium 0.00252 0.00337 
16 54 60 111 Medium 0.00100 0.00111 
17 47 50 160 Medium 0.00040 0.00042 
18 54 55 117 Medium 0.00016 0.00016 
19 31 85 7 Large 0.24885 -0.01042 
20 33 80 14 Large 0.10173 -0.01109 
21 41 75 20 Large 0.04146 -0.01318 
22 54 80 30 Large 0.01605 -0.02653 
23 55 75 61 Large 0.00596 0.01476 
24 69 85 91 Large 0.00255 0.00342 
25 67 75 119 Large 0.00100 0.00112 
26 80 85 157 Large 0.00040 0.00041 
27 78 80 162 Large 0.00016 0.00016 
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4.4 Experiment 1: Design Bias 
In Experiment 1, we primarily tested the correlation between participants’ 
degree of impatience and their pattern of impatience. The degree and pattern of 
impatience were simultaneously measured with the adapted Monetary Choice 
Questionnaire as described above. In addition, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005) and the Consideration for Future Consequences scale (CFC; 
Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) were also administrated (See 
Appendices 3A and 4A for the details of the questionnaires). By testing the 
relationship between the degree and the pattern of impatience, Experiment 1 could 
examine a design bias when pairs of intertemporal choice items were used to detect 
the aggregate pattern of impatience. 
4.4.1 Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants. Participants for Experiment 1 were 104 adults (65 females, 29 
males and others unidentified) from the UK, recruited online via prolific academic 
(https://prolific.ac/). They were on average 37.87 (SD = 11.86) years old.  
Design. Experiment 1 used a within-subject design. Two conditions were 
involved: The no-FED condition and the FED condition. Using a within-participant 
design, Experiment 1 could identify whether an individual exhibited decreasing, 
increasing or constant impatience in intertemporal choice at both individual and 
aggregate levels. 
Tasks and procedures. Participants were asked to complete three tasks: the 
intertemporal choice task, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and the Consideration 
for Future Consequences (CFC) scale. As mentioned earlier, the intertemporal choice 
task was adapted from the Monetary Choice Questionnaire. The no-FED condition 
used the original 27 items from the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (e.g., choosing 
between receiving £11 today and receiving £30 in seven days). In the FED condition, 
a front-end delay of 100 days was added to each of the original items from the 
Monetary Choice Questionnaire (e.g., choosing between receiving £11 in 100 days 
and receiving £30 in 107 days). In addition, three screening items, of which each had 
a dominant option, were added to each condition to check if the participants were just 
choosing randomly (six screening items in total; see Appendix 4B for details of the 
screening items). So, there were in total 60 intertemporal choice items. Items were 
presented individually to participants in a randomized order. 
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After the intertemporal choice task, participants were given the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) and the Consideration for Future Consequences (CFC) scale. 
CRT had three questions of which each was a four-option multiple choice. Previous 
studies showed that high cognitive reflection, measured with the CRT, reduced 
impatience (e.g., Frederick, 2005; see also Appendix 3C for Chapter 3). The CFC scale 
was a self-reported scale on to what degree people cared about consequences 
happening now or in the future. It had fourteen items, each of which was rated on a 
five-point Likert scale. The scale was slightly revised from the original version to 
increase its readability. Demographic information was recorded before participants 
completed the study (see Appendix 4C for details). 
4.4.2 Experiment 1: Results and discussion 
Data were firstly filtered by the screening items. Among all, only three 
participants selected the dominated option in only one of the six screening items. Thus, 
no data was eliminated from the formal analysis. 
Model-free measure of impatience. Individual participants’ degrees of 
impatience were quantified with the proportion of SS choices of all the 54 target items 
as in Myerson, Baumann and Green (2014). The larger the SS proportion, the more 
impatient the participant was. Quantifying the degree of impatience this way had three 
advantages. First, it was model-free and sidestepped the controversy on an appropriate 
model for intertemporal choice (see Doyle, 2012 for a collection of them). Second, 
this measure was straightforward and easily tractable in the FED condition, compared 
to the widely-used one-parameter hyperbolic discount function (Herrnstein, 1981; 
Mazur, 1987): kttd  1 1)( , where k is the hyperbolic discount rate. The hyperbolic 
discount function was the default model used to quantify the degree of impatience in 
the Monetary Choice Questionnaire (Kirby et al., 1999). However, it has a theoretical 
limitation in interpreting choices between two delayed outcomes because it produces 
nonsensical (negative) implied discount rates for 12 out of the 27 items in the FED 
condition (see the numbers in boldface in Table 4.1).  
Third, the proportion measure of the degree of impatience could capture the 
information from the inferred hyperbolic discount rate, k, for the no-FED condition, 
in both a theoretical and an empirical sense. The Monetary Choice Questionnaire was 
designed to measure time preference by a two-way titration procedure, which was 
perfectly shown by the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the interval 
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between SS and LL and the absolute/proportional amount differences (as shown in 
Table 4.2). With such an item structure, any intertemporal choice model assuming 
positive time preference should predict similar order of switch points. For example, 
any model, given any set of parameters, that predicts LL is preferred to SS in item #3, 
will also predict that LL is preferred to SS in items #4-9. This lay the theoretical basis 
to use the proportion of SS choices in the (adapted) Monetary Choice Questionnaire 
as the measure of impatience. Empirically, Myerson et al. (2014) found that the 
correlation between the proportion of SS choices and the logarithm of k, the estimated 
hyperbolic discount rate, in the Monetary Choice Questionnaire was extremely strong 
(Pearson correlation coefficient r = .97). Similarly, the data in Experiment 1 also 
revealed an extremely strong correlation between the logarithm of the estimated k and 
the proportion measure of impatience in the no-FED condition (Pearson correlation 
coefficient r = .94). 
 
Table 4.2 Spearman correlation coefficients between the interval (t) and the 
absolute/proportional amount differences in the original Monetary Choice 
Questionnaire. 
 Correlation coefficient between the interval (t) and  
 Absolute amount difference 
Proportional 
amount difference 
Small -0.98 -1.00 
Medium -0.98 -0.98 
Large -1.00 -1.00 
All -0.87 -0.96 
Note. The absolute amount difference is xL - xS. The proportional amount difference 
is (xL - xS)/xL. 
 
Decreasing impatience. The pattern of impatience could be qualitatively 
identified as decreasing impatience (DI), constant impatience (CI) and increasing 
impatience (II), and could be quantified along a continuum from extremely decreasing 
impatience, through constant impatience, to extremely increasing impatience. For 
brevity this quantification of the pattern will henceforth be called the degree of 
decreasing impatience. Like the measure of impatience, the degree of decreasing 
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impatience was quantified with a model-free measure: d, the number of SS choices in 
the FED condition minus the number of SS choices in the no-FED condition. Thus, a 
negative d meant decreasing impatience and a positive d meant increasing impatience. 
The smaller the d (< 0) value, the higher the degree of decreasing impatience. The 
larger the d (> 0) value, the higher the degree of increasing impatience. 
As shown in Figure 4.1a, a majority of participants exhibited decreasing 
impatience (59.6%) while only a small proportion exhibited increasing impatience 
(24.0%) or constant impatience (16.3%). Thus, at the individual level, Experiment 1 
revealed an overall pattern of decreasing impatience, t(103) = 5.07, p < .001. 
 
Table 4.3 Data from an example pair of items showing decreasing impatience. 
 
FED condition 
SS: 
£27 in 100 days 
LL: 
£50 in 121 days 
No-FED 
condition 
SS: £27 today 8 14 
LL: £50 in 21 days 1 81 
Note. In this pair of choices, only one participant shows increasing impatience by 
switching from LL in the no-FED condition to SS in the FED condition, while 14 
exhibit decreasing impatience by switching from SS in the no-FED condition to LL 
in the FED condition. A McNemar’s chi-square test on the off-diagonal suggests that 
this pattern is statistically significant, χ2 = 11.27, p < .001. 
 
Another view at the aggregate level also revealed a general pattern of 
decreasing impatience. The 27 pairs of items across conditions allowed us to identify 
the pattern of impatience at the aggregate level. McNemar’s chi-square tests showed 
that seven out of the 27 pairs exhibited decreasing impatience (ps < .05), while none 
of them demonstrated increasing impatience (see the left column in Figure 4.2). Table 
4.3 gives an example of these pairs. In this example, fourteen participants switched 
from a choice of SS in the no-FED condition to a choice of LL in the FED condition, 
while only one made the reverse pattern of choices. McNemar’s chi-square test on the 
off-diagonal confirmed the pattern of decreasing impatience shown in this item (χ2 = 
11.27, p < .001). However, despite statistical significance, this specific pair only 
identified the switching patterns from only 15 out of the104 participants, leaving the 
patterns from the majority of participants unidentified. The same issue applied to many 
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other items in this experiment, as well as many previous studies employing the same 
method (e.g., Chark et al., 2015; Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Keren & Roelosfma, 1995; 
Read, et al., 2016; Sayman & Öncüler, 2009; Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Sopher 
& Sheth, 2006; Weber & Chapman, 2005), which highlighted the importance of 
testing the (in)dependence between the degree of impatience and the pattern of 
impatience. 
Correlation between DI and impatience. With the quantified degree of 
impatience and the degree of decreasing impatience at the individual level, Experiment 
1 revealed a significant correlation between the overall degree of impatience and 
degree of decreasing impatience (r = -.33, p < .001), suggesting that impatient 
individuals were more likely to exhibit decreasing impatience than patient ones (see 
Figure 4.1b).  
This quantified degree of decreasing impatience, however, was subject to a 
theoretical limitation (Prelec, 2004). The degree of decreasing impatience was 
approximated by the difference of the numbers of SS choices in no-FED and FED 
conditions, which was analogous to the difference between the elicited discount rates 
in the two conditions, However, according to Prelec (2004), the degree of decreasing 
impatience should be a function of both the decrease of discount rate over time and 
the discount rate per se.23 To sidestep the bias from our approximation, we reduced 
the quantified degree of decreasing impatience to three discrete patterns of impatience: 
decreasing impatience (DI: d < 0), constant impatience (CI: d = 0) and increasing 
impatience (II: d > 0). A one-way ANOVA was used to compare the means of SS 
proportions (or degrees of impatience) across the three groups. If the degree of 
impatience differed across the three groups, it still confirmed a connection between 
the degree of impatience and the pattern of impatience. The results did suggest the 
connection between the pattern of impatience and the degree of impatience by showing 
that the degrees of impatience differed across the three groups, F(2, 101) = 3.38, p = 
.038. A Tukey post-hoc test showed that the SS proportion was higher in the II group 
                                                 
23 Prelec (2004) states that the degree of decreasing impatience is the “Arrow convexity of the log of 
the discount function”. Based on Prelec’s framework, Attema et al. (2010) developed an experimental 
procedure called Time Trade-Off sequences to measure decreasing impatience. However, Prelec’s 
(2004) framework and Attema et al.’s (2010) implementation are still incompatible with subadditive 
discounting. Because of the strong evidence for subadditive discounting in the literature (e.g., Kinari et 
al., 2009; McAlvanah, 2010; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010), 
future development of the framework to measure decreasing impatience should take subadditive 
discounting into consideration. 
CHAPTER 4 DETECTED PATTERNS OF IMPATIENCE 
 89 
than in the DI group (p = .031). Other pair-wise comparisons did not approach 
significance (ps > .25). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Histogram of the degree of decreasing impatience at the individual level 
(a, c and e) and the correlation between the degree of decreasing impatience and the 
degree of impatience (b, d and f). 
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This correlation questioned the assumption that the undetected patterns were 
homogeneous to the detected patterns with pairs of intertemporal choice items and 
thus pinpointed the potential design bias in the detected aggregate pattern of 
impatience with pairs of intertemporal choice items. This was confirmed by the 
analysis based on pairs of items. As shown in Figure 4.2, the detected patterns of 
decreasing impatience at the aggregate level clustered among those with unattractive 
SS options (i.e., the average proportions of SS choices are below 50%). In particular, 
the average SS proportions from six out of the seven pairs of items that identified 
decreasing impatience were below 50%.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Item-based aggregate patterns of impatience. Decreasing impatience or 
increasing impatience was identified by McNemar’s chi-square test with α = .05.  
 
Relationship with other measures. Previous studies showed that cognitive 
reflection reduced impatience in intertemporal choice (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Chapter 
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3 in the thesis, see Appendix 3C). To test the relationship between cognitive reflection 
and impatience in this experiment, participants were divided into two groups 
according to their performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Those 
answered all three CRT questions correctly were regarded to have high cognitive 
reflection and others low cognitive reflection. Consistent with previous findings, 
participants with high cognitive reflection were less impatient that those with low 
cognitive reflection, t(33.3) = 2.99, p = 0.006. The results also revealed a moderate 
correlation between the impatience measure from intertemporal choice and the self-
reported impatience from the Considerations for Future Consequences (CFC) scale, r 
= .23, p = .017. The correlation between the degree of decreasing impatience and 
cognitive reflection or the CFC measure of impatience was not significant (ps > .25). 
4.5 Experiment 2: Order Effect 
Results from Experiment 1 suggested that the pattern of impatience was not 
independent from the degree of impatience and that impatient individuals were more 
likely to be decreasingly impatient that patient individuals. Experiment 2 further 
examined whether decreasing impatience was stable across decision contexts. The 
decision context was simply manipulated by varying the sequential order of the no-
FED and the FED conditions, so the effect of decision context on the detected pattern 
of impatience in Experiment 2 was also an order effect. 
4.5.1 Experiment 2: Methods 
Participants. Four hundred and one adults (232 females, 167 males and others 
unidentified) from the United Kingdom participated in Experiment 2 via Prolific 
Academic. Their average age was 32.49 (SD = 11.68) years. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two between-participant conditions, the no-FED-first 
and the FED-first conditions, as detailed later. The no-FED-first condition had 198 
participants and the FED-first condition had 203 participants. 
Design. A 2 (FED: no-FED and FED) × 2 (Order: no-FED-first and FED-first) 
mixed factorial design was used in Experiment 2. The within-participant factor is the 
front-end delay (FED) as in Experiment 1, which could be no-FED or FED. The order 
of the no-FED and the FED conditions were manipulated between participants.  
Tasks and procedures. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
between-participant conditions. As in Experiment 1, participants in both conditions 
completed three tasks: the intertemporal choice task, the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT) and the Consideration for Future Consequences (CFC) scale. The intertemporal 
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choice task included two within-participant conditions, the no-FED condition and the 
FED condition, each of which consisted of 27 items. So each participant completed 54 
intertemporal choice items as in Experiment 1. In the no-FED-first condition, 
participants answered the no-FED items before the FED items. In the FED-first 
condition, participants answered the FED-items before the no-FED items. Items in 
each within-participant condition were presented in a randomized order. After the 
intertemporal choice task, participants were asked to complete the CRT task and the 
CFC scale as in Experiment 1. Demographic information was recorded at the end of 
the experiment (see Appendix 4C for details of the questions). 
4.5.2 Experiment 2: Results and discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the degree of impatience and the degree of decreasing 
impatience were quantified in a model-free approach. For each participant, the degree 
of impatience was quantified by the proportion of SS choices of all 54 intertemporal 
choice items. The degree of decreasing impatience was quantified by d, the number of 
SS choices in the FED condition minus the number of SS choice in the no-FED 
condition. 
Decreasing impatience. The detected pattern of impatience at the individual 
level suggested that 47.0% [or 66.0%] of the participants exhibited DI, 35.9% [or 
18.7%] exhibited increasing impatience (II) and 17.2% [or 15.3%] exhibited constant 
impatience (CI) in the no-FED-first [or FED-first] condition (see Figure 4.1c and 
4.1e). Aggregately, out of the 27 pairs of intertemporal choices, off-diagonal 
McNemar’s chi-square tests suggested that seven [or fifteen] pairs exhibited 
decreasing impatience while only one [or no] pair exhibited increasing impatience 
with the alpha level of 0.05 in the no-FED-first [or FED-first] condition (see Figure 
4.2). In summary, Experiment 2 revealed an overall pattern of decreasing impatience 
at both the individual and the aggregate levels. 
Order effect. A multilevel linear regression was used to formally test the effect 
of the order of presentation:  
iiiiiiji xxxxy HEEEED  OrderFED3Order2FED10][  
where the dependent variable, y, is the proportion of SS choices in every 27 items per 
participant (unit: %). FEDx  is an effect-coded variable indicating the front-end delay (-
0.5 = no-FED; 0.5 = FED). Orderx was an effect-coded variable indicating the order of 
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presentation (-0.5 = no-FED-first; 0.5 = FED-first). An individual-level random 
intercept, ][ijD , was used to control for participant-specific variability in her degree of 
impatience. The model was implemented in lme4 in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015). Results are presented under Model (1) in Table 4.4. 
The main effect of the front-end delay (FED) confirmed the overall pattern of 
decreasing impatience (β1 = -5.00, p < .001). The interaction effect between order and 
FED suggested the order effect on the degree of decreasing impatience (β3 = -5.02, p 
< .001). Participants in the FED-first condition exhibited stronger degrees of 
decreasing impatience than those in the no-FED-first condition. The order of 
presentation did not influence the overall degree of impatience, β2 = 0.88, p > .25. 
 
Table 4.4 Parameter estimation for Experiment 2. 
Fixed effect Parameter 
Estimation 
 (1)  (2) 
FED β1 -5.00*** -4.45*** 
Order β2 0.88 -0.14 
FED × Order β3 -5.02*** -4.38** 
CRT β4  -11.36*** 
FED× CRT β5  1.75 
Order × CRT β6  -2.95 
FED × Order × CRT β7  2.04 
Intercept β0 54.53*** 51.03*** 
Note. FED is an effect-coded within-participant variable: -0.5 = the no-FED 
condition; 0.5 = the FED condition. Order is an effect-coded between-participant 
variable: -0.5 = the no-FED-first condition; 0.5 = the FED-first condition. CRT is 
also an effect-coded variable, indicating the level of cognitive reflection: -0.5 = low; 
0.5 = high: The dependent variable is the proportion of SS choices of every 27 items 
per participant (%). 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Correlation between DI and impatience. The correlation between the degree 
of decreasing impatience and the degree of impatience was replicated in Experiment 
2 in both the no-FED-first and the FED-first conditions. As shown in Figures 4.1d and 
4.1f, impatient individuals were more likely to exhibit decreasing impatience than 
patient ones in both conditions (no-FED-first condition: r = -.32, p < .001; FED-first 
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condition: r = -.38, p < .001). We further dropped the strength of the quantified 
decreasing impatience and reduced it to three discrete groups: decreasing impatience 
(DI: d < 0), constant impatience (CI: d = 0) and increasing impatience (II: d > 0). A 3 
(groups: DI, CI and II) × 2 (order: no-FED-first and FED-first) ANOVA suggested 
that the overall degree of impatience differed across groups (F(2, 395) = 31.12, p < 
.001). Tukey post-hoc tests suggested that participants in the DI group were more 
impatient than the counterparts in the CI and the II groups (ps < .001). The main effect 
of presentation order (p > .25) and the interaction effect (p = .067) in the ANOVA 
were non-significant. 
Relationship with other measures. To test if cognitive reflection influenced 
the degree of impatience and the degree of DI and moderated the order effect, 
individual participants’ level of cognitive reflection (high or low) was involved in a 
second multilevel linear regression: 
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where CRTix  is the level of cognitive reflection (-0.5 = low cognitive reflection, 0.5 = 
high cognitive reflection). Results are presented under Model (2) in Table 4.4. 
Consistent with the findings from Experiment 1, participants with high cognitive 
reflection were less impatient than those with low cognitive reflection (β4 = -11.36, p 
< .001), but cognitive reflection had no effect on the degree of decreasing impatience 
(β5 = 1.75, p = .237), nor on the order effect (β6 = -2.95, p = .477). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Multilevel mediation analysis (Experiment 2). The subscription j refers to 
the two between-participant conditions. Random effects are allowed for both the 
direct and the indirect effects in the multilevel mediation model. 
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The CFC measure of impatience was positively correlated with the impatience 
measured with the intertemporal choice task in both conditions (no-FED-first 
condition: r = .33, p < .001; FED-first condition: r = .46, p < .001). It was also 
negatively correlated with the degree of DI (no-FED-first condition: r = -.16, p = .020; 
FED-first condition: r = -.23, p < .001). Further multi-level mediation analysis (shown 
in Figure 4.3; see also Bauer, Preacher, & Gil, 2006) suggested that the correlation 
between the degree of DI and the CFC measure of impatience could be completely 
mediated by the degree of impatience measured with the intertemporal choice task 
(with the mean direct effect 'c  = 0.16, p =.066).  
In short, Experiment 2 replicated the correlation between the pattern of 
impatience and the degree of impatience, which in turn revealed the design bias when 
using pairs of intertemporal choice items to detect the aggregate pattern of impatience 
in intertemporal choice. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that the degree of 
decreasing impatience was not a stable trait, but was subject to the decision context, 
even if the context was simply manipulated by varying the sequential presentation 
order of intertemporal choice items.  
4.6 Discussion 
This study focused on the pattern of impatience in intertemporal choice and 
considered two ways that could influence the detected pattern of impatience. They 
were a design bias and an order effect. First, the two experiments showed that the 
individuals’ patterns of impatience depend on their degrees of impatience: Impatient 
individuals were more likely to exhibit decreasing impatience than patient ones. This 
correlation implied that the use of pairs of intertemporal choice items to detect the 
aggregate pattern of impatience could be biased because of the design of items (see 
Figure 4.2 for an overview). Second, the detected pattern of impatience (or the degree 
of decreasing impatience) was subject to an order effect when the test items were 
presented in different sequential orders.  
4.6.1 Complexity and heterogeneity of the pattern of impatience 
A few studies suggested that the pattern of impatience was complex and 
depended on the length of delays. For example, Sayman and Öncüler (2009) argued 
that individuals were likely to be increasingly impatient for short delays (e.g., several 
days) but decreasingly impatient for long delays. Attema et al. (2010) made a similar 
claim. However, it is important to note that their claims of “short delays” were 
distinctly different from each other. Attema et al. (2010) considered delays of several 
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months short, while Sayman and Öncüler (2009) considered delays of the same length 
long ones. By contrast, Chark et al. (2015) found that people exhibited decreasing 
impatience for short delays (within approximately one month), but constant 
impatience for long ones (approximately between one month and one year).Thus, there 
is not a coherent message in terms of how the pattern changes as a function of the 
length of delays. 
Not only is the pattern of impatience complex, it is also heterogeneous across 
individuals. However, the importance of this heterogeneity has not been paid enough 
attention, even among the studies that identified the patterns at the individual level. 
Particularly, the pattern of impatience was usually studies in isolation, disregarding 
the degree of impatience. The present study, to our best knowledge, was the first one 
to test the relationship between individuals’ patterns of impatience and their degrees 
of impatience. We found a connection between the two: Impatient individuals were 
more likely to exhibit decreasing impatience than patient ones (see Figure 4.1b, d and 
f). 
Importantly, the correlation between the pattern of impatience and the degree 
of impatience leads to a design bias when pairs of intertemporal choice items between 
SS and LL were used to detect the aggregate pattern of impatience. Specifically, a pair 
of items offering attractive LL is more likely to detect decreasing impatience than a 
pair of items offering attractive SS (see Figure 4.2). This design bias is inevitable when 
this method is used because it can only identify the patterns from a subset of 
participants and the design of the pair of items can selectively expose different the 
patterns from different subsets of participants (e.g., Chark et al., 2015; Holcomb & 
Nelson, 1992; Keren & Roelosfma, 1995; Read, et al., 2016; Sayman & Öncüler, 2009; 
Scholten & Read, 2006; 2010; Sopher & Sheth, 2006; Weber & Chapman, 2005). 
Consequently, studies employing such a method to detect the pattern of impatience 
are limited in generalisability, especially when only a small number of pairs are 
involved. 
Moreover, the design bias may have interfered the findings on how the pattern 
of impatience changes over the length of the delay when pairs of intertemporal choice 
items were used. Although inter-study or intra-study comparisons are not plausible 
because of numerous confounding factors, such as the magnitude level, front-end 
delay length and the methodological variations discussed below, future studies may 
address these confounding factors with systematic experimental designs.  
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4.6.2 Methodological factors influencing the pattern of impatience 
Some studies have shown that some methodological factors can influence the 
detected pattern of impatience. Read et al. (2005b) found that the framing of 
intertemporal choice questions influences the detected pattern of impatience. 
Particularly, decreasing impatience was observed when time was described by the 
length of delays, but was not when it was described in calendar dates. Studies also 
suggested that response mode mattered. For example, Read and Roelofsma (2003) 
found that a matching task was more likely to identify decreasing impatience than a 
choice task. However, a reversed pattern was observed in two studies using similar 
item structures: Attema et al. (2010) found an aggregate pattern of increasing 
impatience with a matching task while Bleichrodt et al. (2016) found an aggregate 
pattern of decreasing impatience with a choice task in intertemporal choice of 
monetary gains. As illustrated earlier, Experiment 2 in this study identified a new 
methodological factor: the order effect on the detected pattern of impatience. 
Collectively, the effects of the methodological variants suggest that static discount 
functions with decreasing impatience, increasing impatience or even both do not 
capture the dynamic feature of the elicited pattern of impatience.  
4.6.3 Conclusion, limitations and future directions 
This study focused on two methodological concerns on the detected pattern of 
impatience in intertemporal choice. First, studies using aggregate choices in pairs of 
intertemporal choice questions only detected a (small) subset of participants and 
different items might identify the pattern from different subset of participants. The 
study exhibited an interdependence between the degree of impatience (which is 
usually termed as time preference or discount rate) and the pattern of impatience (i.e., 
decreasing, increasing or constant impatience), suggesting that the use of different 
intertemporal choice items could detect different patterns of impatience. Second, the 
change of decision context, which was simply manipulated by the sequential 
presentation order of items, could substantially influence the pattern of impatience. 
The latter called for a better understanding of the cognitive processes involved in 
intertemporal choice as well as the pattern of impatience. 
One limitation of this study is that we only studied a special case of decreasing 
impatience, i.e., the immediacy effect, where the base set has no front-end delay 
(FED). Future investigation could extend this to more general decreasing impatience 
to compare short-FED and long-FED conditions. 
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This study also has two recommendations for future research into the 
elicitation of the pattern of impatience in intertemporal choice. First, when 
appropriate, researchers should elicit indifference points to identify the pattern of 
impatience to avoid the potential design bias in using pairs of items (e.g., Attema et 
al., 2010; Chark et al., 2015). Second, when necessary, instead of using a single pair 
of item, researchers should use multiples pairs of items that offer extensive relative 
attractiveness between SS and LL to detect the pattern of impatience from individuals 
with different degree of impatience.  
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The study of intertemporal choice has drawn much attention in both 
psychology and economics for decades. Undoubtedly there are a vast number of 
accounts for it (see Frederick et al., 2002; Scholten & Read, 2010; Lempert & Phelps, 
2016). Each account speaks a different voice, even if the situation is as simple as a 
binary choice between a smaller-sooner sum of money and a larger-later sum of 
money. Among all, one is the “trait” voice, which proposes that time preference is a 
stable trait that characterise human behaviour in various situations and can be 
measured with specific intertemporal choice tasks. For example, studies have shown 
that measured time preference in laboratory experiments can predict human financial 
behaviour (Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006), criminal act (Wilson & Daly, 2006), and 
health and eating behaviour (Appelhans et al., 2011; Borghans & Golsteyn, 2006; 
Reimers et al., 2009). Another is the “constructive” voice. This voice, by contrast, 
proposes that intertemporal choice or intertemporal preference is unstable and 
malleable to diverse framing of intertemporal choice tasks (see framing effects in 
Section 1.2.1 in Chapter 1 [pp. 17]) and others normatively irrelevant factors (e.g., 
exogenous attention). Although the “constructive” research agenda does not dictate 
that preferences are exclusively constructed, it pays little attention to the stability of 
preferences.  
The two voices contrast starkly, but very little effort has been made to alleviate 
the tension. One way to alleviate the tension between the “trait” and the “constructive” 
voices is to foster a better understanding of the cognitive processes underlying 
intertemporal choice, therefore introducing models thereof so as to reconcile the 
conflicting theoretical standing points. Below, I will first summarise the findings from 
the preceding chapters and then discuss the theoretical implications and potential 
future directions. 
5.1 Summaries of the Findings 
In this section, I will briefly recap the findings from the three empirical 
chapters, crystallising our understanding of the findings. 
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5.1.1 Evaluation rules 
The evaluation rule concerns how information is represented and how choice 
is made. In Chapter 2, an array of models that embrace different evaluation rules were 
quantitatively contested based on large-scale secondary data sets. The results from 
Chapter 2 provide strong support for the class of attribute-based models and thus the 
attribute-based evaluation rule. The findings are consistent with other studies that 
compared attribute-based models with alternative-based models in intertemporal 
choice (e.g., Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; Scholten et al., 2014). Especially, Dai and 
Busemeyer (2014) compared alternative-based with attribute-based models with 
individual-level data. They also found that attribute-based models received stronger 
evidence from a larger number of participants. 
5.1.2 Attention effects 
Exogenous attention is normatively irrelevant to value-based decision making 
and should not influence intertemporal choice. However, as shown in Chapter 3 and 
other studies (e.g., Fisher & Rangel, 2014), exogenous attention influences 
intertemporal preference in systematic ways, as in other value-based decision making 
(Armel et al., 2008; Fiedler & Glőckner, 2012; Krajbich et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 
2016). Moreover, the attention effects revealed in Chapter 3 are beyond the framework 
in the literature. While the existing framework usually assumes an option-wise 
attention effect and sometimes an attribute-wise attention effect, the study in Chapter 
3 revealed a component-wise attention effect: Each component receiving attention is 
overweighed independently from other components in the same option or along the 
same attribute. 
5.1.3 Background contrast effects 
Background contrast indicates violations of sequential independence, which 
means that the preference in one choice should not be influenced by others. Consistent 
with other studies (e.g., Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Stewart et al., 2015), Chapter 3 
reveals robust background contrast effects on intertemporal choice. In addition, the 
order effect revealed in Chapter 4 is related to the background contrast effect. 
Collectively, it is evident that background contrast plays an important role in the 
elicited time preference and decreasing impatience, a stylised behavioural pattern in 
intertemporal choice. However, this has been largely overlooked. 
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5.2 Theory Development Revisited 
Intertemporal choice modelling started with economic rationality (Fisher, 
1930). Later on, it is the behavioural regularities that have motivated the development 
of the theories and models of intertemporal choice. In this section, I will briefly outline 
the history of the theory and model development in the study of intertemporal choice, 
with the implications from the present thesis. 
5.2.1 Static models 
In the early stage of model development, intertemporal choice models were 
often built upon specific empirical findings. For example, to accommodate decreasing 
impatience (or hyperbolic discounting), a class of hyperbolic discounting models were 
proposed (e.g., Herrnstein, 1981; Mazur, 1987; Laibson, 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992). To accommodate both decreasing impatience and increasing impatience, more 
sophisticated discount models have been proposed (Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker, 
2009; Ebert & Prelec, 2007; Sayman & Öncüler, 2009). To accommodate the absolute 
magnitude effect, value functions with increasing elasticity have been proposed (e.g., 
Chapman, 1996b; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Scholten et al., 2014).  
Violations of transitivity in intertemporal choice gave rise to the class of 
attribute-based models (Leland 2002, Roelofsma & Read, 2000; Rubinstein 2003; 
Scholten & Read, 2010). Chapter 2 further suggests that the descriptive accuracy of 
attribute-based models is beyond intransitivity because attribute-based models that 
cannot accommodate intransitivity in terms of weak stochastic transitivity still exhibit 
much stronger descriptive accuracy than alternative-based ones.24 This suggests that 
the attribute-based evaluation rule is probably more psychologically plausible than 
other evaluation rules (Vlaev, Chater, Stewart, & Brown, 2011). This idea is 
compatible with a recent eye-tracking study by Arieli et al. (2011). Their process-level 
eye-tracking data suggest that eye movements during decision making are made more 
often within attributes than within alternatives in intertemporal choice. This cognitive 
process strongly suggests that decision makers make attribute-based evaluation more 
often than alternative-based evaluation in intertemporal choice. 
                                                 
24 Note that, as shown in Chapter 2, in combination with the Luce specification most attribute-based 
models can accommodate relative-nonadditivity (an intransitive choice pattern) in terms of the violation 
of the product rule. However, no model, except for the full tradeoff model (TM), predicts intransitivity 
in terms of the violation of the weak stochastic transitivity. 
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5.2.2 Dynamic models 
Recently, dynamic diffusion models have been introduced to account for the 
stochastic components in value-based decision making including intertemporal choice 
(e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Usher & McClelland, 2004). For example, Dai 
and Busemeyer (2014) applied dynamic diffusion models to capture the stochastic 
variation in the choice process, which is viewed as a preference accumulation process. 
Correspondingly, a choice is made when the accumulated preference for an option 
reaches a threshold.  
Some other researchers extended dynamic diffusion models with the 
involvement of the process-level data, though outside of intertemporal choice (e.g., 
Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Towal, Mormann, & Koch, 2013). 
Particularly, Krajbich and colleagues made a crucial assumption that the speed of 
preference accumulation of an option depends on visual attention. Preference 
accumulation for an option will be accelerated when it is focused attention on. This 
approach has embraced great popularity and has accumulated evidence in many 
studies (Armel et al., 2008; Franco-Watkins et al., 2016; Krajbich et al., 2010; 
Krajbich & Rangel, 2011; Shimojo et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 2016 Störmer & 
Alvarez, 2016). Implicitly, these studies held an option-wise attention effect. 
Following this line of accounts, the study in Chapter 3 further suggests that not only 
does the attention effect operate in an option-wise way, it also operate in attribute-wise 
and component-wise ways.  
In addition, the study in Chapter 3 reveals background contrast effects on 
intertemporal choice, symbolising a violation of sequential independence. The order 
effect found in Experiment 2 of Chapter 4 further suggests a violation of sequential 
independence. Recently, Lempert, Glimcher and Phelps (2015) and Stewart et al. 
(2015) also provided evidence on how the revealed discount function, as well as the 
revealed utility function, for intertemporal choice varies according to the distributions 
of attribute values (either outcomes or delays) used in the experiment. A few models 
have offer accounts to the violations of sequential independence. For example, the 
Decision-by-Sampling model (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Stewart et al., 2015; 
DbS) assumes that the valuation of a quantity is relative but not absolute, which has 
its deep roots in psychophysics (Laming, 1997; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005). 
Models such as Decision-by-Sampling is also compatible with a constructive view of 
preference (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992). 
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5.2.3 A theory gap 
Models such as Decision-by-Sampling (Stewart et al., 2006) offer theoretical 
accounts for the constructive features of intertemporal choice or preference. Although 
they do not dictate that preferences are purely constructed, the inherent stability of 
preferences is rarely an integral part of these models. By contrast, static intertemporal 
choice models assume stable intertemporal preference but are unsurprisingly silent on 
the dynamic features that arise from the elicitation of intertemporal preference. There 
is a lack of theoretical linkage between the two voices. 
A possible solution to filling this gap is the Bayesian approach to human 
learning (Gopnik &. Tenenbaum, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Tenenbaum, 
Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). Within the Bayesian approach, time preference can be 
viewed as a mental construct with uncertainty and can be learnt or updated from 
repeated choices (Amir & Levav, 2008), interactions with the environment (Rieskamp, 
Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006), arbitrary anchoring (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2003) and peer influence (Narayan, Rao, & Saunders, 2011). Accordingly, the 
decision maker has a prior probabilistic distribution of his own time preference. 
Exposure to a tradeoff between the delays the outcome magnitude is regarded as a 
signal, or a piece of evidence, that decision makers takes into consideration when 
learning their own preference. With the piece of evidence, the prior distribution can 
be updated to a posterior distribution. This approach may also make a sensible link 
between the “trait” voice, which focuses on the prior or posterior distributions of the 
probabilistic time preference, and the “constructive” voice, which focuses on the 
evidence for preference updating. 
5.3 Extensions to Other Domains of Intertemporal Choice 
The thesis focuses on binary intertemporal choice between smaller-sooner (SS) 
and larger-later (LL) monetary gains, such as choosing between $100 in one year or 
$200 in two years. This is the most intensively employed paradigm in the study of 
intertemporal choice, but researchers have also used other paradigms to study 
intertemporal choice. These paradigms vary in different dimensions, including the 
response mode, single-dated outcomes vs. sequences of outcomes, the sign of 
outcomes (i.e., gains vs. losses), commodities (e.g., money vs. health). To further 
understand if the findings from the thesis can be extended to other domains of 
intertemporal choice, it is essential to consider the differences between these domains 
and to understand the cognitive processes underpinning those differences. By doing 
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so, researchers might also be able to judge whether the cognitive processes found to 
play a role in the binary SS-LL task can speak for the difference between intertemporal 
choices in different domains. 
5.3.1 Other response modes 
Although choice tasks are the most widely-used approach, some studies used 
other response modes such as matching (e.g., Attema et al, 2010; Olivola & Wang, 
2016; Read & Roelofsma, 2003) or pricing (e.g., Tversky, Slovic, & Kahneman, 1990) 
to study intertemporal choice. These studies suggest that response modes play a role 
in intertemporal choice. In the literature, one of the most prominent theoretical 
explanations for the role of response modes is scale compatibility by Amos Tversky 
and his colleagues (Slovic, Griffin, & Tversky, 1990; Tversky et al., 1990; Tversky, 
Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Scale compatibility means that an attribute looms larger 
when it is compatible with the response required. For example, when people are asked 
to indicate the amount of immediately available money equivalent to $100 in one year, 
the amount attribute is compatible with the response mode and thus its weight looms 
larger. By contrast, when people are asked to indicate the length of delay to the 
recipient of $50 that makes it equally valuable to $100 in one year, the delay attribute 
is compatible with the response mode and then looms larger. Consistent with the 
theoretical account, Tversky et al. (1990) found that people tended to be less impatient 
in pricing of delayed amounts, which loomed the amount attribute larger, than in 
choice between delayed amounts, which was supposed to be a neutral response mode 
(not triggering either attribute). Similarly, Read and Roelofsma (2003) found that 
people were less impatient in amount-matching than in binary choice and Olivola and 
Wang (2016) found that people were less impatient in the amount-matching task than 
in the delay-matching task.  
Scale compatibility is especially relevant to the attention effect in Chapter 3. 
Indeed, scale compatibility can be re-interpreted as the attribute-wise attention effect 
as the former suggests that when an attribute is compatible to the response mode, the 
comparison along that attribute looms and thus is overweighed. I conjecture that this 
compatibility-led overweight of an attribute could be an effect of contingent attention 
allocation. 
5.3.2 Sequences 
Studies also suggest that intertemporal choice of sequences is evaluated 
differently from intertemporal choice of single-date outcomes (e.g., Chapman, 1996a; 
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Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008; Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1993; Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991; Manzini, Mariotti, & Mittone, 2010; Read & 
Powell, 2002; Read & Scholten, 2012; Rubinstein, 2003; Scholten, Read, & Sanborn, 
2016). The most compelling finding in choice of intertemporal sequences is probably 
negative time preference, which refers to that people prefer a desired outcome to take 
place later, rather than earlier. For examples, in a choice between sequences in Figures 
5.1a and 5.1b. Many people tend to prefer the improving sequence in Figure 5.1a to 
the deteriorating sequence in Figure 5.1b, although the deteriorating sequence is 
superior to the improving one given any positive discount rate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Examples of improving and deteriorating sequences with an equal sum: 
(a) an improving sequence; (b) a deteriorating sequence. 
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However, negative time preference in intertemporal choice between sequences 
is not universal either (e.g., Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008; Gigliotti & Sopher, 1997; 
Manzini, Mariotti & Mittone, 2010; Scholten, Read & Sanborn, 2016). It interacts with 
many other factors including response mode (Frederick & Loewenstein, 2008). 
Frederick and Loewenstein (2008) further point out that it is lists of multiple motives 
that drive the preferences for the improving, the flat and the deteriorating sequences 
respectively. Specifically, they identified nine factors: (1) anticipation and dread, (2) 
contrast effects, (3) extrapolation, (4) uncertainty, (5) opportunity cost, (6) pure time 
preference, (7) diminishing marginal utility, (8) equity among selves and (9) divide 
equally heuristic. Among them, Factors 1-3 favour improving sequences, 4-6 favour 
deteriorating sequences and 7-9 favour flat sequences. The resulting preference could 
be the joint effect by all those motives and should depend on the features of the task 
that activate these motives. 
5.3.3 Losses 
Intertemporal choice of monetary payments or losses has also been studied 
(e.g., Estle et al., 2006; Hardisty et al., 2013; Ohmura et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2009; 
Yates & Watts, 1975), though much less often than monetary gains. These studies 
always compared gains with losses and have documented the evidence for the sign 
effect as discussed in Chapter 1. However, the psychological processes underlying 
intertemporal choice of losses per se are rarely discussed. Future research could pay 
more attention to the potential differences between the psychological processes of 
intertemporal choice between gains and intertemporal choice between losses. 
5.3.4 Non-monetary goods 
Intertemporal choice of non-monetary goods is an understudied area despite 
that studies often suggest commodity of the goods plays a role (Chapman 1996b; 
Charlton & Fantino, 2008; Estle et al., 2007; Odum et al., 2006; 2011; Odum & 
Rainaud, 2003; Reuben et al., 2010; Tsukayama & Duckworth, 2010; Ubfal, 2016) 
and that they are mostly more ecologically valid than intertemporal choice of monetary 
outcomes. The reasons for the lack of attention to intertemporal choice of non-
monetary goods is probably two-fold. First, the illiquidity of non-monetary goods 
makes them not easily tradable in a market, thus invalidating the Net Present Value 
(NPV) model to models such decisions. Second, because of satiation, the utility from 
consumption is not easy to capture for the Discounted Utility (DU) model. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the body of research on the discounting of non-monetary goods 
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always fall prey to such limitations. Future research could pay more attention to 
understanding the cognitive processes in intertemporal choice of non-monetary goods. 
5.4 Conclusion 
To conclude, the studies in this thesis cover several aspects of the cognitive 
processes involved in intertemporal choice, including the evaluation rules, the 
attention effects and the background contrast effect regarding intertemporal choice in 
general and decreasing impatience, a specific behavioural pattern in intertemporal 
choice. The findings not only improve our understanding of the cognitive and 
psychological underpinnings of this type of choice, but also offer insights to reconcile 
the conflicting findings documented in the literature. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 2A 
Method for maximum likelihood search 
Maximum log-likelihood, ln(Lqrs), was searched for each combination of 
model q, stochastic specification r and data set s. In principle, the search was 
implemented by the SIMPLEX algorithm with the fminsearch function in Matlab. 
However, because of both the high dimensionality of some models and the 
complexity and heterogeneity in the data sets, three more steps were taken to ensure 
the identification of the global maximum log-likelihood: 
1. The fminsearch function was repeated 20 times consecutively to guarantee the 
search for local optimum; 
2. Step 1 was run for 100 independent repetitions; 
3. Twenty of the 100 repetitions were preceded by the Metropolis-Hastings 
version of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampler for 50 thousand 
iterations each, which started with a random sample of parameters. 
The search domains were as indicated in Table 2.2. For parameters having an 
unbounded domain (i.e., +∞), +∞ was replaced by 1010 as the search domain. 
A total of 11,776 (256 data sets crossed by 46 models) maximum log-
likelihood values were obtained with this procedure. The 46 models included 15 core 
models crossed by 3 stochastic specifications plus 1 baseline model. 
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Appendix 2B 
Summary statistics of the 256 data sets involved in the model comparison 
Table A1 below shows the full list of the data sets involved in the model 
comparison in Chapter 2. The list consists of 256 data sets from 97 research articles 
or projects. Column Eligible indicates if a data set was eligible and thus included in 
the formal results. A Yes indicates that the data set passed the screening procedure 
based on the relative performance of formal models and the baseline model. A No 
indicates that the data set was excluded from formal analysis because the baseline 
model outperformed the formal models for the data set. Column Source shows the 
author(s) and the year of publication of the article or research project. Note that a 
research paper or project always appears more than once in the list because they mostly 
involved multiple experiments and/or multiple experimental conditions and different 
experiments/conditions were coded into different data sets. Column Experiment 
indicates the experiment ID from a research article or project. When only one 
experiment was involved, it is coded as 1. Column Number of Items, as the name 
suggests, indicates the number of binary intertemporal choice items in a data set. 
Column Number of Participants indicates the average number of participants’ 
responses across intertemporal choice items in a data set. Column Now-Later indicates 
whether a data set involved intertemporal choice(s) between an immediately available 
option and a delayed option. Column Later-Later indicates whether a data set involved 
intertemporal choice(s) between two delayed options.  
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Table A1 List of the data sets involved in the model comparison in Chapter 2. 
Eligible Source Experiment Number of Items 
Number of 
Participants Now-Later Later-Later 
Yes Acheson et al. (2011) 1 27 292.96 Yes No 
Yes Acheson et al. (2011) 1 27 202.93 Yes No 
Yes Andersen et al. (2008) 1 60 241.97 No Yes 
Yes Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) 1 21 93.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Appelhans et al. (2011) 1 147 95.88 Yes No 
Yes Ashraf et al. (2006) 1 4 1764.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Augustine and Larsen (2011) 1 27 33.96 Yes No 
Yes Augustine and Larsen (2011) 1 27 36.00 Yes No 
Yes Augustine and Larsen (2011) 2 27 30.96 Yes No 
Yes Augustine and Larsen (2011) 2 27 36.00 Yes No 
Yes Bauer et al. (2012) 1 10 544.00 No Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2010a) 1 46 35.93 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2010a) 1 46 38.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2010a) 2 24 54.96 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2010a) 2 24 166.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2010a) 2 24 95.00 Yes Yes 
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Yes Benjamin et al. (2010b) 1 24 210.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2013) 1 5 92.00 Yes No 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2013) 2 10 103.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Benjamin et al. (2013) 3 10 36.90 Yes Yes 
Yes Benningfield et al. (2014) 1 27 19.00 Yes No 
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Yes Bjork et al. (2004) 1 105 41.00 Yes No 
Yes Bjork et al. (2004) 1 105 31.00 Yes No 
Yes Bjork et al. (2004) 1 105 88.00 Yes No 
Yes Borghans and Golsteyn (2006) 1 10 1150.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Brase and Brase (2012) 1 27 255.00 Yes No 
Yes Campitelli and Labollita (2010) 1 3 157.00 Yes No 
Yes Chao et al. (2009) 1 27 184.59 Yes No 
Yes Chark et al. (2015) 1 20 125.00 No Yes 
Yes Chark et al. (2015) 3 30 64.00 No Yes 
Yes Chark et al. (2015) 2 20 1138.00 No Yes 
Yes Chen (2010 [Chinese]) 1a 2 57.50 Yes Yes 
Yes Cherniawsky and Holroyd (2013) 1 308 36.00 Yes No 
Yes Cherniawsky and Holroyd (2013) 1 308 36.00 Yes No 
Yes Cheung (2014) 1 40 81.00 No Yes 
Yes Chuang and Schechter (2015) 1 2 449.00 Yes No 
Yes Chuang and Schechter (2015) 2 2 195.00 Yes No 
Yes de Wit et al. (2007) 1 126 830.00 Yes No 
Yes Dittrich and Leipold (2014) 1 6 1019.00 No Yes 
Yes Dohmen et al. (2010) 1 20 500.00 Yes No 
Yes Doyle and Chen (2012) 1 33 64.00 Yes No 
Yes Doyle and Chen (2012) 2 33 38.00 Yes No 
Yes Doyle and Chen (2012) 3 40 37.00 Yes No 
Yes Drichoutis and Nayga Jr. (2013a) 1 30 86.00 No Yes 
Yes Drichoutis and Nayga Jr. (2013b) 1 30 33.00 No Yes 
Yes Drichoutis and Nayga Jr. (2013b) 1 30 23.00 No Yes 
Yes Drichoutis and Nayga Jr. (2013b) 1 30 30.00 No Yes 
Yes Duquette et al. (2012) 1 3 69.33 Yes No 
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Yes Enzler et al. (2014) 1 10 3157.00 Yes No 
Yes Epper et al. (2011) 1 38 112.00 No Yes 
Yes Ericson et al. (2015) 1 718 6.53 Yes Yes 
Yes Ericson et al. (2015) 1 720 6.82 Yes Yes 
Yes Ericson et al. (2015) 1 719 6.76 Yes Yes 
Yes Ericson et al. (2015) 1 720 6.48 Yes Yes 
Yes Ericson et al. (2015) 1 718 5.58 Yes Yes 
Yes Faralla et al. (2012) 1 120 25.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Field et al. (2006) 1 182 29.86 Yes No 
Yes Field et al. (2006) 1 182 90.00 Yes No 
Yes Fowler and Kam (2006) 1 20 245.00 No Yes 
Yes Freeman et al. (2013) 1 182 16.00 Yes No 
Yes Freeman et al. (2013) 1 182 16.00 Yes No 
Yes Fuchs (1982) 1 6 504.00 Yes No 
Yes Griskevicius et al. (2012) 2 20 82.00 No Yes 
Yes Griskevicius et al. (2012) 2 20 61.00 No Yes 
Yes Griskevicius et al. (2012) 2 20 62.00 No Yes 
Yes Han and Takahashi (2012) 1 273 50.00 Yes No 
Yes Han and Takahashi (2012) 1 273 50.00 Yes No 
Yes Hardisty and Weber (2009) 1 8 64.00 Yes No 
Yes Hardisty and Weber (2009) 2 8 116.00 Yes No 
Yes Hardisty et al. (2013) 1 229 1.48 Yes No 
Yes Hardisty et al. (2013) 1 27 116.00 Yes No 
Yes Hardisty et al. (2013) 2 3 87.00 Yes No 
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Yes Jimura et al. (2011) 1 6 20.00 Yes No 
Yes Jimura et al. (2011) 1 6 19.00 Yes No 
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Yes Kirby and Petry (2004) 1 27 44.00 Yes No 
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Yes Stillwell and Tunney (2012) 1 98 275.06 Yes No 
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Yes van der Wal et al. (2013) 1 7 24.00 Yes No 
Yes van der Wal et al. (2013) 2 27 15.33 Yes No 
Yes van der Wal et al. (2013) 3 7 21.00 Yes No 
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Yes Yamane et al. (2013) 1 75 17.00 Yes Yes 
Yes Yamane et al. (2013) 1 75 50.00 Yes Yes 
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No Benjamin et al. (2010a) 1 46 37.00 Yes Yes 
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No Franco-Watkins et al. (2010) 1 80 53.00 Yes No 
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No van der Wal et al. (2013) 2 27 15.33 Yes No 
No van der Wal et al. (2013) 2 27 14.00 Yes No 
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Appendix 2C 
Parameter Space Partitioning Search 
Some intertemporal choice models have irregular forms, so it is difficult to 
analytically derive their properties in accommodating the behavioural regularities. In 
such cases, Parameter Space Partitioning (Pitt et al., 2006), implemented by Markov 
chains, is applied to search the models’ parameter spaces, as well as stimulus spaces, 
to identify if a model is able to accommodate a specific behavioural regularity.  
Double-exponential discounting model. The qualitative properties of the 
double-exponential discounting model have rarely been discussed in the literature. we 
explore its ability to accommodate behavioural regularities by searching both its 
parameter space and a reasonable stimulus space (see Table A2). This search 
particularly identifies its ability to accommodate the delay effect and the common 
difference effect (and their reversals).  
 
Table A2 Search dimensions and domains for the double-exponential discounting 
model. 
Dimension Search domain 
 Delay effect Common difference effect 
β (0, 1) (0, 1) 
δ (0, 1) (0, 1) 
ω (0.5, 1) (0.5, 1) 
Δt (0, 50) (0, 50) 
tS (0, 10) [0, 10] 
tS2 - tS  (1, 50) 
Note. Parameter Space Partitioning search involves three parameters (β, δ and ω) and 
two (for the delay effect) or three (for the common difference effect) stimulus 
dimensions. Δt represents the interval between SS and LL and it is kept constant across 
pairs for the common difference effect. For the common difference effect, tS and tS2 
are the SS delay of the early- and later-onset pairs respectively  
 
For the delay effect, we compare the implied (exponential) discount factors for 
the smaller delay, tS, and the counterpart from the larger delay, tL (denoted as tS + Δt 
in Table A2) given the double-exponential discounting model and a set of parameter 
thereof. Specifically, with a set of parameters (β, δ and ω), the implied discount factors 
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for both the interval between 0 and tS and the interval between 0 and tL are estimated. 
Particularly, the implied per-period discount factor for a delay t is given as
  )0/(10 )1( o  tttt GZZEG . The results suggest that the implied discount factor is 
constantly larger for the longer delay (tL) than for the shorter one (tS) given any values 
from the parameter space and stimulus space, producing a delay effect. 
For the common difference effect and its reversal, we compare the implied 
discount rate over the interval Δt with an earlier onset, tS, and that from the later onset, 
tS2. The implied per-period discount factor over interval Δt with onset t is given as 
  tttt tt ttttt ' 'o '' /1)1( )1( GZZE GZZEG . The results suggest that the implied per-period discount 
factor over interval Δt is constantly larger for the larger onset delay (tS2) than for the 
smaller onset delay (tS), producing a common difference effect. 
Intertemporal choice heuristics (ITCH) model. Weak stochastic transitivity 
(WST) does not necessarily hold for the Intertemporal choice heuristics (ITCH) model. 
Thus, we use Parameter Space Partitioning to identify if it can accommodate two 
violations of the weak stochastic transitivity: subadditivity and superadditivity.  
Following Scholten et al. (2014), I used a tuple of three intertemporal choice 
items for this search. The three options are denoted as SS (xS, tS), MM (xM, tM) and LL 
(xL, tL) respectively with 0 < xS< xM < xL and 0 ≤ tS< tM < tL. We simulate binary choices 
between any of the three pairs of options based on a sample of parameters from the 
ITCH model. Intertemporal choice is subadditive if SS is preferred to MM, MM is 
preferred to LL but LL is preferred to SS (subadditivity: SS ≻ MM, MM ≻ LL, SS ≺ 
LL). Intertemporal choice is superadditive if LL is preferred to MM, MM is preferred 
to SS but SS is preferred to LL (superadditivity: SS ≺ MM, MM ≺ LL, SS ≻ LL). To 
facilitate the search process, the SS outcome (xS) and the SS delay (tS) are set to 1 
respectively. The search process involves both the parameter space (κ, wt and wx) and 
the stimulus space (tM, tL, xM and xL) as shown in Table A3. From the search of both 
the parameter and stimulus spaces, we identify that the ITCH model could 
accommodate both subadditivity and superadditivity in terms of the violation of WST. 
Table A3 also gives examples of parameters and stimuli when the model 
accommodates subadditivity and superadditivity respectively. However, because this 
feature is unsystematic for  the ITCH model, it is not featured in Table 2.3. 
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Table A3 Search dimensions, domains and examples for the intertemporal choice 
heuristics model (ITCH). 
Dimension Search domain Examples 
  Subadditivity Superadditivity 
κ (e−20, e20) 6.062 0.099 
wt (0, 1) 0.109 0.878 
wx (0, 1) 0.608 0.064 
tM (0, 10) 5.029 5.780 
tL (10, 50) 28.031 44.830 
xM (0, 10) 9.952 1.743 
xL (10, 50) 45.924 33.511 
Note. Examples of ITCH accommodating subadditivity and superadditivity 
respectively were provided by the search algorithm.  
 
Reference 
Pitt, M. A., Kim, W., Navarro, D. J., & Myung, J. I. (2006). Global model analysis 
by parameter space partitioning. Psychological Review, 113 (1), 57–83. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.113.1.57  
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Appendix 2D 
Relative nonadditivity 
In combination with the Luce specification, all attribute-based models (except 
for the proportional difference model (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016; PD)), can 
accommodate relative nonadditivity in terms of the violation of the product rule. The 
cases for the full tradeoff model (TM) and basic tradeoff model 1 (Scholten & Read, 
2013; BTMSR) have been illustrated in Scholten et al. (2014, pp.420) with a numerical 
example. This appendix shows this feature for the five attribute-based models with a 
formal proof. It also shows why the PD model (Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016; PD) 
do not have this feature. 
Proof. 
Following Scholten et al. (2014), I used a tuple of three options to examine 
whether each attribute-based model could produce the pattern of relative nonadditivity 
in terms of the violation of the product rule. The three options are denoted as SS (xS, 
tS), MM (xM, tM) and LL (xL, tL) respectively with 0 < xS< xM < xL and 0 ≤ tS< tM < tL. 
The product rule of transitivity suggests that the odd of choosing LL in a choice 
between LL and SS should be the product of the odd of choosing LL in a choice 
between LL and MM and the odd of choosing MM in a choice between MM and SS: 
i.e., Ω(LL, SS) = Ω(LL, MM) × Ω(MM, SS). If Ω(LL, SS) ≠ Ω(LL, MM) × Ω(MM, 
SS), it means that the choice pattern is intransitive or nonadditive (violating the 
product rule). Specifically, the choice pattern is subadditive if Ω(LL, SS) > Ω(LL, 
MM) × Ω(MM, SS) and superadditive if Ω(LL, SS) < Ω(LL, MM) × Ω(MM, SS). 
Relative nonadditivity in the violation of the product rule means that the ratio 
Ω(LL,SS) 
Ω(LL,MM) × Ω(MM,SS) decreases as the amounts (xS, xM and xL) increase in proportion. 
Combined with the Luce specification, the ratio can be written as a function of 
advantages functions (outcome advantage V(.) and time advantage Q(.)): 
Ω(LL,SS) 
Ω(LL,MM) × Ω(MM,SS) =
(𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝐿) 𝑄(𝑡𝑆,𝑡𝐿) 
)
1 𝜀⁄
(𝑉(𝑥𝑀,𝑥𝐿) 𝑄(𝑡𝑀,𝑡𝐿) 
)
1 𝜀⁄
 ×(𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝑀) 𝑄(𝑡𝑆,𝑡𝑀) 
)
1 𝜀⁄
= ( 𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝐿)𝑉(𝑥𝑀,𝑥𝐿)∙𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝑀))
1 𝜀⁄ ∙
(𝑄(𝑡𝑀,𝑡𝐿)∙𝑄(𝑡𝑆,𝑡𝑀) 𝑄(𝑡𝑆,𝑡𝐿) )
1 𝜀⁄
. 
Let xM = a × xS and xL= b × xS (1 < a < b) and g(xS) =
𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝐿)
𝑉(𝑥𝑀,𝑥𝐿)∙𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑥𝑀)
=
𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑏𝑥𝑆)
𝑉(𝑎𝑥𝑆,𝑏𝑥𝑆)∙𝑉(𝑥𝑆,𝑎𝑥𝑆)
. It is obvious that Ω(LL,SS) Ω(LL,MM) × Ω(MM,SS) is a monotonically increasing 
  156 
function of g(xS). Thus, for each model, to determine whether it accommodate relative 
nonadditivity in terms of the violation of the product rule, we need only to know if 
g(xS) is a monotonically decreasing function of xS. If, for a model, g(xS) is a 
monotonically decreasing function of xS, then 
Ω(LL,SS) 
Ω(LL,MM) × Ω(MM,SS)  decreases as xS 
increases, showing that the model, in combination with the Luce specification, 
produces a pattern of relative nonadditivity in the violation of the product rule. 
Otherwise, this model does not reliably predict a pattern of relative nonadditivity in 
terms of the violation of the product rule. 
Full Tradeoff Model (Scholten et al., 2014; TM). For TM, g(xS) = 
𝛾(log(1+𝛾𝑏𝑥𝑆)−log(1+𝛾𝑥𝑆))
(log(1+𝛾𝑏𝑥𝑆)−log(1+𝛾𝑎𝑥𝑆))∙(log(1+𝛾𝑎𝑥𝑆)−log(1+𝛾𝑥𝑆))
 
The derivative g’(xS) = 
−
𝛾2( 𝑏−𝑎
(𝑏𝛾𝑥𝑆+1)(log(1+𝑎𝛾𝑥𝑆)−log(1+𝑏𝛾𝑏𝑥𝑆))
2+
𝑎−1
(𝛾𝑥𝑆+1)(log(1+𝛾𝑥𝑆)−log(1+𝑎𝛾𝑥𝑆))
2)
𝑎𝛾𝑥𝑆+1
 < 0 for any 
parameter and stimulus values in the domain. Thus, g(xS) is a monotonically 
decreasing function of xS and the full tradeoff model can accommodate relative 
nonadditivity in terms of the violation of the product rule. 
Basic Tradeoff Model 1 (Scholten & Read, 2013; BTMSR). g(xS) for BTMSR 
is the same as g(xS) for the full tradeoff model above. Thus BTMSR, in combination 
with the Luce specification, can also accommodate relative nonadditivity in terms of 
the violation of the product rule.  
Basic Tradeoff Model 2 (Dai & Busemeyer, 2014; BTMDB). g(xS) for 
BTMDB is: 
g(xS) =  
(𝑏𝑥𝑆)𝛾−𝑥𝑆𝛾
((𝑏𝑥𝑆)𝛾−(𝑎𝑥𝑆)𝛾)∙((𝑎𝑥𝑆)𝛾−𝑥𝑆𝛾)
. 
The derivative g’(xS) = −
𝛾( 1
(𝑏𝑥𝑆)
𝛾−(𝑎𝑥𝑆)
𝛾+
1
(𝑎𝑥𝑆)
𝛾−𝑥𝑆𝛾
)
𝑥𝑆
 < 0 for any parameter and stimulus 
values in the domain. Thus, BTMDB can accommodate relative nonadditivity in terms 
of the violation of the product rule. 
Intertemporal choice heuristics model (Ericson et al., 2015; ITCH). g(xS) 
for the ITCH model is: 
g(xS) =  
(1−𝑤𝑥)(𝑏−1)𝑥𝑆+2𝑤𝑥𝑏−1𝑏+1
((1−𝑤𝑥)(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑆+2𝑤𝑥𝑏−𝑎𝑏+𝑎)((1−𝑤𝑥)(𝑎−1)𝑥𝑆+2𝑤𝑥
𝑎−1
𝑎+1)
. 
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g’(xS)=
−
(𝑎+1)(𝑏−1)(1−𝑤𝑥)(𝑎+𝑏)((𝑎+1)(𝑏−1)(1−𝑤𝑥)2(𝑎+𝑏)𝑥𝑆2+4(𝑎+1)(1−𝑤𝑥)(𝑎+𝑏)𝑤𝑥𝑥𝑆+8𝑎𝑤𝑥2)
(𝑎−1)(𝑏+1)(𝑏−𝑎)((𝑎+1)(𝑎+𝑏)(1−𝑤𝑥)2𝑥𝑆2+2(2𝑎+𝑏+1)(1−𝑤𝑥)𝑤𝑥𝑥𝑆+4𝑤𝑥2)
2  < 0 
for any parameter and stimulus values in the domain. Thus, the ITCH model can 
accommodate relativity nonadditivity in terms of the violation of the product rule. 
Difference-ratio-interest-finance-time model (Read et al., 2013; DRIFT). 
For the DRIFT model, 
g(xS) =  
((1−𝑤𝐼)(1−𝑤𝑅)(𝑏−1)𝑥𝑆+𝑤𝑅(𝑏−1)+𝑤𝐼(𝑏
1
𝑡𝐿−𝑡𝑆−1))
((1−𝑤𝐼)(1−𝑤𝑅)(𝑏−𝑎)𝑥𝑆+𝑤𝑅
(𝑏−𝑎)
𝑎 +𝑤𝐼((
𝑏
𝑎)
1
𝑡𝐿−𝑡𝑀−1))((1−𝑤𝐼)(1−𝑤𝑅)(𝑎−1)𝑥𝑆+𝑤𝑅(𝑎−1)+𝑤𝐼(𝑎
1
𝑡𝐿−𝑡𝑆−1))
. 
The derivative, g’(xS), becomes intractable and we do not have an analytical solution 
to determining whether g’(xS) is constantly negative given any parameter and stimulus 
values. Instead, we used the fmincon function in Matlab (with the “interior-point” 
optimisation algorithm) to determine whether g’(xS) is constantly negative given any 
parameter and stimulus values. Extensive search of the parameter and the stimulus 
spaces suggests that g’(xS) for the DRIFT model is constantly negative given any 
parameter and stimulus values. Thus, the DRIFT model can also accommodate relative 
nonadditivity in terms of the violation of the product rule. 
Proportional difference model (PD). For the proportional difference model, 
g(xS) =  
(𝑏−1𝑏 )
(𝑏−𝑎𝑏 )∙(
𝑎−1
𝑎 )
. It is obvious that xS is cancelled out in g(xS). So this model is silent 
on relative nonadditivity. 
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Appendix 3A 
Cognitive Reflection Test 
 
Please answer the following questions by checking the answer you think is correct. 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
$0.05 
$0.10 
$0.50 
$1.00 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets?  
5 minutes 
100 minutes 
20 minutes 
500 minutes 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the lake?  
47 days 
24 days 
36 days 
29 days 
 
Note. The order of the options in each CRT question was shuffled. 
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Appendix 3B 
Demographic information questions 
 
Please provide some demographic information below. All information you provide 
will be kept anonymous and confidential and will only be used for group analysis 
 
1.What is your gender?  
Female 
Male 
 
2.What is your age in years? _______ 
 
3.What is the highest education degree you have earned 
Less than high school 
High school 
Bachelor's degree or equivalent 
Master's degree or equivalent 
Doctoral degree or equivalent 
Others 
 
4.Have you taken any university-level courses in the following subjects? (please 
check all that apply)  
Economics 
Psychology 
Finance 
Mathematics 
Statistics 
None of the above 
 
5.What is your race?  
White/Caucasian 
African American 
Hispanic 
Asian 
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Native American 
Pacific Islander 
Others 
 
6.What is your current employment status?  
Full-time employed 
Part-time employed 
Self-employed 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Full-time student 
Others 
 
7. Please provide a rough estimate of the total combined income of all members of 
your household in the last year.  
Less than $20,000 
$20,000 - $39,999 
$40,000 - $59,999 
$60,000 - $79,999 
$80,000 or more 
Prefer not to answer 
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Appendix 3C 
Results relating to cognitive reflection 
Aside from attention manipulation, the two experiments also measured 
participants’ level of cognitive reflection with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005). To test the potential effects of cognitive reflection and its interaction 
effect with manipulated attention on intertemporal preference, participants in both 
experiments were further divided into two sub-groups according to their performance 
in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Those who correctly answered all three 
questions in CRT are considered high in cognitive reflection and others low in 
cognitive reflection.  
 
Table A4 Parameter estimation from models involving cognitive reflection. 
Fixed-effect Parameter Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Attention β1 0.532 [0.452, 0.613] -0.177 [-0.256, -0.100] 
Background Contrast β2 0.062 [0.052, 0.072] -0.057 [-0.067, -0.048] 
Attention × 
Background Contrast β3 -0.009 [-0.033, 0.015] -0.028 [-0.055, -0.003] 
CRT β4 0.743 [0.664, 0.824] 0.641 [0.563, 0.720] 
Attention × CRT β5 -0.652 [-0.811, -0.493] -0.292 [-0.451, -0.136] 
Background Contrast 
× CRT β6 0.034 [0.017, 0.050] -0.005 [-0.021, 0.012] 
Attention × 
Background Contrast 
× CRT 
β7 -0.015 [-0.048, 0.017] 0.014 [-0.047, 0.019] 
Note. Attention is an effect-coded variable: -0.5 = delay-focus; 0.5 = outcome-focus. 
Background contrast ranges from -1 (dominated by all other LL options) to 1 
(dominating all other LL options). CRT is also an effect-coded variable: -0.5 = low 
cognitive reflection; 0.5 = high cognitive reflection. The estimates outside the 
brackets are the median (Md) and the estimates in the brackets are the 95% High 
Density Intervals (95% HDIs) of the 150,000 samples from the posterior distribution. 
The 95% HDIs of the cells in boldface do not cross 0. 
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Table A4 presents the results from the mixed-effect Bayesian models 
involving cognitive reflection from the two experiments respectively. First of all, 
comparisons with Table 3.1 (pp. 69 in the thesis) and Table 3.2 (pp. 73 in the thesis) 
suggest that involving cognitive reflection in the model does not change the results 
regarding the attention effects and the background contrast effects. Thus this is a 
further robustness check of the main findings from Chapter 3. Second, consistent with 
findings from Frederick (2005), the main effect of cognitive reflection suggests that 
participants with high cognitive reflection were less impatient than those with low 
cognitive reflection in both experiments.  
 
Table A5 Average proportions of LL choices in the two experiments, segregated by 
cognitive reflection groups. 
EXPERIMENT 1: ATTENTION TO LL COMPONENTS 
Cognitive reflection Attention condition 
 Delay-focus Outcome-focus 
High 39.7% (N = 42) 44.1% (N = 53) 
Low 21.4% (N = 48) 35.7% (N = 43) 
Difference between LL 
proportions of high- and 
low-cognitive-reflection 
groups 
18.3% 8.4% 
EXPERIMENT 2: ATTENTION TO SS COMPONENTS 
Cognitive reflection Attention condition 
 Delay-focus Outcome-focus 
High 50.4% (N = 43) 45.5% (N = 47) 
Low 37.1% (N = 53) 37.2% (N = 50) 
Difference between LL 
proportions of high- and 
low-cognitive-reflection 
groups 
13.3% 8.3% 
 
Third, the effect of cognitive reflection on intertemporal choice differs across 
attention conditions. In particular, in Experiment 1 outcome-focus, compared with 
delay-focus, attenuates the effect of cognitive reflection on impatience in 
intertemporal preference. The top panel of Table A5 presents an intuitive illustration 
of this effect. In the delay-focus condition, the difference between the LL proportion 
of low-cognitive-reflection participants and the LL proportion of high-cognitive-
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reflection participants is 18.3%, whereas the difference in the outcome-focus 
condition is only 8.4%. Similarly, in Experiment 2, outcome-focus also reduces the 
effect of cognitive reflection on impatience in intertemporal preference. As shown in 
the bottom panel of Table A5, the difference between the overall LL proportion from 
the participants with high cognitive-reflection and the overall LL proportion from the 
participants with low cognitive-reflection in the outcome-focus condition (8.3%) is 
smaller than the difference in the delay-focus condition (13.3%). Collectively, the 
moderation of manipulated attention on the effect of cognitive reflection on 
intertemporal preference suggested that excessive impatience among people with low 
cognitive reflection could be, at least, partially attributable to inattention or a lack of 
attention to outcomes and more attention to delays. 
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Appendix 4A 
Consideration of Future Consequences scale 
 
We will ask you to evaluate how much a number of statements are 
characteristic of you. Please click on the appropriate box for each statement. 
1. I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence them with my 
behaviour. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
2. I often do things to achieve outcomes that may not result for many years. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns. The future will take care of itself. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
4. My behaviour is only influenced by the effects it will have in a matter of days 
or weeks. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
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5. Convenience is a big factor in my choices and actions. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
6. I will sacrifice immediate happiness to achieve future outcomes. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
7. It is important to pay attention to warnings even when they are about outcomes 
that will not occur for many years. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
8. It is better to do things with large delayed effects than things with small 
immediate effects. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
9. I usually ignore warnings about possible future problems. They can be 
resolved later, before they reach crisis level. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
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Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
10. Sacrifices here and now are usually unnecessary. The future can be dealt with 
at a later time. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns. I will take care of future problems at 
a later date. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
12. My day to day work has immediate affects, so it is more important to me than 
behaviour that has distant affects. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
 
13. I always think about how what I decide might affect me in the future. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
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Extremely characteristic 
 
14. My behaviour is usually affected by future consequences. 
Extremely uncharacteristic  
Somewhat uncharacteristic  
Uncertain  
Somewhat characteristic  
Extremely characteristic 
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Appendix 4B 
Screening items for Experiment 1 in Chapter 4 
 
Condition Option A Option B 
No-FED £37 today £25 in 17 days 
No-FED £84 today £70 in 95 days 
No-FED £62 today  £60 in 169 days 
FED £37 in 100 days £25 in 117 days 
FED £84 in 100 days £70 in 195 days 
FED £62 in 100 days £60 in 269 days 
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Appendix 4C 
Demographic information questions 
 
Please provide some demographic information below. All information you 
provide will be kept anonymous and confidential and will only be used for 
group analysis 
 
1. What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
Others/Prefer not to say (3) 
 
2. What year were you born? _____________ 
 
3. Which country do you come from? _____________ 
 
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Less than secondary school 
Secondary school 
Some university 
Bachelor's degree 
Master's degree 
Doctoral degree 
Professional degree (JD, MD) 
 
5. What is your employment status? 
Full-time 
Part-time  
Unemployed 
Other 
 
6. Please indicate your current family structure. 
Single without children 
Single with children 
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Married without children 
Married with children 
Life partner without children 
Life partner with children  
